Cisco 300-215 Dumps

If IPS and SIEM logs do not give enough insight into a file's behavior, the next logical step is to review theAntivirus solutionlogs. These logs often provide detailed behavior analytics such as:

File actions and access patterns

Registry modifications

File execution history

The Cisco CyberOps guide emphasizes AV logs as critical forensic artifacts for understanding endpoint-based infections, especially when beaconing or suspicious activity is suspected.

To prepare a post-incident report, thecauseof the incident (what enabled it) and theeffect(what damage was done) are the primary components analyzed first. This allows teams to understand vulnerabilities exploited and the consequences, forming the basis for corrective action.

The Cisco CyberOps guide recommends beginning withroot cause analysisfollowed by impact assessment to guide future prevention strategies.

According to the Cisco CyberOps Associate guide, the goal of a root cause analysis is to determine how an attacker successfully exploited a system so that similar vulnerabilities can be mitigated in the future. The "method of infection" (e.g., phishing email with malicious attachment, drive-by download, credential compromise, etc.) is the most relevant factor in understanding the initial access vector and subsequent spread of ransomware across the network.

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YARA rulesare primarily used for malware classification and detection based onbinary pattern matchingwithin files. They describe sequences of bytes, strings, and other file characteristics found in malicious binaries.

The Cisco CyberOps Associate guide explains:"YARA rules operate by inspecting binary data using conditions and string matches to identify specific patterns that indicate known malware samples.".

According to the Cisco Certified CyberOps Associate guide (Chapter 5 - Identifying Attack Methods), attachments in emails—especially with file extensions like.xlsm—are high-risk indicators when analyzing suspicious or phishing emails. Malicious actors often use macro-enabled Excel files (.xlsm) as a payload delivery mechanism for malware or other exploits. These attachments are typically disguised as legitimate content such as refunds or invoices to trick the recipient into opening them.

The presence of“Card_Refund_18_6913.xlsm”is a strongIndicator of Compromise (IoC), as.xlsmfiles can contain VBA macros capable of executing malicious code. This matches exactly with examples provided in the study material discussing how macro-based payloads are delivered and recognized.

Hence,option Cis the most direct indicator of attack in this email.

The exhibit shows multipleARP reply packetswith the same IP addresses (192.168.51.105and192.168.51.201) being mapped todifferent MAC addresses, which triggers the message: "duplicate use of [IP] detected". This is a strong indicator of anARP spoofing(or poisoning) attack.

ARP spoofing occurs when a malicious actor sends falsified ARP messages to associate their MAC address with the IP address of another host. This misleads other devices on the network and allows interception or redirection of traffic.

The Cisco CyberOps Associate guide specifically recommendsconfiguring port securityon switches as a method tomitigate ARP spoofing, by limiting the number of MAC addresses allowed per port or statically assigning legitimate MAC addresses to switch ports.

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) offers features like:

File trajectory: to track file behavior and spread across endpoints.

Orbital Advanced Search: for querying endpoint data to detect threats in real time.

The use of repetitive patterns in images is a known indicator of steganography, which is an anti-forensics technique used to hide malicious code or files inside seemingly benign content such as image or audio files. The repetitive patterns suggest that the image may contain embedded hidden data. This technique is particularly difficult to detect through conventional scanning or antivirus software.

According to theCyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) 300-215 study guide, steganography is defined as “concealing malicious content or instructions within ordinary files such as .jpg, .png, or audio files, allowing the content to bypass security filters and reach the target system without detection”.

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Dynamic malware analysis involves executing the malware in a controlled environment to observe its behavior, such as file creation, network traffic, or system modifications. Asandboxis designed for this purpose—it safely executes and monitors suspicious code without risking the host system. The other tools (Decompiler, Unpacker, Disassembler) are primarily used in static analysis.

Correct answer: D. Sandbox

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Fileless malwareoperates in memory and often leverages legitimate tools such asPowerShellto avoid traditional file-based detection. Since these threats don't leave typical file traces, analysts must rely onPowerShell event logsto trace suspicious or unauthorized script execution.

The Cisco CyberOps Associate guide explicitly states:

“PowerShell logs provide insight into script block execution and can reveal indicators of fileless attacks that reside in memory.”

Hence,PowerShell event logsare the most effective forensic source for detecting fileless malware activity on Windows systems.

The code in the exhibit is written in Python. Here’s how we can confirm:

The function definition uses Python syntax: def function_name(args):

It uses the b64encode and decode functions — typical of Python’s base64 module.

Data structures such as dictionaries are used with curly braces (e.g., form_data = {entry1: enc1, ...}).

The conditional syntax uses “if r.status_code == 200:” which is Pythonic.

The request object “r = post(...)” and use of headers show standard use of the Python requests library.

This type of script is typical in exfiltration scenarios where encoded information is sent via a web form (in this case Google Forms), bypassing detection systems.

The STIX data structure shows apatternfield with this entry:

file:hashes.'SHA-256' = '3299f07bc0711b3587fe8a1c6bf3ee6cbcc14cb775f64b28a61d72ebcb8968d3'

This value is aSHA-256 file hash, a well-knownindicator of compromise (IoC)for identifying malicious files.

Therefore, the correct answer is:

A. SHA256 file hash.

The correct registry path to investigate user profiles and login details is:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList

This location stores information about each user profile on the machine, including login activity and the LastWrite time for forensic tracking.

The scenario describes an attack vector where insiders or malicious actors useremovable media (USB drives)to introduce malware, which then connects to external sources to exfiltrate data and compromise systems.

Option B addresses the human factor and technological prevention. The guide stresses the need for training to ensure users are aware of social engineering and removable media risks. Blocking the use of USB drives at a system level further minimizes attack vectors.

Option E, usingMulti-Factor Authentication (MFA), provides an additional layer of defense. Even if credentials are stolen, MFA can prevent the attacker from accessing sensitive internal resources without the second authentication factor.

These controls align with defense-in-depth strategies recommended in the Cisco CyberOps Associate curriculum to combat insider threats and external unauthorized access.

YARA rulesare designed to identifyfilesthat match specific patterns, strings, or binary characteristics.

The Cisco CyberOps guide states:

“YARA helps researchers and analysts identify and classify malware samples based on textual or binary patterns”.

The STIX intelligence feed in the exhibit identifies specific malicious domains, such as:

fightcovid19.shop

nocovid19.shop

stopcovid19.shop

These are categorized as “Malicious FQDN Indicator.” The recommended cybersecurity actions when such threat intelligence is received are:

D. Block network access to identified domains: This directly prevents users or systems from communicating with known malicious infrastructure and is a critical first step in threat mitigation.

B. Add a SIEM rule to alert on connections to identified domains: This ensures that any attempted communication with these domains is flagged for immediate review and action, enabling real-time threat detection and incident response.

Blocking all .shop domains (Option A or C) would be overbroad and potentially disruptive, as many legitimate websites also use that TLD. Option E (routing to block hole) could be valid as a DNS strategy, but B and D represent the most actionable and precise responses per standard incident response practices.

The log entry shows a failed SSH login attempt for an invalid user “admin” from IP192.168.1.100. As the system has just gone live and no legitimate use is expected, this could be an early reconnaissance or brute-force attempt. However, blocking IPs or resetting passwords without fully understanding the context could lead to incomplete remediation or false positives.

According to Cisco CyberOps best practices, the first step is to thoroughly investigate the alert by correlating it with other logs (e.g., authentication logs, IDS/IPS logs) to determine the intent and scope of activity.

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According to theCyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) 300-215 study guidecurriculum, command-and-control (C2) communication is a strong indicator that a system has already been compromised and is actively under the control of an attacker. Sudden outbound traffic to high-risk regions and resolution of known malicious domains are high-confidence signs of an active threat. Therefore, prioritizing detection and disruption of this outbound traffic is critical to prevent further damage or data exfiltration.

While monitoring vulnerability exploitation (B) and gathering port scan data (D) are also valuable, they are more preventive or forensic in nature. The most immediate threat—and therefore the top priority—is stopping active C2 communications.

Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) is a tunneling protocol used to encapsulate a wide variety of network layer protocols inside point-to-point connections. If packets encapsulated with GRE are bypassing monitoring tools, it's likely due to tunneling—where payloads are hidden within another protocol. Tunneling can obscure malicious content or lateral movement in a network and is a common method used in data exfiltration.

Once an incident has occurred, the appropriate course of action is to engage the organization's Incident Response (IR) plan. This is a structured approach to contain, analyze, and eradicate threats before they spread across the network.

The Cisco CyberOps Associate study guide emphasizes:

“Incident response and handling are essential within an organization… The main objective of implementing an incident handling process is to reduce the impact of a cyber-attack, ensure the damages caused are assessed, and implement recovery procedures”.

In particular, the containment phase of IR is focused on isolating the threat and preventing lateral movement or further compromise.

Options such as "root cause" or "attack surface" are relevant at later stages of analysis and mitigation, not immediate containment. Therefore, the correct answer is C.

When analyzing suspicious files in a sandbox environment, a security analyst focuses on identifying and evaluating their behavior in a controlled setting to confirm potential malicious activity:

Inspect processes (B): Observing the processes that the file spawns or injects into during execution helps identify malicious actions or privilege escalation. This is a crucial part of dynamic analysis in the sandbox environment.

Inspect PE header (E): The PE (Portable Executable) header contains metadata about how the file will execute on Windows systems. It reveals details such as the entry point, libraries used, and whether the file is suspiciously crafted or packed, which can be strong indicators of malicious behavior.

The other options (A, C, D) are important in the broader forensic analysis, but within thesandbox dynamic analysis, focusing on process behavior and file execution headers is critical for determining how the file interacts with the system and whether it is indeed malicious.

The Cisco study material recommends integrating automation for log/event collection and contextual analysis to reduce detection delays and ensure rapid identification of anomalies. It also emphasizes the need for pre-defined roles and documented steps in anIncident Handling Playbook, following NIST SP 800-61 Rev.2 standards, to improve consistency and readiness during incidents.

TheCisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense (Firepower)includes advanced capabilities such as intrusion prevention, URL filtering, and deep packet inspection. According to the CyberOps guide, it can detect and block C2 communications by analyzing traffic patterns and comparing them to threat intelligence data. The guide specifically states: "Advanced solutions such as Firepower provide detection capabilities for command and control (C2) traffic by identifying unusual outbound connections and behavioral anomalies".

A disassembler is a forensic and reverse engineering tool that translates machine-level code (binary) back into human-readable assembly language. This is used during static malware analysis to understand how the malware is constructed and what it is designed to do without actually executing the code.

According to theCyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) 300-215 study guide, “Disassembler tools are used to assist with reverse malware engineering by allowing a security professional to examine the binary and understand the functionality of the malware code”.

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According to theCyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) 300-215 study guide, during thepost-incident activityphase, it is critical to analyze lessons learned and update processes to ensure quicker and more efficient response in the future. Specifically:

Introducing a priority rating for incident response workloads(A) helps address the issue of team members being occupied with other tasks and unable to prioritize abnormal system activity. This ensures incidents are handled based on severity, not just workload.

Creating an executive team delegation plan(D) addresses the issue of delays due to unavailability of management for approvals. It ensures alternative decision-makers are available for swift action.

These strategies are based on the NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2 recommendations and are highlighted in the Cisco guide’s post-incident activity phase (page 418), which emphasizeslessons learnedand how to reduce detection and response times for future incidents.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation:

From the exhibit, Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (formerly Threat Grid) has captured outbound HTTP POST communication to the IP address 51.38.124.206 on port 80. This destination is highlighted in the analysis under “Outbound HTTP POST Communications,” indicating exfiltration behavior or command-and-control (C2) signaling.

Key indicators:

The report shows that binary data was POSTed to this IP.

The source system generated 22 packets and sent 6,192 bytes.

The system has flagged the behavior with a severity of 25 and confidence of 25—suggesting that this is an IoC worth acting on.

Therefore, the artifacts suggest that the destination IP 51.38.124.206 is involved in malicious activity, and the correct answer is:

Answer: A. Destination IP 51.38.124.206 is identified as malicious.

In highly sensitive environments such as secure government networks, the presence of anomalous DLL injection, beaconing to known interception points, and signs of encrypted data exfiltration constitutes a critical incident. The appropriate response in such classified contexts involves:

Invoking a pre-established, classified incident response protocol,

Immediately notifying national cyber defense operatives (such as national CERT or military cyber command),

Prioritizing containment to stop lateral spread,

Proceeding with eradication of malware or backdoors.

This response sequence aligns with the high-severity, immediate-response model described in the Cisco CyberOps Associate v1.2 curriculum under national defense and classified incident frameworks. The study guide emphasizes the importance of stakeholder communication and multi-agency coordination during advanced persistent threat (APT) intrusions involving critical infrastructure or defense systems.

The described scenario includes both internal alerts (unusual network traffic, failed logins, suspicious file access) and external intelligence indicating active ransomware campaigns in the same industry. This constitutes a strong combination of precursors and indicators, as defined in the NIST SP 800-61 incident handling model and reinforced in the Cisco CyberOps Associate curriculum.

According to the Cisco guide:

“Once an incident has occurred, the IR team needs to contain it quickly before it affects other systems and networks within the organization.”

“The containment phase is crucial in stopping the threat from spreading and compromising more systems”.

Given these indicators and the high-value nature of the data involved, it is essential to proactively isolate suspected systems and activate the incident response plan to prevent damage from potential ransomware.

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The XML structure shows that:

The file namestarts with:"Final Report"

The file extensionequals:"doc.exe"

Together, this forms"Final Report.doc.exe"— a knowndouble-extensiontechnique used todisguise executablesas benign documents. This is a red flag in email forensics, commonly linked tomalware distribution, and explicitly covered in the Cisco CyberOps study material as a typicalevasion methodfor malicious attachments.

TCPdumpis a CLI-based packet capture tool that is widely used for real-time traffic inspection and analysis on Unix/Linux systems.

TCPsharkis a variant CLI tool used similarly for packet analysis.

AlthoughWiresharkis a powerful network protocol analyzer, it requires a GUI. Therefore, it is not suitable for environments without a graphical interface.

When Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) are configured to block specific patterns (like${), attackers may bypass this using URL encoding (e.g.,%24%7B). In such cases, the WAF must decode these patterns before applying matching rules. EnablingURL decodingensures the WAF recognizes encoded payloads and applies protections appropriately. This is a recommended hardening strategy against bypass techniques for command injection and remote code execution.

Theroot cause analysisin incident response focuses on identifying theinitial trigger or root causeof the incident to understand how it started and how to prevent recurrence. In this scenario, thephishing email sent to the victim(A) is the initial trigger that led to the employee’s action of clicking the malvertising link, resulting in the malware download.

The other options represent later stages in the incident response cycle, such as detection (SIEM alert, cybersecurity team’s alert) or supporting evidence (email header information), but they do not address the root cause, which is thephishing email itself.

This aligns with theCyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) 300-215 study guide, which states that identifying theinitial vector of compromiseis critical to theroot cause analysisphase of incident response (Chapter: Incident Response Techniques, page 410-412).

The PowerShell cmdlet Get-Content reads content line-by-line from a file and is commonly used for processing logs or large text files. When combined with Select-String, it can search for specific patterns (such as "ERROR" or "SUCCESS") within those lines and return a collection of matching objects, including metadata like line number and line content.

Option D uses:

Get-Content –Path: Correct syntax to read the log file from a UNC path.

Select-String “ERROR”, “SUCCESS”: Searches for these terms in each line and returns matching lines as structured output.

The other options (A, B, C) use non-existent or incorrect cmdlets/parameters such as Get-Content-Folder, –ifmatch, –Directory, which are invalid in PowerShell.

From the exhibit, the first artifact (PE32 executable fromsyracusecoffee.com) and the second artifact (HTML fromqstride.com) suggest astaged malware deliverymethod. The executable and the HTML file are linked to different domains, often indicating redirection or multi-stage infection strategies, which is common in phishing or malvertising campaigns.

The Cisco guide explains this tactic as:“One file may appear benign but can initiate downloads or connections to external resources to fetch additional payloads or redirect users”. This pattern of domain redirection strongly supportsOption B.