CompTIA CAS-005 Dumps

Proper parsing of data is crucial for the SIEM to accurately interpret and analyze the logs being forwarded by the log collector. If the data is not parsed correctly, the SIEM may misinterpret the logs, leading to false positives and inaccurate alerts. Ensuring that the log data is correctly parsed allows the SIEM to correlate and analyze the logs effectively, which is essential for accurate alerting and monitoring.

Step-by-Step Explanation:

Both samples share similar function names, variable naming styles, and logic flow, indicating that they were likely written by the same developer. This is a keyobservation in malware attribution, as cyber threat analysts often look for unique coding styles to link malware to specific threat actors.

The presence of C2 (Command and Control) communication in both samples supports this theory, as attackers often reuse parts of their own malware code across different attacks.

Advancements in quantum computing pose a significant threat to current encryption systems, especially those based on the difficulty of factoring large prime numbers, such as RSA. Quantum computers have the potential to solve these problems exponentially faster than classical computers, making current cryptographic systems vulnerable.

Why Large Prime Numbers are Vulnerable:

Shor's Algorithm: Quantum computers can use Shor's algorithm to factorize large integers efficiently, which undermines the security of RSA encryption.

Cryptographic Breakthrough: The ability to quickly factor large prime numbers means that encrypted data, which relies on the hardness of thismathematical problem, can be decrypted.

Other options, while relevant, do not capture the primary reason for the shift towards new encryption algorithms:

B. Zero Trust security architectures: While important, the shift to homomorphic encryption is not the main driver for new encryption algorithms.

C. Perfect forward secrecy: It enhances security but is not the main reason for new encryption algorithms.

D. Real-time IP traffic capture: Quantum computers pose a more significant threat to the underlying cryptographic algorithms than to the real-time capture of traffic.

The log shows an AXFR (zone transfer) query, which exposed internal DNS records, aiding lateral movement. Let’s evaluate:

A. Disabling DNS zone transfers:AXFR allows full DNS zone data to be transferred. Disabling it externally prevents attackers from mapping internal networks, directly mitigating this issue per CAS-005’s security operations focus.

B. Restricting to UDP/53:AXFR uses TCP/53, so this wouldn’t stop it.

C. DNSmasking:Obscures records but isn’t a standard term for this fix.

The table highlights that tampering threats (IDs 02 and 03) are rated Critical, making them the most significant risks. These threats involve malicious insiders inserting backdoors or attackers injecting malicious code into third-party libraries. To mitigate such risks, organizations must implement a secure software development lifecycle (SDLC) with formalized code scanning, gate checks, and supply chain validation.

Option C directly addresses these issues. Secure development practices include static/dynamic code analysis, dependency checks, peer reviews, and mandatory approvals before code promotion. This approach detects backdoors, prevents unauthorized modifications, and reduces the likelihood of compromised libraries being integrated.

Option A (PAM with conditional access) mitigates privilege escalation but does not address software tampering. Option B (rate limiting and federation) reduces brute-force authentication risks (ID 05) but not critical tampering. Option D (Zero Trust with microsegmentation) strengthens network defense but does not secure the integrity of source code or libraries.

Therefore, a secure SDLC with gate checks and code scanning is the best mitigation for the most critical threats identified.

10.1.45.65 SFTP ServerDisable 8080

10.1.45.66 Email Server Disable 415 and 443

10.1.45.67 Web Server Disable 21, 80

10.1.45.68 UTM Appliance Disable 21

The output shows that multiple systems have outdated or vulnerable software versions (OpenSSL 1.01 and Java 11 runtime). This suggests that the systems are not being patched regularly or effectively.

A. Automating the patching system to update base images: Automating the patching process ensures that the latest security updates and patches are applied to all systems, including newly deployed ones. This addresses the root cause by ensuring that base images used for deployment are always up-to-date with the latest security patches.

B. Recompiling the affected programs with the most current patches: While this can fix the immediate vulnerabilities, it does not address the root cause of the problem, which is the lack of regular updates.

C. Disabling unused/unneeded ports on all servers: This improves security but does not address the specific issue of outdated software.

D. Deploying a WAF with virtual patching upstream of the affected systems: This can provide a temporary shield but does not resolve the underlying issue of outdated software.

Automating the patching system to update base images ensures that all deployed systems are using the latest, most secure versions of software, addressing the root cause of the vulnerability trend.

A Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB) is a security policy enforcement point placed between cloud service consumers and cloud service providers to combine and interject enterprise security policies as cloud-based resources are accessed. Implementing a CASB provides several benefits:

A. Improve firewall rules to avoid access to those platforms: This can help but is not as effective or comprehensive as a CASB.

B. Implement a cloud-access security broker: A CASB can provide visibility into cloud application usage, enforce data security policies, and protect against data leaks by monitoring and controlling access to cloud services. It also provides advanced features like data encryption, data loss prevention (DLP), and compliance monitoring.

C. Create SIEM rules to raise alerts for access to those platforms: This helps in monitoring but does not prevent data leaks.

D. Deploy an internet proxy that filters certain domains: This can block access to specific sites but lacks the granular control and visibility provided by a CASB.

Implementing a CASB is the most comprehensive solution to decrease the risk of data leaks by providing visibility, control, and enforcement of security policies for cloud services.

Configuring a span port on the perimeter firewall to ingest logs is the best architectural change to ensure that all client proxy traffic is captured for analysis. Here’s why:

Comprehensive Traffic Capture: A span port (or mirror port) on the perimeter firewall can capture all inbound and outbound traffic, including traffic that might bypass the proxy. This ensures that all network traffic is available for analysis.

Centralized Logging: By capturing logs at the perimeter firewall, the organization can centralize logging and analysis, making it easier to detect and investigate anomalies.

Minimal Disruption: Implementing a span port is a non-intrusive method that does not require significant changes to the network architecture, thus minimizing disruption to existing services.

Risk appetite is the amount of risk an organization is willing to accept to achieve its objectives. When operating with a constrained budget, understanding the organization's risk appetite is crucial because:

It helps prioritize security investments based on the level of risk the organization is willing to tolerate.

High-impact, low-likelihood events may be deemed acceptable if they fall within the organization's risk appetite, allowing for budget allocation to other critical areas.

Properly understanding and defining risk appetite ensures that limited resources are used effectively to manage risks that align with the organization's strategic goals.

Step-by-Step Explanation:

Understand the QuestionRequirements:The goal is to use a regular expression (regex) to match software versions 10.0 through 10.3, but exclude version 10.4.

Review Regex Syntax:

[ ] indicates a character set (matches any one character in the set).

[0-3] matches any digit between 0 and 3.

\. escapes the period (.) so it matches a literal period instead of acting as a wildcard.

( ) groups parts of the regex together.

Analyze Each Option:

Option A: Reader(*)[1][0].[0-4:

Incorrect. The use of (*) is not valid syntax in this context and [0-4 is incomplete or misformatted.

Option B: Reader[11[01X.f0-3'

Incorrect. This is an invalid regex syntax, mixing character sets and mismatched brackets.

Option C: Reader( )[1][0].[0-3:

Correct. This regex is valid and matches "Reader 10.0", "Reader 10.1", "Reader 10.2", and "Reader 10.3" while excluding "Reader 10.4".

Breakdown:

Reader: Matches the text "Reader".

[1][0]: Matches "10" as a combination of two characters.

\.: Matches the literal period.

[0-3]: Matches any single digit between 0 and 3.

Option D: Reader( )[1][0] X.[1-3:

Incorrect. The syntax X.[1-3 is invalid, and this does not match the required versions.

Conclusion:The regex in Option C correctly identifies all affected versions (10.0, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3) while excluding the unaffected version (10.4).

The data provided shows that all companies have SIEM systems, but they differ in their implementation of UEBA, DLP, ISAC membership, and TIP integration. The key metric to evaluate is the effectiveness in detecting and responding to attacks, as shown by the "Time to Detect" and "Time to Respond" columns. Company 1, which is an ISAC member, has the fastest detection (10 minutes) and response (20 minutes) times. Company 3, which is not an ISAC member, has slower detection (12 minutes) and response (24 minutes) times, despite having UEBA and TIP integration. Company 2, which lacks TIP integration but is an ISAC member, has the slowest times (20 minutes to detect, 40 minutes to respond). This suggests that ISAC membership correlates with faster detection and response, likely due to access to shared threat intelligence.

According to the CompTIA SecurityX CAS-005 objectives (Domain 2: Security Operations, 2.2), Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) are critical for enabling organizations to share real-timethreat intelligence within their industry. ISACs provide access to actionable intelligence, best practices, and coordinated response strategies, which are essential for defending against sophisticated attacks targeting critical infrastructure like the energy sector. The lack of ISAC membership (Company 3) limits access to this intelligence, hindering proactive defense and response capabilities. While UEBA, DLP, and TIP integration are valuable, they are more focused on internal monitoring, data protection,and individual threat intelligence feeds, respectively, and do not provide the same industry-wide collaboration as an ISAC.

In a Discretionary Access Control (DAC) model, the data owner or an assigned stakeholder has the authority to determine who can access resources. SecurityX CAS-005 IAM objectives describe DAC as user- or owner-controlled, where permissions can be granted or revoked at the owner’s discretion.

In this scenario, because permissions from the legacy system could not be migrated, multiple stakeholders were made responsible for assigning and managing access—matching the DAC model’s characteristics.

Option A relates to outsourcing, which does not define an access control model.

Option C is about authentication limitations, unrelated to the choice of DAC.

Option D describes backup responsibilities, which are operational tasks, not access control.

Step-by-Step Explanation:

Runtime Application Self-Protection (RASP) (A)monitors and protects applications in real time by detecting and blocking attacks as they occur. Unlike traditional security solutions, RASP is integrated into the application itself, meaning it works regardless of the programming language used. It effectively mitigates common vulnerabilities such as SQL injection, XSS, and buffer overflows.

Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) (C) is a passive scanning approach that may not prevent attacks in real-time, while Network Intrusion PreventionSystems (NIPS) (D) focuses on network traffic, not application-layer security.

Multicloud provider solutionsinvolve using services from more than one cloud provider to ensure resiliency and redundancy. In the event of a failure or SLA breach by one CSP, another provider can maintain service continuity. An on-premises backup could help, but does not address CSP-specific SLA concerns directly. Round-robin load balancing and active-active within the same tenant still depend on a single provider, thus posing risks if the CSP fails.

Anacceptable use policy (AUP)defines what is considered appropriate use of corporate email and prevents unnecessary emails to personal accounts. This helps in reducing false DLP alerts while maintaining compliance.

Quarantining emails (A)is unnecessary since the content was not flagged as sensitive.

Encryption (C)secures emails but does not address overuse.

Phishing awareness training (D)is unrelated to policy enforcement for outgoing emails.

The best approach for managing and monitoring IoT devices, such as thermostats, is to operate them on a separate network with no access to other internal devices. This segmentation ensures that the IoT devices are isolated from the main network, reducing the risk of potential security breaches affecting other critical systems. Additionally, this setup allows for secure vendor updates without exposing the broader network to potential vulnerabilities inherent in IoT devices.

The log snippet indicates a DNS AXFR (zone transfer) request, which can be exploited by attackers to gather detailed information about an internal network's infrastructure. Disabling DNS zone transfers is the best solution to mitigate this risk. Zone transfers should generally be restricted to authorized secondary DNS servers and not be publicly accessible, as they can reveal sensitive network information that facilitates lateral movement during an attack.

The best solution is to use a non-persistent virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) with thin clients (B). Thin clients are inexpensive, easy to replace, and resilient in harsh environments where traditional endpoints may be damaged. With non-persistent VDI, employee desktops are virtualized and reset to a clean state after logout, reducing risks from turnover, malware persistence, or user misconfiguration. Centralized management ensures consistent patching and security updates while minimizing downtime, since damaged thin clients can be swapped quickly with minimal disruption.

Option A (environmental controls) may reduce equipment damage but does not address turnover or regulatory retention requirements. Option C (redundant servers and journaling) improves data integrity but does not solve endpoint-related risks or staffing issues. Option D (maintaining spare endpoints) mitigates hardware failures but still relies on managing and configuring full systems, which is inefficient for high-turnover environments.

CAS-005 emphasizes virtualization and centralization strategies in environments where operational resilience, rapid recovery, and compliance are critical. Non-persistent VDI with thin clients provides the most comprehensive solution here.

SecurityX CAS-005 cloud architecture guidance emphasizes horizontal scaling for workloads that need to handle both predictable and fluctuating growth over time. Horizontal scaling allows the infrastructure to add nodes for both compute and storage dynamically, providing elasticity to meet fluctuating computational demands while accommodating exponential storage growth.

Vertical scaling (B) has hardware limits and is not as flexible for large, sustained growth.

CDN (A) is optimized for content distribution, not intensive compute workloads.

Load balancing (C) distributes workloads but does not address scaling for data growth.

To enable code signing with an existing PKI, the first step is to configure the Certificate Authority (CA) to issue code signing certificates. Adding a new template with attributes specific to code signing (e.g., key usage for signing) allows the CA to support this requirement without disrupting existing operations.

Option A:Correct—templates define certificate types; this isthe foundational step.

Option B:Wildcard certificates are for domains, not code signing.

Option C:Recalculating root CA keys is unnecessary and risky unless compromised.

Option D:SAN (Subject Alternative Name) is for multi-domain certificates, irrelevant here.

In reviewing email headers and determining actions to mitigate phishing attempts, the security analyst should focus on patterns of suspicious behavior and the reputation of the sending domains. Here’s the analysis of the options provided:

A. Block messages from hr-saas.com because it is not a recognized domain: Blocking a domain solely because it is not recognized can lead to legitimate emails being missed. Recognition alone should not be the criterion for blocking.

B. Reroute all messages with unusual security warning notices to the IT administrator: While rerouting suspicious messages can be a good practice, it is not specific to the domain sending repeated suspicious messages.

C. Quarantine all messages with sales-mail.com in the email header: Quarantining messages based on the presence of a specific domain in the email header can be too broad and may capture legitimate emails.

D. Block vendor com for repeated attempts to send suspicious messages: This option is the most appropriate because it targets a domain that has shown a pattern of sending suspicious messages. Blocking a domain that repeatedly sends phishing attempts without previous communications helps in preventing future attempts from the same source and aligns with the goal of mitigating phishing risks.

Chain of custody ensures that evidence is protected, documented, and accounted for from the moment it is collected until it is presented in court or a legal proceeding. Properly maintaining chain of custody is critical to proving that the evidence has not been tampered with. Although encryption protects data during transit, and legal issues are important, without a documented chain of custody, the integrity of the evidence itself could be challenged and invalidated.

RACI matrix(Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed) is used for role mapping across the project lifecycle.

CMDB is a configuration inventory; ITIL is a framework. Recall trees are for disaster recovery/business continuity.

FromCAS-005, Domain 1: Security Governance and Compliance:

“The RACI matrix is essential in role assignment and accountability for software development and operational processes.”

Incident response follows a standard process (e.g., NIST 800-61): Preparation, Identification, Containment, Eradication, Recovery, Lessons Learned. After identifying the attack (file and origin), the next step isContainment—limiting the spread or impact (e.g., isolating systems) before remediation or recovery.

Option A:Remediation (fixing the root cause) follows containment.

Option B:Correct—containment prevents further damage post-identification.

Option C:“Response” is too vague; it encompasses all steps.

Option D:Recovery (restoring systems) comes after containment and eradication.

The best location to test a newly released feature for an internal application, without affecting the production environment, is the staging environment. Here’s a detailed explanation:

Staging Environment: This environment closely mirrors the production environment in terms of hardware, software, configurations, and settings. It serves as a final testing ground before deploying changes to production. Testing in the staging environment ensures that the new feature will behave as expected in the actual production setup.

Isolation fromProduction: The staging environment is isolated from production, which means any issues arising from the new feature will not impact the live users or the integrity of the production data. This aligns with best practices in change management and risk mitigation.

Realistic Testing: Since the staging environment replicates the production environment, it provides realistic testing conditions. This helps in identifying potential issues that might not be apparent in a development or testing environment, which often have different configurations and workloads.

A crisis management plan defines coordinated communication and response strategies for high-profile incidents that may harm an organization’s public reputation and shareholder confidence. CAS-005 GRC content includes crisis communication planning for regulatory compliance and public relations in the wake of breaches.

A Data Subject Access Request (A) addresses individual data rights, not overall crisis handling.

Business Impact Analysis (B) helps assess potential operational and financial impacts but does not manage public perception during an incident.

Supply chain management (C) is preventative for vendor risks, not responsive to current crises.

Regression testing is a software testingpractice that ensures that recent code changes have not adversely affected existing functionalities. In this scenario, the reintroduction of a previously fixed bug indicates that changes or integrations brought back the old issue. Implementing comprehensive regression testing would help detect such reintroductions by systematically retesting the existing functionalities whenever changes are made to the codebase. This practice is crucial in maintaining the integrity of the application, especially in complexsystems where multiple components interact.​

Tokenizationreplaces sensitive data (e.g., PII) with non-sensitive placeholders while maintaining format consistency, ensuring compliancewithout disrupting testing. This method is commonly used forPCI-DSS and GDPR compliancewhile preserving data structure for functional tests.

Encryption (A)secures data but does not remove sensitivity or solve testing concerns.

Truncation (B)removes portions of data but may impact testing if format requirements are strict.

Synthetic data (C)can be useful but may not always match real-world scenarios perfectly for testing purposes.

When using AI to fully automate the process of deciding client loan rates, the primary concern from a privacy perspective is model explainability.

Why Model Explainability is Critical:

Transparency: It ensures that the decision-making process of the AI model can be understood and explained to stakeholders, including clients.

Accountability: Helps in identifying biases and errors in the model, ensuring that the AI is making fair and unbiased decisions.

Regulatory Compliance: Various regulations require that decisions, especially those affecting individuals' financial status, can be explained and justified.

Trust: Builds trust among users and stakeholders by demonstrating that the AI decisions are transparent and justifiable.

Other options, such ascredential theft, prompt injections, and social engineering, are significant concerns but do not directly address the privacy and fairness implications of automated decision-making.

The logs show that the user connected fromToronto (104.18.16.29)andLos Angeles (95.67.137.12)within minutes. The sudden location change is a typical trigger forgeoblocking in a Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW), leading to theHR System being denied.

A compromised account (B)would show failed login attempts or unusual activities, but all other access attempts were allowed.

Business hours restriction (C)is unlikely since the user was granted access earlier.

Approved subnet issues (D)would affect all applications, not just HR System access.

Vendor lock-in occurs when a client is overly dependent on a vendor, limiting flexibility. Risks include:

Option B:Vendors changing offerings (e.g., features, pricing) can disrupt the client, a key lock-in risk.

Option D:Decreased quality of service may result from reliance on a single vendor without alternatives.

Option A:Seamless data movement is a benefit, not a risk.

Option C:Sufficient service is neutral or positive, not a risk.

Option E:Multicloud is hindered by lock-in, not a risk of it.

Option F:Increased interoperability contradicts lock-in’s limitations.

OWIN23 is running Windows 7, which is a legacy operating system. Many EDR solutions no longer provide full support for outdated operating systems like Windows 7, which has reached its end of life and is no longer receiving security updates from Microsoft. This makes such systems more vulnerable to infections and attacks, including remote access Trojans (RATs).

A. OWIN23 uses a legacy version of Windows that is not supported by the EDR: This is the most probable cause because the lack of support means that the EDR solution may not fully protect or monitor this system, making it an easy target for infections.

B. LN002 was not supported by the EDR solution and propagates the RAT: While LN002 is unmanaged, it is less likely to propagate the RAT to OWIN23 directly without an established vector.

C. The EDR has an unknown vulnerability that was exploited by the attacker: This is possible but less likely than the lack of support for an outdated OS.

D. OWIN29 spreads the malware through other hosts in the network: While this could happen, the status indicates OWIN29 is in a bypass mode, which might limit its interactions but does not directly explain the infection on OWIN23.

The table shows detailed information about products, includinglocation, chassis manufacturer, OS, application developer, and vendor. This type of information is typically assessed in a supply chain assessment to evaluate the security and reliability of components and services from different suppliers.

Why Supply Chain Assessment?

Component Evaluation: Assessing the origin and security of each component used in the products, including hardware, software, and third-party services.

Vendor Reliability: Evaluating the security practices and reliability of vendors involved in providing components or services.

Risk Management: Identifying potential risks associated with the supply chain, such as vulnerabilities in third-party components or insecure development practices.

Other types of assessments do not align with the detailed supplier and component information provided:

A. System: Focuses on individual system security, not the broader supply chain.

C. Quantitative: Focuses on numerical risk assessments, not supplier information.

D. Organizational: Focuses on internal organizational practices, not external suppliers.

The SIEM report shows that some devices, such as VM003 (Critical server) and NET003 (IPS), are DOWN and therefore not reporting logs. In security monitoring, the absence of log data from critical systems creates dangerous blind spots. If logs are missing, attacks can proceed undetected, or investigations may lack the data needed for incident response.

The most effective action is to perform a non-reporting device assessment (C). This means identifying and correcting issues where devices fail to send logs, whether due to outages, misconfigurations, or integration gaps. Ensuring all critical devices, especially servers and intrusion prevention systems, consistently send logs to the SIEM strengthens overall visibility and monitoring posture.

Option A (time calibration) is important for correlation accuracy but does not address missing log feeds. Option B (centralized use case library) enhances detection but only works if the SIEM is receiving complete data. Option D (resiliency plan) helps protect log retention but is irrelevant if logs are never received in the first place.

Therefore, fixing non-reporting log sources is the highest priority to improve monitoring effectiveness.

For a disaster recovery (DR) plan requiring immediate data availability, the first step is understanding what needs to be protected and recovered. Identifying critical business processes and their associated software and hardware requirements establishes the foundation for the DR plan. This ensures that backups and recovery mechanisms align with business priorities, meeting the "moment's notice" requirement.

Option A:A change management plan is important for system consistency but doesn’t directly address immediate data availability in a DR context.

Option B:Hiring staff supports execution but doesn’t define what needs to be recovered or how. It’s a later step.

Option C:A warm site (a partially operational backup site) is a good DR solution, but designing it comes after identifying critical processes and resources.

Option D:This is the first step in any DR planning process—knowing what’s critical ensures the plan meets availability goals efficiently.

The CIO needs to clarify the organization’s risk appetite, which defines the level of residual risk the business is willing to accept after all mitigation measures are applied. Risk appetite reflects the balance between operational requirements, security controls, and cost constraints. In business continuity planning, risk appetite helps decision-makers determine which risks must be reduced through additional investments (e.g., redundant systems, faster recovery strategies) and which risks are tolerable based on business priorities.

Mitigation (A) refers to the strategies used to reduce risk but not the threshold of acceptable residual risk. Impact (B) and Likelihood (C) are components of risk assessment—measuring severity and probability—but they do not define acceptance criteria. Risk appetite is the guiding principle that aligns technical controls with executive tolerance for disruption or loss.

By clarifying appetite, the CIO provides the compliance team and IT leadership with a framework for designing remediation activities that ensure continuity of critical internal processes while aligning with the organization’s strategic objectives and regulatory requirements.

To ensure that logs from a legacy platform are properly retained beyond the default retention period, configuring the SIEM to aggregate the logs is the best approach. SIEM solutions are designed to collect, aggregate, and store logs from various sources, providing centralized log management and retention. This setup ensures that logs are retained according to policy and can be easily accessed for analysis and compliance purposes.

To improve the quality of code scanning results and reduce false positives, the best solution is to limit the tool to a specific coding language and fine-tune the rule set. By configuring the code scanning tool to focus on the specific language used in the application, the tool can more accurately identify relevant issues and reduce the number of false positives. Additionally, tuning the rule set ensures that the tool's checks are appropriate for the application's context, further improving the accuracy ofthe scan results.

When a security analyst receives a notification about an attack that appears to originate from an internal vulnerability scanner, it suggests that the scanner itself might have been compromised. This situation is critical because a compromised scanner can potentially conduct unauthorized scans, leak sensitive information, or execute malicious actions within the network. The appropriate first action involves containing the threat to prevent further damage and allow for a thorough investigation.

Here’s why quarantining the scanner sensor is the best immediate action:

Containment and Isolation: Quarantining the scanner will immediately prevent it from continuing any malicious activity or scans. This containment is crucial to protect the rest of the network from potential harm.

Forensic Analysis: By isolating the scanner, a forensic analysis can be performed to understand how it was compromised, what actions it took, and what data or systems might have been affected. This analysis will provide valuable insights into the nature of the attack and help in taking appropriate remedial actions.

Preventing Further Attacks: If the scanner is allowed to continue operating, it might execute more unauthorized actions, leading to greater damage. Quarantine ensures that the threat is neutralized promptly.

Root Cause Identification: A forensic analysis can help identify vulnerabilities in the scanner’s configuration, software, or underlying system that allowed the compromise. This information is essential for preventing future incidents.

Other options, while potentially useful in the long term, are not appropriate as immediate actions in this scenario:

A. Create an allow list for the vulnerability scanner IPs to avoid false positives: This action addresses false positives but does not mitigate the immediate threat posed by the compromised scanner.

B. Configure the scan policy to avoid targeting an out-of-scope host: This step is preventive for future scans but does not deal with the current incident where the scanner is already compromised.

C. Set network behavior analysis rules: While useful for ongoing monitoring and detection, this does not address the immediate need to stop the compromised scanner’s activities.

In conclusion, the first and most crucial action is to quarantine the scanner sensor to halt any malicious activity and perform a forensic analysis to understand the scope and nature of the compromise. This step ensures that the threat is contained and provides a basis for further remediation efforts.

To ensure the most secure way of keeping a legacy system (COL) operating until a new solution is available, isolating the system and enforcing strict firewall rules is the best approach. This method minimizes the attack surface by restricting access to only the necessary endpoints, thereby reducing the risk of unauthorized access and potential security breaches. Isolating the system ensures that it is not exposed to the broader network, while firewall rules control the traffic that can reach the system, providing a secure environment until a replacement is implemented.

Excessive MFA push notifications can be a sign of an attempted push notification attack, where attackers repeatedly send MFA prompts hoping the user will eventually approve one by mistake. To mitigate this:

A. Provisioning FIDO2 devices: While FIDO2 devices offer strong authentication, they may not be practical for all users and do not directly address the issue of excessive push notifications.

B. Deploying a text message-based MFA: SMS-based MFA can still be vulnerable to similar spamming attacks and phishing.

C. Enabling OTP via email: Email-based OTPs add another layer of security but do not directly solve the issue of excessive notifications.

D. Configuring prompt-driven MFA: This option allows users to respond to prompts in a secure manner, often including features like time-limited approval windows, additional verification steps, or requiring specificactions to approve. This can help prevent users from accidentally approving malicious attempts.

Configuring prompt-driven MFA is the best solution to restrict unnecessary MFA notifications and improve security.

Phishing simulations are a proven method for reinforcing security awareness, meeting compliance training requirements, and improving user incident reporting. In CAS-005, social engineering testing is a recommended component of organizational security culture programs.

DoS attacks (A) and penetration tests (B) assess technical security, not user awareness.

Fake ransomware (D) can cause unnecessary alarm and operational disruption.

To reduce the risk of unauthorized BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) usage, the organization should implement Conditional Access and Network Access Control (NAC).

Why Conditional Access and NAC?

Conditional Access:

User-to-Device Binding: Conditional access policies can enforce that only registered and compliant devices are allowed to access corporate resources.

Context-Aware Security: Enforces access controls based on the context of the access attempt, such as user identity, device compliance, location, and more.

Network Access Control (NAC):

DeviceConfiguration Requirements: NAC ensures that only devices meeting specific security configurations are allowed to connect to the network.

Access Control: Provides granular control over network access, ensuring that BYOD devices comply with security policies before gaining access.

Other options, while useful, do not address the specific need to control and secure BYOD devices effectively:

A. Cloud IAM to enforce token-based MFA: Enhances authentication security but does not control device compliance.

D. PAM to enforce local password policies: Focuses on privileged account management, not BYOD control.

E. SD-WAN to enforce web content filtering: Enhances network performance and security but does not enforce BYOD device compliance.

F. DLP to enforce data protection capabilities: Protects data but does not control BYOD device access and compliance.

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the regulation most likely being addressed by the news organization. GDPR includes provisions for the "right to be forgotten," which allows individuals to request the deletion of personal data that is no longer necessary for the purposes for which it was collected. This regulation aims to protect the privacy and personal data of individuals within the European Union.

Adversary emulation simulates specific advanced persistent threat (APT) behaviors and techniques to test an organization’s security posture. In SecurityX CAS-005, this is part of red-teaming and purple-teaming strategies for realistic resilience testing.

Reliability factors (B) relate to operational uptime, not threat simulation.

Honeypots (C) attract attackers but do not directly emulate specific adversaries.

Internal reconnaissance (D) is one phase of an attack simulation, not the full emulation of advanced threat actors.

Attack surface reductionfocuses on minimizingunnecessary services, open ports, and vulnerabilities, reducing the exposure to potential adversaries. This aligns withzero trust and least privilege principles.

Secure Boot (A)helps ensure system integrity but does not minimize exposed services.

Disabling third-party integrations (C)may help, but broader attack surface reduction is the best first step.

Limiting access (D)is important but does not directly reduce exposed services.

The situation where several employees were contacted by the same individual impersonating a recruiter best describes aspear-phishing campaign. Here’s why:

Targeted Approach: Spear-phishing involves targeting specific individuals within an organization with personalized and convincing messages to trick them into divulging sensitive information or performing actions that compromise security.

Impersonation: The use of impersonation, in this case, a recruiter, is a common tactic in spear-phishing to gain the trust of the targeted individuals and increase the likelihood of a successful attack.

Correlated Contacts: The fact that several employees were contacted by the same individual suggests a coordinated effort to breach the organization’s security by targeting multiple points of entry through social engineering.

To prevent unauthorized applications from running, the company needs a mechanism to explicitly define and enforce which applications are allowed to execute. "Permit listing" (often referred to as "whitelisting" in security contexts) is the most effective solution here. It involves creating a list of approved applications, and only those on the list are permitted to run, blocking all others by default. This directly addresses the root cause—users installing unapproved software—by restricting execution to only authorized programs.

Option A (Signing):Code signing ensures the authenticity and integrity of software by verifying it comes from a trusted source and hasn’t been tampered with. While useful, it doesn’t inherently prevent unauthorized applications from running unless combined with a policy like whitelisting.

Option B (Access control):Access control governs who can access systems or resources but doesn’t specifically restrict which applications can execute. It’s too broad for this scenario.

Option C (HIPS):A Host-based Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) can detect and block malicious behavior, but it’s reactive and relies on signatures or heuristics, not a proactive allow-only approach.

Option D (Permit listing):This is the best fit, as it proactively enforces a policy where only explicitly authorized applications can run, preventing malware introduced by unauthorized software.

Based on the provided authentication logs, we observe that User1's accountexperienced multiple failed login attempts within a very short time span (at 8:01:23 AM on 12/15). This pattern indicates a potential brute-force attack or an attempt to gain unauthorized access. Here’s a breakdown of why disabling User1's account is the appropriate first step:

Failed Login Attempts: The logs show that User1 had four consecutive failed login attempts:

VM01 at 8:01:23 AM

VM08 at 8:01:23 AM

VM01 at 8:01:23 AM

VM08 at 8:01:23 AM

Security Protocols and Best Practices: According to CompTIA Security+ guidelines, multiple failed login attempts within a short timeframe should trigger an immediate response to prevent further potential unauthorized access attempts. This typically involves temporarily disabling the account to stop ongoing brute-force attacks.

Account Lockout Policy: Implementing an account lockout policy is a standard practice to thwart brute-force attacks. Disabling User1's account will align with these best practices and prevent further failed attempts, which might lead to successful unauthorized access if not addressed.

Based on the security policy that any publicly available server must be patched within 12 hours after a patch is released, the securityanalyst should patch Host 1 first. Here’s why:

Public Availability: Host 1 is externally available, making it accessible from the internet. Publicly available servers are at higher risk of being targeted by attackers, especially when a zero-day vulnerability is known.

Exposure to Threats: Host 1 has IIS installed and is publicly accessible, increasing its exposure to potential exploitation. Patching this host first reduces the risk of a successful attack.

Prioritization of Critical Assets: According to best practices, assets that are exposed to higher risks should be prioritized for patching to mitigate potential threats promptly.

SecurityX CAS-005 exam content emphasizes integrating security into the SDLC and using automated tools to identify vulnerabilities early.

Software dependency management solutions track and analyze libraries and components for known vulnerabilities before deployment, using vulnerability databases such as NVD or OSS Index.

IAST scanning still requires the application to be running and may detect issues later.

WAF policies help block attacks in production but do not prevent vulnerable code from being deployed.

SIEM monitoring is reactive and identifies issues after they occur.By detecting vulnerable dependencies early, software dependency management solutions prevent late-stage deployment delays and reduce security risk.

Software Composition Analysis (SCA) is the best method for identifying all components, dependencies, and open-source libraries used inan application. It ensures that organizations track and manage vulnerabilities in third-party code before deployment.

SCA tools generate a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), which provides a full representation of the code and modules used in the application.

Other options:

Static Application Security Testing (SAST) (C) checks for vulnerabilities but does not map dependencies.

Interactive Application Security Testing (IAST) (D) works at runtime, not before deployment.

Runtime Application Self-Protection (RASP) (B) works while the application is running.

The best way to mitigate the ability of attackers or penetration testers to execute arbitrary payloads is to enforce application controls with allow lists (B). Application allow listing ensures that only pre-approved, trusted software and scripts can be executed on the system. This prevents attackers from dropping or running malicious binaries, even if they exploit vulnerabilities to gain access. CAS-005 emphasizes allow listing as a preventive control against post-exploitation persistence and lateral movement.

Option A (ASLR) randomizes memory addresses and helps mitigate buffer overflow exploits but does not directly prevent execution of unauthorized programs. Option C (OS restrictions of globally writable folders) improves security hygiene but still does not stop attackers from executing already placed payloads in non-restricted locations. Option D (EDR signatures) are reactive and limited, since attackers often use novel or obfuscated payloads not yet captured by signature databases.

Therefore, implementing application controls with allow lists provides the strongest defense against unauthorized payload execution in this context.

A Content Delivery Network (CDN) caches and distributes static and dynamic web content across multiple geographically distributed edge servers, reducing latency for global users. This directly addresses page-loading delays caused by distance from the primary data centers.

RASP is for runtime application security, not latency.

Remote journaling is for data replication, not performance optimization.

SASE can improve security and WAN routing, but a CDN is purpose-built for content delivery performance.

Tokenization replaces sensitive data elements with non-sensitive equivalents, called tokens, that can be used within the internal tests. The original data is stored securely and can be retrieved if necessary. This approach allows the software development team to work with data that appears realistic and valid without exposing the actual sensitive information.

Configuring data hashing (Option A) is not suitable for test data as ittransforms the data into a fixed-length value that is not usable in the same way as the original data. Replacing data with null records (Option C) is not useful as it does not provide valid data for testing. Data obfuscation (Option D) could be an alternative but might not meet the regulatory requirements as effectively as tokenization.

The first immediate action in an active incident iscontainment.Blocking the IP address (40.90.23.154)at the network edge prevents further communication with the malicious external server. Disabling PowerShell or removing local admin privileges are valid hardening steps, but containment by network control is the highest priority during an active compromise to stop data exfiltration or further command and control activity.

The hijacked administrator account was used across multiple ASNs (indicating different network locations) in a short time, despite MFA and SSO. This suggests a stolen session or token misuse. Let’s analyze:

A. Token theft detection with lockouts:Useful for detecting stolen SSO tokens, but it’s reactive and may not prevent initial misuse across networks.

B. Context-based authentication:This adds real-time checks (e.g., geolocation, IP changes) to verify login attempts. Given the rapid ASN changes, this proactively mitigates the issue by challenging suspicious logins, aligning with CAS-005’s focus on adaptive security.

C. Decentralize accounts:This removes SSO, increasing complexity and weakening MFA enforcement, which isn’t practical or secure.

Understanding the Security Event:

HOST002 is the only device authorized for internet traffic. However, theSIEM logs show that VM002 is making network connections to web.corp.local.

This indicatesunauthorized access, which could bea sign of lateral movement or network infection.

This is ared flagfor potential malware, unauthorized software, or a compromised host.

Why Option D is Correct:

Unusual network traffic patternsare often an indicator of acompromised system.

VM002 should not be communicating externally, but it is.

This suggests a possiblebreach or malware infectionattempting to communicate with a command-and-control (C2) server.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

A (Misconfiguration):While a misconfiguration could explain the unauthorized connections, the pattern of activity suggests something more malicious.

B (Security incident on HOST002):The issue is not with HOST002. The suspicious activity isfrom VM002.

C (False positives):The repeated pattern of unauthorized connections makes false positivesunlikely.

A Configuration Management Database (CMDB) provides the best foundation for identifying which specific assets are affected by a given vulnerability. A CMDB maintains detailed information about the IT environment, including hardware, software, configurations, and relationships between assets. This comprehensive view allows organizations to quickly identify and address vulnerabilities affecting specific assets.

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Forward secrecy (also known as perfect forward secrecy, PFS) ensures that session keys used in a VPN tunnel are ephemeral, meaning that even if an attacker compromises a long-term private key, past sessions cannot be decrypted. According to the CompTIA SecurityX CAS-005 study guide (Domain 3: Cybersecurity Technology, 3.1), enabling forward secrecy on VPN tunnels reduces the risk of cryptanalysis by ensuring that each session’s encryption key is unique and not derived from a single compromised key. This directly mitigates the impact of attacks like key theft or future decryption attempts.

Option A:Forward secrecy is not required for hardware-accelerated cryptography, which depends on processor capabilities, not key management.

Option C:While confidentiality is important, this is too vague and does not specifically explain why forward secrecy is chosen.

Option D:Modern protocols (e.g., TLS 1.3, IPsec with ECDHE) support forward secrecy but donot mandate it as a prerequisite for use.

Option B:This is the most precise, as forward secrecy directly reduces the success of cryptanalysis by limiting the scope of key compromise.

The strings utility extracts human-readable text from binary files. Security analysts use it to identify Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) such as URLs, IP addresses, filenames, and commands embedded in the malware.

Option A (reconstructing timeline) would require event logs or forensic timeline tools.

Option C (replicating the attack) involves execution in a sandbox, not static string extraction.

The logs indicate multiple failed login attempts for user10, who may have been part of the staff reduction 60 days prior. If user10's account was removed, and their home directory deleted, any applications or services relying on files or configurations within that directory would fail. This scenario is common when service accounts are not properly identified and preserved during staff reductions.

Ensuring that service accounts are documented and maintained separately from user accounts is essential to prevent unintended disruptions to applications and services.

To prevent emails from being marked as spam, several DNS records related to email authentication need to be properly configured and updated when there are changes to the email server'scertificates:

A. DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance): DMARC records help email servers determine how to handle messages that fail SPF or DKIM checks, improving email deliverability and reducing the likelihood of emails being marked as spam.

B. SPF (Sender Policy Framework): SPF records specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of your domain. Updating the SPF record ensures that the new email server is recognized as an authorized sender.

C. DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail): DKIM adds a digital signature to email headers, allowing the receiving server to verify that the email has not been tampered with and is from an authorized sender. Updating DKIM records ensures that emails are properly signed and authenticated.

D. DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions): DNSSEC adds security to DNS by enabling DNS responses to be verified. While important for DNS security, it does not directly address the issue of emails being marked as spam.

E. SASC: This is not a relevant standard for this scenario.

F. SAN (Subject Alternative Name): SAN is used in SSL/TLS certificates for securing multiple domain names, not for email delivery issues.

G. SOA (Start of Authority): SOA records are used for DNS zone administration and do not directly impact email deliverability.

H. MX (Mail Exchange): MX records specify the mail servers responsible for receiving email on behalf of a domain. While important, the primary issue here is the authentication of outgoing emails, which is handled by SPF, DKIM, and DMARC.

The most cost-effective and secure solution is to configure VPN concentrators inside the OT networks at both sites (Option D). This setup allows encrypted communications between Site A and Site B, enabling controllers at either site to serve as secondary or failover devices for the other. By leveraging VPN tunnels, the organization avoids the expensive and time-consuming process of laying new fiber infrastructure, while still ensuring secure, authenticated, and encrypted connections across sites.

Option A, direct fiber connectivity, provides high performance but is extremely costly and less flexible than VPN solutions. Option B, deploying redundant SCADA controllers at each site, increases hardware, licensing, and management costs while still requiring interconnectivity. Option C, air-gapping the OT network, may improve isolation but would prevent remote failover capabilities, contradicting the requirement for cross-site control.

By implementing VPN concentrators, the organization achieves secure cross-site redundancy, supports operational continuity in case of controller outages, and does so in a cost-effective manner aligned with common OT security practices.

The application allows users to input URLs, which the application then fetches using requests.get(url). This functionality can be exploited if not properly validated, leading to potential security vulnerabilities such as Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).

Implementing a code scanner as part of the development pipeline can help identify insecure coding practices, such as unsanitized user inputs and improper handling of external requests. Code scanners analyze the source code for known vulnerabilities and coding errors, enabling developers to remediate issues before deployment.

Step-by-Step Explanation:

Option A: Deny list

Deny lists block specific applications or processes identified as malicious.

This approach is reactive and mayinadvertently block the non-standard applications that are currently in use without proper ownership.

Option B: Allow list

Allow lists permit only pre-approved applications to run.

While secure, this approach requires defining all non-standard applications, which may disrupt operations in an environment where ownership is unclear.

Option C: Audit mode

Correct Answer.

Audit mode allows monitoring and logging of applications without enforcing restrictions.

This is ideal in environments with non-standard applications and undefined ownership because it enables the engineer to observe the environment and gradually implement control without interruption.

Audit mode provides critical visibility into the software landscape, ensuring that necessary applications remain functional.

Option D: MAC list

Mandatory Access Control (MAC) lists restrict access based on classification and clearance levels.

This does not align with application control objectives in this context.

CompTIA CASP+ Study Guide - Chapters on Endpoint Security and Application Control.

CASP+ Objective 2.4: Implement appropriate security controls for enterprise endpoints.

Step by Step Explanation:

Understanding the Scenario: Theorganization is using customer-managed encryption keys in the cloud, which is more expensive than using the cloud provider's free managed keys. The CISO needs to find a way to reduce costs without significantly weakening the security posture.

Analyzing the Answer Choices:

A. Utilize an on-premises HSM to locally manage keys: While on-premises HSMs offer strong security, they introduce additional costs and complexity (procurement, maintenance, etc.). This option is unlikely to reduce costs compared to cloud-based key management.

B. Adjust the configuration for cloud provider keys on data that is classified as public: This is the most practical and cost-effective approach. Data classified as public doesn't require the same level of protection as sensitive data. Using the cloud provider's free managed keys for public data can significantly reduce costs without compromising security, as the data is intended to be publicly accessible anyway.

Formal methods in software engineering use mathematically based specifications to ensure system correctness, safety, and compliance with requirements. SecurityX CAS-005 stresses the importance of traceability between code and both functional and non-functional requirements for high-assurance systems like avionics. A lack of traceability means it is impossible to verify that the implementation meets all required safety and performance standards—exactly what formal methods address.

The most likely cause of the anti-malware alerts on customer workstations is unsecure bundled libraries. When developing and deploying new applications, it is common for developers to use third-party libraries. If these libraries are not properly vetted for security, they can introduce vulnerabilities or malicious code.

Why Unsecure Bundled Libraries?

Third-Party Risks: Using libraries that are not secure can lead to malware infections if the libraries contain malicious code or vulnerabilities.

Code Dependencies: Libraries may have dependencies that are not secure, leading to potential security risks.

Common Issue: This is a frequent issue in software development where libraries are used for convenience but not properly vetted for security.

Other options, while relevant, are less likely to cause widespread anti-malware alerts:

A. Misconfigured code commit: Could lead to issues but less likely to trigger anti-malware alerts.

C. Invalid code signing certificate: Would lead to trust issues but not typically anti-malware alerts.

D. Data leakage: Relevant for privacy concerns but not directly related to anti-malware alerts.

To design resilience in an enterprise system that can survive environmental catastrophes, recover within 24 hours, and be resilient to active exploitation, the best strategy is to allocate fully redundant and geographically distributed standby sites. Here’s why:

Geographical Redundancy: Having geographically distributed standby sites ensures that if one site is affected by an environmental catastrophe, the other sites can take over, providing continuity of operations.

Full Redundancy: Fully redundant sites mean that all critical systems and data are replicated, enabling quick recovery in the event of a critical loss of availability.

Resilience to Exploitation: Distributing resources across multiple sites reduces the risk of a single point of failure and increases resilience against targeted attacks.

To improve the vulnerability management process in an environment where new devices/IPs are added and dropped regularly, the company should perform regular discovery scanning throughout the IT landscape using the vulnerability management tool. Here’s why:

Accurate Asset Inventory: Regular discovery scans help maintain an up-to-date inventory of all assets, ensuring that the vulnerability management process includes all relevant devices and IPs.

Consistency in Reporting: By continuously discovering and scanning new and existing assets, the company can generate consistent and comprehensive vulnerability reports that reflect the current state of the network.

Proactive Management: Regular scans enable the organization to proactively identify and address vulnerabilities on new and existing assets, reducing the window of exposure to potential threats.

The most appropriate technique to improve the cryptographic strength of a password-storage component in a web application without completely replacing the crypto-module is key stretching. Here's why:

Enhanced Security: Key stretching algorithms, such as PBKDF2, bcrypt, and scrypt, increase the computational effort required to derive the encryption key from the password, making brute-force attacks more difficult and time-consuming.

Compatibility: Key stretching can be implemented alongside existing cryptographic modules, enhancing their security without the need for a complete overhaul.

Industry Best Practices: Key stretching is a widely recommended practice for securely storing passwords, as it significantly improves resistance to password-cracking attacks.

SecurityX CAS-005 secure DevOps guidance recommends integrating security controls into the CI/CD pipeline. By validating container security baselines at security gates before deployment, noncompliant builds are stopped early, ensuring consistency across environments.

Option B is useful but does not ensure compliance if changes are made after image creation.

Option A detects drift but only after deployment.

Option D is reactive and does not prevent insecure deployments.

The attacker gained domain control by collecting the KRBTGT hash (used for Kerberos tickets). Let’s evaluate:

A. Deleting SQLSV:Irrelevant since pass-the-hash failed there.

B. Reimaging ADMIN01S:Addresses the compromised host but not domain control.

C. Rotating KRBTGT password:Invalidates stolen Kerberos tickets, mitigating domain control per CAS-005’s focus on identity security.

Unauthorized code changesand lack ofindependent verificationare directly mitigated bycode signing, which ensures that code is from a trusted source and has not been altered.

While digital signatures are part of code signing, the broader practice of code signing encompasses signature management, version integrity, and trusted sources.

Lightweight cryptography is irrelevant in this context; it's more about efficiency in constrained devices.

Non-repudiation is a benefit of digital signatures but doesn't directly solve the verification/integrity concerns alone.

FromCAS-005 Guide, Domain 4: Security Architecture, Tools, and Technologies:

“Code signing ensures that the code has not been tampered with and originates from a trusted developer.”

DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) digitally signs outbound messages with the organization’s private key, enabling recipients to verify integrity and authenticity using the corresponding public key in DNS.

SPF validates sending server IPs, not message integrity.

DMARC builds policy enforcement on top of SPF and DKIM results.

TLS secures the transport channel, not the message content itself.

User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) is the best solution to help the company overcome challenges associated with suspicious activity that cannot be categorized by traditional detection tools. UEBA uses advanced analytics to establish baselines of normal behavior for users and entities within the network. It then identifies deviations from these baselines, which may indicate malicious activity. This approach is particularly effective for detecting unknown threats and sophisticated attacks that do not match known indicators of compromise (IoCs).

The table indicates varying load times for users accessing the website from different geographic locations. Customers from Australia and India are experiencingsignificantly higher load times compared to those from the United States. This suggests that latency and geographical distance are affecting the website's performance.

A. IDS (Intrusion Detection System): While an IDS is useful for detecting malicious activities, it does not address performance issues related to latency and geographical distribution of content.

B. CDN (Content Delivery Network): A CDN stores copies of the website's content in multiple geographic locations. By serving content from the nearest server to the user, a CDN can significantly reduce load times and improve user experience globally.

C. WAF (Web Application Firewall): A WAF protects web applications by filtering and monitoring HTTP traffic but does not improve performance related to geographical latency.

D. NAC (Network Access Control): NAC solutions control access to network resources but are not designed to address web performance issues.

Implementing a CDN is the best solution to resolve the performance issues observed in the log output.

OpenSSH vulnerabilityispublic facingand has acritical CVSS of 9.2.

Exploitable SSH services can lead to direct server compromise.

Although Apache has a higher score, it's internal.

FromCAS-005, Domain 3: Vulnerability Management:

“Prioritize external vulnerabilities with high CVSS and exposed attack surfaces.”

To support email authenticity and enable analysis by a third-party platform, the protocols must verify the sender’s identity and provide metadata for inspection. According to the CompTIA SecurityX CAS-005 study guide (Domain 3: Cybersecurity Technology, 3.2):

DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance):DMARC builds on SPF and DKIM to enforce policies for email authenticity and provides reporting mechanisms to share authentication results with third parties for analysis.

DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail):DKIM adds a cryptographic signature to emails, allowing recipients to verify the sender’s domain and ensure the email’s integrity.

These two protocols are essential for authenticity and reporting.

Option C (TLS):TLS ensures encryption during transmission but does not address authenticity or reporting.

Option D (SPF):SPF verifies sender IP addresses but lacks reporting capabilities without DMARC.

Option E (DNSSEC):DNSSEC secures DNS queries but is not specific to email authenticity.

Option F (MX):MX records define mail servers, not authenticity or reporting.

Integrating IDS, firewall, and DLP to reduce response time requires orchestration and automation. Let’s evaluate:

A. SOAR(Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response):SOAR integrates security tools, automates workflows, and speeds up incident response. It’s the best fit for this scenario, as CAS-005 highlights SOAR for operational efficiency.

B. CWPP (CloudWorkload Protection Platform):Focused on securing cloud workloads, not integrating on-premises tools.

C. XCCDF (Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format):A standard for compliance checklists, not a tool for integration or response.

The logs indicate unauthorized access from104.18.16.29, an external IP, to the building camera’s administrative console during off-hours.Restricting access only to approved IPsensures that only authorized personnel can remotely control the cameras, reducing the risk of unauthorized access and manipulation.

Implementing WAF protection (A)secures against web application attacks but does not restrict unauthorized administrative access.

Upgrading the firmware (B)is good security hygiene but does not immediately mitigate the active threat.

Blocking IP 104.18.16.29 (D)is a temporary measure, as an attacker can switch to another IP. A better long-term solution is whitelisting trusted IPs.

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) in Operational Technology (OT) environments commonly useLadder Logic, a graphical programming language resembling electrical relay logic diagrams. It’s the most relevant for PLCs due to its widespread use in industrial automation.

Option A:Ladder Logic is the standard for PLC programming, making it the best choice.

Option B:Rust is modern and secure but not typically used for PLCs.

Option C:C is used in some embedded systems but less common for PLCs.

Option D:Python is versatile but not native to PLC programming.

Option E:Java is rare in PLC contexts.

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) supports change management by securing messages (e.g., approvals, updates).Non-repudiation, provided via digital signatures, ensures a sender cannot deny sending a message, critical for auditability in change processes.

Option A:Correct—PKI’s digital signatures ensure non-repudiation.

Option B:Confidentiality (via encryption) is a PKI feature but less tied to change management’s focus on accountability.

Option C:Delivery receipts are not aPKI function; they’re protocol-specific (e.g., SMTP).

Option D:Attestation relates to verifying attributes, not a direct PKI message capability.

The beststrategy for securely managing cryptographic material is to use a Hardware Security Module (HSM). Here’s why:

Security and Integrity: HSMs are specialized hardware devices designed to protect and manage digital keys. They provide high levels of physical and logical security, ensuring that cryptographic material is well protected against tampering and unauthorized access.

Centralized Key Management: Using HSMs allows for centralized management of cryptographic keys, reducing the risks associated with decentralized and potentially insecure key storage practices, such as on personal laptops.

Compliance and Best Practices: HSMs comply with various industry standards and regulations (such as FIPS 140-2) for secure key management. This ensures that the organization adheres to best practices and meets compliance requirements.