IIBA IIBA-CCA Dumps

Logging requirements in cybersecurity focus on ensuring the system can produce reliable, actionable records that support detection, investigation, compliance, and accountability. The most fundamental capability is the ability torecord information about user access and actionswithin the system. This includes authentication events such as logon success or failure, logoff, session creation, and privilege elevation; authorization decisions such as access granted or denied; and security-relevant actions such as viewing, creating, modifying, deleting, exporting, or transmitting sensitive data. Good security logging also captures context like timestamp synchronization, user or service identity, source device or IP, target resource, action performed, and outcome.

This capability supports multiple operational needs. Security monitoring teams rely on logs to identify anomalies like repeated failed logins, unusual access times, access from unexpected locations, or high-risk administrative changes. Incident responders need logs to reconstruct timelines, confirm scope, and preserve evidence. Auditors and compliance teams require logs to demonstrate control effectiveness, segregation of duties, and traceability of changes.

The other options are not sufficient to satisfy logging requirements. Single sign-on can simplify authentication but does not guarantee application-level activity logging. Integration with specialized tools may be useful, but the solution must first generate the required events. Deployment model options do not address whether the system can create detailed audit trails. Therefore, the required capability is recording user access and actions in the system.

In NIST-style risk assessment,overall likelihoodis not a single guess; it is derived by considering two related likelihood components. First isthe likelihood that a threat event will be initiated. This reflects how probable it is that a threat actor or source will attempt the attack or that a threat event will occur, considering factors such as adversary capability, intent, targeting, opportunity, and environmental conditions. Second isthe likelihood that an initiated event will succeed, meaning the attempt results in the adverse outcome. This depends heavily on the organization’s existing protections and conditions, including control strength, system exposure, vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, detection and response capability, and user behavior.

Option A matches this structure: analysts evaluate bothattack initiation likelihoodandinitiated attack success likelihoodto reach an overall view of likelihood. A high initiation likelihood with low success likelihood might occur when an organization is frequently targeted but has strong defenses. Conversely, low initiation likelihood with high success likelihood might apply to niche systems that are rarely targeted but poorly protected.

The other options are incomplete or misplaced. Risk impact is a separate dimension from likelihood, and mitigation strategy is an output of risk treatment, not an input to likelihood. Site traffic and commerce volume can influence exposure but do not define likelihood by themselves. Past experience and trends are useful evidence, but they support estimating the two likelihood components rather than replacing them.

AnAccess Control List (ACL)is a structured, system-maintained list of authorization rules that specifieswho or what is allowed to access a resourceand what actions are permitted. In many operating systems, network devices, and applications, an ACL functions as an internal table that maps identities such as user IDs, group IDs, service accounts, or even device/terminal identifiers to permissions like read, write, execute, modify, delete, or administer. When a subject attempts to access an object, the system consults the ACL to determine whether the requested operation should be allowed or denied, enforcing the organization’s security policy at runtime.

The description in the question matches the classic definition of an ACL as a computerized table of access rules tied to login IDs and sometimes the originating endpoint or terminal context. ACLs are central to implementingdiscretionary access controland are also widely used in networking (for example, permitting or denying traffic flows based on source/destination and ports) and file systems (controlling access to folders and files).

AnAccess Control Entry (ACE)is only a single line item within an ACL (one rule for one subject). A “Relational Access Database” is not a standard security control term for authorization tables. A “Directory Management System” manages identities and groups, but it is not the same as the enforcement list attached to a specific resource. Therefore, the correct answer isAccess Control List.

Incident management is a structured operational process used to ensure security issues are handled consistently, evidence is preserved, impact is reduced, and improvements are implemented to prevent recurrence. The phases listed in option B match how incident management is commonly documented in operational security programs.

Reportingis the entry point: users, monitoring tools, and service desks raise alerts or tickets, capturing what happened, when, and initial impact. Clear reporting channels and defined severity criteria ensure incidents are escalated quickly and handled by the right teams.Investigationfollows, focusing on fact-finding and evidence collection such as logs, endpoint telemetry, network traces, and user statements.Assessmentdetermines scope, business impact, affected assets and data, and the likelihood of continuing compromise. This step drives prioritization and selects the appropriate handling path.

Corrective actionsimplement containment, eradication, and recovery activities, such as isolating hosts, disabling compromised accounts, applying patches, rotating credentials, restoring from backups, and validating system integrity. Corrective actions also include communications, documentation, and coordination with legal, privacy, and business stakeholders when required. Finally,reviewis the lessons-learned phase that updates playbooks, improves detections, closes control gaps, and ensures root causes are addressed through durable fixes rather than temporary workarounds.

The other options do not represent standard incident management phases: A is a marketing model, while C and D are incomplete or mis-ordered compared to established incident management lifecycle documentation.

In the United States,HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, is the primary federal framework that governs how certain healthcare information must be protected and used. In cybersecurity and compliance documentation, HIPAA is most often discussed through its implementing rules, especially thePrivacy Ruleand theSecurity Rule. The Privacy Rule establishes when protected health information may be used or disclosed and grants individuals rights over their health information. The Security Rule focuses specifically on safeguarding electronic protected health information by requiring administrative, physical, and technical safeguards.

From a security controls perspective, HIPAA-driven programs typically include risk analysis and risk management, policies and workforce training, access controls based on least privilege, unique user identification, authentication controls, audit logging, integrity protections, transmission security such as encryption for data in transit, and contingency planning such as backups and disaster recovery. HIPAA also expects organizations to manage third-party risk through appropriate agreements and oversight when vendors handle protected health information.

The other options do not fit the question. The Privacy Act generally applies to U.S. federal agencies’ handling of personal records, PIPEDA is a Canadian privacy law, and PCI-DSS is an industry security standard focused on payment card data rather than healthcare data. Therefore, HIPAA is the correct legislation for U.S. healthcare data protection requirements.

Opportunity cost is a core enterprise-risk and economics concept: when an organization allocates limited resources to one activity, it reduces what is available for other priorities. Increasing cybersecurity typically requiresmoney, skilled personnel time, executive attention, tooling, and operational capacity. Those resources could otherwise be used for revenue-generating work such as new product features, customer experience improvements, system modernization, market expansion, or process automation. That tradeoff is exactly what option D describes, making it the correct answer.

Cybersecurity documents stress that risk treatment decisions must balancerisk reductionagainstcost, feasibility, and business impact. While stronger security can reduce the likelihood and impact of incidents, it can also introduce friction (extra approval steps, stronger authentication, segmentation), slow delivery when changes require additional reviews, and demand ongoing operational effort (monitoring, patching, vulnerability remediation, access recertification, incident response testing). These impacts are not arguments against security; they are the reason governance processes prioritize controls based on the most critical assets, highest-risk threats, and compliance requirements.

Option A may be true in some cases, but it describes a direct cost, not the broader economic concept of opportunity cost. Option B is a trend statement and not the definition. Option C is incorrect because security spend is not always less than breach risk; organizations must evaluate cost-benefit and acceptable residual risk rather than assume a universal rule.

Cybersecurity controls are the safeguards an organization implements to reduce risk to an acceptable level. In standard risk-management language, a control is not limited to a one-time review; it is an ongoing capability that is designed, implemented, and operated to prevent, detect, or correct unwanted events. That capability is typically delivered throughtechnology solutions(technical controls) andprocess solutions(administrative or procedural controls), which is why option B is correct.

Technology controls include items like firewalls, endpoint protection, encryption, multifactor authentication, logging and monitoring, vulnerability scanning, secure configuration baselines, and data-loss prevention. These controls directly enforce security requirements through system behavior and automation, helping reduce the likelihood or impact of threats.

Process controls include policies, standards, access approval workflows, segregation of duties, change management, secure development practices, incident response playbooks, training, and periodic access recertification. These ensure people consistently perform security-critical tasks correctly and create accountability and repeatability.

Options C and D describe possible outcomes or limitations (controls may not fully eliminate risk and may only mitigate part of it), but they are not what controlsinclude. Option A is incorrect because “only initial reviews” are insufficient; reviews can be a component of a control, but effective controls require sustained operation, evidence, and reassessment as systems, threats, and business needs change.

An organization’s risk management strategy is a governance-level artifact that sets direction for how risk is managed across the enterprise. A core requirement in cybersecurity governance frameworks is clear accountability, including executive ownership for risk decisions that affect the whole organization. Assigning an executive responsible for risk management establishes authority to set risk appetite and tolerance, coordinate risk activities across business units, resolve conflicts between competing priorities, and ensure risk decisions are made consistently rather than in isolated silos. This executive role also supports oversight of risk reporting to senior leadership, ensures resources are allocated to address material risks, and drives integration between cybersecurity, privacy, compliance, and operational resilience programs. Without an accountable executive function, risk management often becomes fragmented, with inconsistent scoring, uneven control implementation, and unclear decision rights for accepting or treating risk.

Option A can be part of a strategy, but the question asks what should be addressed, and the most critical foundational element is enterprise accountability and governance. Option B is too granular for a strategy; selecting controls for each IT asset belongs in security architecture, control baselines, and system-level risk assessments. Option C is typically handled in incident response and breach management plans and procedures, which are operational documents derived from strategy but not the strategy itself. Therefore, the best answer is the assignment of an executive responsible for risk management across the organization.

Creating a fake website to trick individuals into entering usernames and passwords is a classic example of phishing. Phishing is a social engineering technique where an attacker impersonates a trusted entity to deceive a victim into disclosing sensitive information (credentials, personal data, payment details) or taking an action that benefits the attacker (downloading malware, approving an MFA prompt, wiring funds). A counterfeit login page is commonly used in credential-harvesting campaigns: the victim believes they are authenticating to a legitimate service, but the credentials are captured by the attacker and later used for account takeover. This is not necessarily a breach yet because the question describes an attempt to acquire credentials; a breach would be confirmed unauthorized access or disclosure. While phishing is a kind of threat, “threat” is too broad compared to the specific described behavior. It is also not ransomware, which focuses on encrypting or locking data and demanding payment. Cybersecurity documentation emphasizes layered defenses against phishing: user awareness training, email and web filtering, domain and certificate validation, anti-spoofing controls, strong authentication (especially MFA resistant to prompt fatigue), password managers that reduce credential entry on lookalike domains, and monitoring for suspicious logins. Because the attack relies on deception through a fake website to steal credentials, the best match is phishing.

SSL and its successor TLS arecryptographic protocolsdesigned to provide secure communications over untrusted networks. The encryption capability comes from theTLS protocol suite, which defines how two endpoints negotiate security settings, authenticate, exchange keys, and protect data as it travels between them. During the TLS handshake, the endpoints agree on a cipher suite, establish shared session keys using secure key exchange methods, and then use symmetric encryption and integrity checks to protect application data against eavesdropping and tampering. Because TLS specifies these mechanisms and the sequence of steps, it is accurate to say that encryption capability is provided byprotocols.

Certificates are important but they are not the encryption mechanism itself. Digital certificates primarily supportauthentication and trustby binding a public key to an identity and enabling verification through a trusted certificate authority chain. Certificates help prevent impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks by allowing clients to validate the server’s identity, and in mutual TLS they can validate both parties. However, certificates alone do not define how encryption is negotiated or applied; TLS does.

Passwords are unrelated to transport encryption; they are an authentication secret and do not provide session encryption for network traffic. “Controls” is too general: SSL/TLS is indeed a security control, but the question asks specifically what provides the encryption capability. That capability is implemented and standardized by the SSL/TLSprotocols, which orchestrate key establishment and encrypted communication.

The principle of least privilege requires that users, administrators, services, and applications are granted only the minimum access necessary to perform authorized job functions, and nothing more. Option A follows this principle because the administrator’s elevated permissions are limited in scope to the specific applications they are responsible for supporting. This reduces the attack surface and limits blast radius: if that administrator account is compromised, the attacker’s reach is constrained to only those applications rather than the entire enterprise environment.

Least privilege is typically implemented through role-based access control, separation of duties, and privileged access management practices. These controls ensure privileges are assigned based on defined roles, reviewed regularly, and removed when no longer required. They also promote using standard user accounts for routine tasks and reserving administrative actions for controlled, auditable sessions. In addition, least privilege supports stronger accountability through logging and change tracking, because fewer people have the ability to make high-impact changes across systems.

The other scenarios violate least privilege. Option B grants excessive enterprise-wide permissions, creating unnecessary risk and enabling widespread damage from mistakes or compromise. Option C provides “just in case” administrative access, which cybersecurity guidance explicitly discourages because it increases exposure without a validated business need. Option D is overly broad because access to all HR files exceeds what is required for performance appraisals, which typically should be limited to relevant employee records only.

Risk mitigation is the risk treatment approach focused onreducing risk to an acceptable levelby lowering either the likelihood of a risk event, the impact of that event, or both. In cybersecurity risk management, mitigation is accomplished by implementingcontrols and countermeasuressuch as technical safeguards, process changes, and administrative measures. Examples include patching vulnerable systems, hardening configurations, enabling multi-factor authentication, applying least privilege, network segmentation, encryption, improved logging and monitoring, secure development practices, and user awareness training. Each of these actions reduces exposure or limits damage if an incident occurs.

The other options describe different risk treatment strategies, not mitigation. Purchasing insurance is generally consideredrisk transfer, where financial impact is shifted to a third party, but the underlying threat and vulnerability may still exist. Eliminating risk by stopping the risky activity isrisk avoidance; it removes the exposure by discontinuing the process, system, or behavior causing the risk. Documenting the risk and preparing a recovery plan aligns more closely withrisk acceptancecombined withcontingency planningor resilience planning; it acknowledges the risk and focuses on recovery rather than reducing the probability of occurrence.

Therefore, the correct definition of risk mitigation is reducing the risk through implementing one or more countermeasures.

Personal information is classified primarily based on the harm that could result fromunauthorized disclosure, which maps directly to theconfidentialityobjective. Cybersecurity and privacy governance frameworks treat personal data as sensitive because exposure can lead to identity theft, fraud, discrimination, personal safety risks, and loss of privacy. Organizations also face regulatory penalties, contractual consequences, and reputational damage when personal data is disclosed without authorization. For this reason, when determining classification, the first and most influential question is typically: “What is the impact if this data becomes known to someone who should not have it?” That impact assessment drives the required protection level and handling rules.

Confidentiality-focused controls then follow from the classification decision, including least privilege and role-based access, strong authentication, encryption at rest and in transit, secure key management, data loss prevention where appropriate, logging and monitoring of access to sensitive records, and strict sharing/transfer procedures.

Integrity and availability matter for personal information, but they are usually secondary in classification decisions. Integrity affects trustworthiness and correctness (for example, incorrect medical or payroll data), and availability affects the ability to access records when needed. However, the defining sensitivity of personal information is that it must not be disclosed improperly. “Accessibility” is not a core security objective used in standard classification models; it is an operational usability concept that is managed through access design after sensitivity is established.

Multiple attempts by unauthorized users to access confidential data most closely aligns with activity from a hacker, meaning an unauthorized actor attempting to gain access to systems or information. Cybersecurity operations commonly observe this pattern as repeated login failures, password-spraying, credential-stuffing, brute-force attempts, repeated probing of restricted endpoints, or abnormal access requests against protected repositories. While “user” is too generic and could include authorized individuals, the question explicitly states “unauthorized users,” pointing to malicious or illegitimate actors. “Admin” and “IT Support” are roles typically associated with legitimate privileged access and operational troubleshooting; repeated unauthorized access attempts from those roles would be atypical and would still represent compromise or misuse rather than normal operations. Cybersecurity documentation often classifies these attempts as indicators of malicious intent and potential precursor events to a breach. Controls recommended to counter such activity include strong authentication (multi-factor authentication), account lockout and throttling policies, anomaly detection, IP reputation filtering, conditional access, least privilege, and monitoring of authentication logs for patterns across accounts and geographies. The key distinction is that repeated unauthorized attempts represent hostile behavior by an external or rogue actor, which is best described as a hacker in the provided options.

The OSISession Layer(Layer 5) is responsible forestablishing, managing, and terminating sessionsbetween communicating applications. A session is the logical dialogue that allows two endpoints to coordinate how communication starts, how it continues, and how it ends. This includes controlling the “conversation” state, such as who can transmit at what time, maintaining the session so it stays active, and closing it cleanly when it is no longer needed. Because of this, option A best matches the Session Layer’s core responsibilities.

In contrast,presenting data to the receiver in a recognizable formis the job of thePresentation Layer(Layer 6), which deals with formatting, encoding, compression, and often cryptographic transformation concepts.Adding appropriate network addresses to packetsaligns to theNetwork Layer(Layer 3), where logical addressing and routing decisions occur, typically associated with IP addressing.Transmitting the data on the mediumis handled at thePhysical Layer(Layer 1), which concerns signals, cabling, and the actual movement of bits.

From a cybersecurity perspective, session management is important because weaknesses can enablesession hijacking, replay, or fixation, especially when session identifiers are predictable, not protected, or not properly invalidated. Controls commonly include strong authentication, secure session token generation, timeout and reauthentication rules, and proper session termination to reduce exposure.

In cybersecurity guidance,employees are often described as the first and last line of defensebecause human actions influence nearly every stage of an attack. They are thefirst linesince many threats begin with user interaction: phishing emails, malicious links, social engineering calls, unsafe file handling, weak passwords, and accidental disclosure of sensitive information. A well-trained user who recognizes suspicious requests, verifies identities, and reports anomalies can stop an incident before any technical control is even engaged.

Employees are also thelast linebecause technical protections such as firewalls, filters, and endpoint tools are not perfect. Attackers routinely bypass or evade automated defenses using stolen credentials, living-off-the-land techniques, misconfigurations, or novel malware. When those controls fail, the organization still depends on people to apply secure behaviors: following least privilege, protecting credentials, using multifactor authentication correctly, confirming out-of-band requests for payments or data, and escalating unusual activity quickly. Incident response, containment, and recovery also depend on humans making correct decisions under pressure, following documented procedures, and communicating accurately.

Cybersecurity documents emphasize that a strong security culture, regular awareness training, role-based education, clear reporting channels, and consistent policy enforcement reduce human-enabled risk and turn employees into an effective security control rather than a vulnerability.

“Strengthen the security from lessons learned” fits theremediationstage because it focuses on eliminating root causes and improving controls so the same incident is less likely to recur. In incident management lifecycles,responseis about immediate actions to contain and manage the incident (triage, containment, eradication actions in progress, communications, and preserving evidence).Detectionis the identification and confirmation stage (alerts, analysis, validation, and initial classification).Recoveryis restoring services to normal operation and verifying stability, including bringing systems back online, validating data integrity, and meeting recovery objectives.

After the environment is stable, organizations conduct a post-incident review and then implement corrective and preventive actions. That work is remediation: closing exploited vulnerabilities, hardening configurations, rotating credentials and keys, tightening access and privileged account controls, improving monitoring and logging coverage, updating firewall rules or segmentation, refining secure development practices, and correcting process gaps such as weak change management or incomplete asset inventory. Remediation also includes updating policies and playbooks, enhancing detection rules based on observed attacker techniques, and training targeted groups if human factors contributed.

Cybersecurity guidance emphasizes documenting lessons learned, assigning owners and deadlines, validating fixes, and tracking completion because “lessons learned” without implemented change does not reduce risk. The defining characteristic is durable improvement to the control environment, which is why this activity belongs toremediationrather than response, detection, or recovery.

Apatchis a vendor- or developer-provided update intended to correct defects in software, includingprogramming errorsandsecurity vulnerabilities. Cybersecurity and IT operations documents describe patching as a primary method of vulnerability remediation because many attacks succeed by exploiting known weaknesses for which fixes already exist. When a vulnerability is disclosed, the vendor may publish a patch that changes code, updates components, adjusts configuration defaults, or replaces vulnerable libraries. Applying the patch reduces the likelihood that an attacker can use that weakness to gain unauthorized access, execute malicious code, elevate privileges, or disrupt availability.

A patch is different from acontrol, which is a broader safeguard (technical, administrative, or physical) used to reduce risk; patching itself can be part of a control, such as a patch management program. It is also different from arelease, which is a broader software distribution that may include new features, improvements, and multiple fixes; a patch is usually more targeted and may be issued between major releases. Alogis an audit record of events and is used for monitoring, troubleshooting, and incident investigation—not for fixing code defects.

Cybersecurity guidance emphasizes disciplined patch management: maintaining asset inventories, prioritizing patches by risk and exposure, testing changes, deploying promptly, verifying installation, and documenting exceptions to manage residual risk.

A Business Analyst documents current technology in the “as-is” state because business processes are rarely isolated; they depend on applications, interfaces, data exchanges, identity services, and shared infrastructure. From a cybersecurity perspective, replacing one solution can unintentionally change trust boundaries, authentication flows, authorization decisions, logging coverage, and data movement across integrated systems. Option B is correct because understanding the current technology landscape helps identify where security impacts may occur across the value chain, including upstream data providers, downstream consumers, third-party services, and internal platforms that rely on the existing system.

Cybersecurity documents emphasize that integration points are common attack surfaces. APIs, file transfers, message queues, single sign-on, batch jobs, and shared databases can introduce risks such as broken access control, insecure data transmission, data leakage, privilege escalation, and gaps in monitoring. If the BA captures current integrations, dependencies, and data flows, the delivery team can properly perform threat modeling, define security requirements, and avoid breaking compensating controls that other systems depend on. This also supports planning for secure decommissioning, migration, and cutover, ensuring credentials, keys, service accounts, and network paths are rotated or removed appropriately.

The other options are less precise for the question. Training is not the core driver for documenting current technology. Governance requirements apply broadly but do not explain why current tech must be included. Data classification is important, but it is a separate activity from capturing technology dependencies needed to assess integration security impacts.

When analyzing a web-based business environment for potential cost savings, the Business Analyst must account forapplication vulnerabilitiesbecause they directly affect the organization’s exposure to cyber attack and the true cost of operating a system. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in application code, configuration, components, or dependencies that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. In web environments, common examples include insecure authentication, injection flaws, broken access control, misconfigurations, outdated libraries, and weak session management.

Cost-saving recommendations frequently involve consolidating platforms, reducing tooling, lowering support effort, retiring controls, delaying upgrades, or moving to shared services. Without including known or likely vulnerabilities, the analysis can unintentionally recommend changes that reduce preventive and detective capability, increase attack surface, or extend the time vulnerabilities remain unpatched. Cybersecurity governance guidance emphasizes that technology rationalization must consider security posture: vulnerable applications often require additional controls (patching cadence, WAF rules, monitoring, code fixes, penetration testing, secure SDLC work) that carry ongoing cost. These costs are part of the system’s “total cost of ownership” and should be weighed against proposed savings.

While impact severity and threat likelihood are important for overall risk scoring, the question asks what risk factor must be included when documenting the current state of a web-based environment. The most essential factor that ties directly to the environment’s condition and drives remediation cost and exposure isapplication vulnerabilities.

SSL/TLS relies ondigital certificatesto support encrypted communications and to help users trust that they are connecting to the correct server. A TLS certificate is typically anX.509 certificatethat binds a public key to an identity, such as a domain name, and is digitally signed by a trusted issuer. In most public internet use cases, these certificates are issued byCertificate Authoritiesthat browsers and operating systems already trust through pre-installed root certificates. Because of that trust chain, organizations commonly obtain certificates by purchasing or otherwise obtaining them from certificate authorities, which is why option B is correct.

During the TLS handshake, the server presents its certificate to the client. The client validates the certificate’s signature chain, validity period, and that the certificate matches the domain being accessed. Once validated, TLS establishes session keys used to encrypt data in transit and protect it from eavesdropping and tampering. Certificates themselves are not “similar to unencrypted data,” and they are not specific to thumb-drive storage; they are used to secure network communications. Certificates also do not primarily provide “authorization” to access data. Authorization is typically enforced by application and access control mechanisms after authentication. Certificates supportauthenticationof endpoints and enable secure key exchange, which are prerequisites for secure transport encryption and trustworthy connections.

Role-based access control assigns permissions to defined roles that reflect job functions, and users receive access by being placed into the appropriate role. The major operational and security benefit is that itsimplifies and standardizes access provisioning. Instead of granting permissions individually to each user, administrators manage a smaller, controlled set of roles such as Accounts Payable Clerk, HR Specialist, or Application Administrator. When a new employee joins or changes responsibilities, access can be adjusted quickly and consistently by changing role membership. This reduces manual errors, limits over-provisioning, and helps enforce least privilege because each role is designed to include only the permissions required for that function.

RBAC also improves governance by making access decisions more repeatable and policy-driven. Security and compliance teams can review roles, validate that each role’s permissions match business needs, and require approvals for changes to role definitions. This approach supports segregation of duties by separating conflicting capabilities into different roles, which lowers fraud and misuse risk.

Option B is a real advantage of RBAC, but it is typically a secondary outcome of having structured roles rather than the primary “significant benefit” emphasized in access-control design. Option C relates to identity lifecycle processes such as deprovisioning, which can be integrated with RBAC but is not guaranteed by RBAC alone. Option D describes distributing tasks among multiple users, which is more aligned with segregation of duties design, not the core benefit of RBAC.