Juniper JN0-232 Dumps

Afeature profilein a UTM (Unified Threat Management) configuration defines how a specific UTM feature should operate. Examples include:

Anantivirus feature profilethat specifies the type of scanning to perform (streaming or full file-based).

Aweb filtering feature profilethat defines filtering methods, categories, and actions.

Anantispam profilethat defines how spam detection and actions are performed.

Feature profiles do not directly apply to traffic or policies. Instead, they arereferenced inside a UTM policy, and then that policy is applied to a security policy.

Therefore, a feature profile’s purpose is todefine the operation of a specific UTM feature.

Security policies on SRX support several actions:

Permit:Allows traffic to pass according to the rule.

Deny:Silently drops the traffic without notifying the source.

Reject:Drops the trafficand sends a TCP RST (for TCP) or ICMP unreachable (for UDP/other protocols)back to the source. This provides feedback to the sending host.

Next-policy:Allows policy chaining to evaluate the next policy set.

Therefore, the action that causes traffic to drop and a message to be sent to the source isreject.

In Juniper SRX flow-based packet processing, theflow moduleis responsible for security functions such as screening, session management, NAT, and policy enforcement. The processing order is critical:

Screens are applied before any session lookup.This ensures that packets are inspected for anomalies, floods, or protocol violations before consuming resources for session management. Examples of these screens include TCP SYN flood protection, ICMP flood protection, and port scanning protection.

After screening, thesession lookupoccurs. At this point, the firewall checks whether the packet belongs to an existing session in the session table. If a matching session is found, the packet bypasses policy evaluation and is forwarded according to the session state.

If no existing session is found, the packet continues throughroute lookup, NAT processing, and security policy evaluationbefore a new session is created.

Thus,screening occurs before the session lookup, protecting the system early in the flow process. This design ensures efficiency by dropping malicious or malformed traffic before allocating session resources.

License Requirement (Option B):NextGen Web Filtering (NGWF) is a licensed feature on SRX devices. Without a license, the service cannot operate.

Local vs. Cloud Lists (Option C):NGWF checkslocal block/allow lists first. If the URL does not match locally, the request is then checked against the Juniper cloud database.

Option A:Incorrect, since the cloud is only consulted if the URL is not in the local list.

Option D:Incorrect, as NGWF requires a valid subscription/license.

Correct Statements:NGWF requires a license, and it checks local lists before cloud lookup.

Routing instances:Security zones are local to their routing instance. Theycannot be shared between routing instances(Option B is correct). Each routing instance must define its own zones.

Intrazone and interzone traffic:Both types of traffic require policies in Junos OS. Intrazone traffic must have an explicit intra-zone policy to be controlled (Option C is correct).

Sharing zones:Option A is incorrect, as zones cannot span routing instances.

Multiple zones:SRX devices fully support multiple security zones (trust, untrust, DMZ, etc.). Option D is incorrect.

Correct Statements:B and C

When troubleshooting packet handling on an SRX Series device, administrators need to understand exactly how theflow moduleis processing traffic. The most effective tool for this is theflow traceoptions feature.

Flow traceoptions:Provides detailed per-packet trace information showing each processing step within the flow module. It reveals how traffic is evaluated against session tables, NAT rules, and security policies. This is the recommended method for in-depth troubleshooting.

Why not the others?

Theflow session table(Option A) shows only active sessions and counters, not detailed step-by-step handling.

Theforwarding table(Option B) relates to routing and forwarding decisions, not flow security processing.

Firewall filters(Option D) can match and log traffic but do not display detailed flow processing steps.

Therefore, the correct method to get detailed information about flow handling is toenable flow traceoptions.

SSH Access (Option B):Host-inbound-traffic controls traffic destined to the SRX device itself (management/control plane). If host-inbound-traffic is not configured to allow SSH, then SSH access to the firewall is blocked.

Explicit Zone Configuration (Option D):For user-defined security zones, host-inbound-traffic must be explicitly configured to allow specific services (SSH, ICMP, SNMP, etc.).

Console Access (Option A):Console access is not controlled by host-inbound-traffic. Console access is always available directly.

Management Zone (Option C):In the management functional zone, host-inbound-traffic is implicitly allowed for management services, so this is not explicitly required.

Correct Statements:B and D

Exception traffic refers to traffic that must be sent from thePacket Forwarding Engine (PFE) to the Routing Engine (RE)for processing, such as routing protocol updates, management traffic, and control-plane destined packets.

Option B:Correct. Exception traffic is rate-limited on the internal connection between the PFE and RE to protect the Routing Engine from denial-of-service attacks.

Option A:Incorrect. Exception traffic is not handled only on the PFE; it requires RE involvement.

Option C:Incorrect. Rejected traffic by security policies is simply dropped, not classified as exception traffic.

Option D:Incorrect. Malformed packets are dropped, not considered exception traffic.

Correct Statement:Exception traffic is rate-limited between the PFE and RE.

Inbound Flow (before NAT):Source =10.20.30.40(internal private IP)Destination =203.0.113.1(public DNS server)

Outbound Flow (after NAT):Source =192.0.2.1(translated IP)Destination =203.0.113.1(unchanged)

Analysis:

Thesource IP (10.20.30.40)was translated to192.0.2.1. This indicatesSource NATwas applied →Option B is correct.

Thedestination IP changedbetween the inbound and outbound view. Inbound it was203.0.113.1, and outbound it is still203.0.113.1in appearance, but notice the reversal: the session entry shows it as the outbound "source" side. This confirmsDestination NAT translation has occurredfor return flow consistency →Option D is correct.

Option A:Incorrect. The original source IP was indeed translated.

Option C:Incorrect. The destination IP did change in the flow processing.

Correct Statements:

The original source IP address was translated to a new source IP address.

The original destination IP address was translated to a new destination IP address.

Source NAT (Network Address Translation) is used on SRX devices to allow hosts with private IP addresses to access external networks, such as the Internet. The SRX translates theprivate IP address of the source host into a public IP addressbefore forwarding traffic toward the destination.

It does not translate MAC addresses (Option A).

NAT is unidirectional in this case: it specifically translates private-to-public in the outbound direction, while the reverse (return traffic) is handled automatically through the session table. It is not a bidirectional translation (Option C).

NAT processing occurs as part of the flow module, not limited only to ingress traffic (Option D).

Therefore, the correct statement is that source NAT translatesprivate IP addresses to public IP addresses.

Juniper SRX evaluatessecurity policiessequentially from top to bottom. Once a policy match is found, no further policies are evaluated. In this exhibit:

First Policy (FTP, deny):

Source: 172.25.11.0/24

Destination: 10.1.0.0/16

Application: FTP

Action: deny⇒Any FTP traffic from 172.25.11.0/24 to 10.1.0.0/16 isdenied.

Second Policy (SSH, permit):

Same source/destination but application = SSH

Action = permit⇒SSH traffic from 172.25.11.0/24 to 10.1.0.0/16 ispermitted.

Third Policy (HTTPS, permit):⇒HTTPS from the same source/destination ispermitted.

Fourth Policy (Ping, permit):

Source: 172.25.11.0/24 to any destination

Application: ping

Action: permit⇒ICMP echo requests (ping) from 172.25.11.0/24 to any destination arepermitted.

Fifth Policy (any → any, deny):⇒Serves as a defaultdeny allat the end.

Now checking each option:

Option A:SSH from 172.25.11.10 → 10.1.0.10 matches theSSH permit rule(second policy).✅Correct.

Option B:Ping from 172.25.11.100 → 10.1.0.10 matches theping permit rule(fourth policy). This traffic is permitted, not denied.❌Incorrect.

Option C:FTP from 10.1.0.10 → 172.25.11.100 isreverse traffic (untrust to trust). The table applies onlytrust → untrust, so this policy does not apply.❌Incorrect.

Option D:FTP from 172.25.11.11 → 10.1.0.10 matches the first policy (FTP deny rule).✅Correct.

Correct Statements:A, D

NAT processing in Junos OS follows a strict sequence to ensure correct packet handling:

Static NAT– applied first because it provides a permanent one-to-one bidirectional mapping.

Destination NAT– applied second to translate inbound destination addresses, often used for servers in private networks.

Source NAT– applied last to translate outbound private source addresses to public ones.

This ensures deterministic behavior and avoids conflicts between translation types.

Options B, C, and D list incorrect sequences.

Correct Order:static NAT → destination NAT → source NAT

When a new packet arrives that does not match an existing session, the SRX performs full flow-based processing. After ingress zone determination, the firewall must know the destination zone to evaluate security policies.

The SRX determines theegress zone by performing a route lookupon the packet’s destination IP address.

The routing decision identifies the outgoing interface, and the zone associated with that interface becomes theegress zone.

Session lookup (Option A) happens first but is only useful for existing sessions.

Destination port (Option B) is used for application identification, not zone determination.

Ingress zone properties (Option D) cannot determine the egress zone.

To enforce acatch-all blocking policyafter other specific policies, the correct solution is aglobal security policy (Option A).

Global policiescan apply universally across zones, and an administrator can configure a final “deny all” rule to block any unmatched traffic.

ATP policy (Option B):Protects against advanced threats, not used for catch-all rule enforcement.

IDP policy (Option C):Focuses on intrusion detection and prevention signatures, not general traffic blocking.

Integrated user firewall policy (Option D):Applies policies based on user identity, but it does not provide a universal block across all services.

Correct Solution:Global security policy

In Junos OS, NAT rules are evaluated intop-down order. When a new rule is added, it is placed at thebottomof the rule set by default.

To move a rule to the top of the rule set, the command is:

set security nat source rule-set rule top

Option A (top):Correct. Moves the specified rule to the top of the list.

Option B (run):Used to execute operational commands, not rule reordering.

Option C (up):Not valid for reordering NAT rules.

Option D (insert):Not a supported NAT reordering command in Junos.

Correct Command:top

Content filtering on SRX devices inspects and controls specific file types transferred across certain application protocols:

SMTP (Option A):Supported. Content filtering can block specific file attachments in emails.

HTTP (Option D):Supported. Content filtering can block downloads of specific file types over web traffic.

SNMP (Option B):Not supported; SNMP is a management protocol, not a content delivery protocol.

TFTP (Option C):Not supported by content filtering.

Correct Protocols:SMTP and HTTP

Unified security policies integratetraditional zone-based policieswithapplication-based policies. Their characteristics include:

Zone-based or global (Option B):Unified policies can be applied as either zone-specific or global policies.

AppID engine (Option C):They leverage the AppID engine for application identification, enabling fine-grained control at the application layer.

Policy matching (Option A):Policies are evaluated sequentially like standard security policies; applications are not matched before policy processing.

Multiple matches (Option D):If multiple policies could match, the first match applies (sequential order), not the “most restrictive.”

Correct Statements:B and C

Default assignment:All logical interfaces are placed in thenull zone by defaultuntil explicitly assigned to a user-defined security zone (Option A is correct).

Removal from null zone:Once an interface is assigned to a security zone, it is removed from the null zone (Option D is correct).

No traffic acceptance:The null zone is a discard zone; it cannot be configured to accept any traffic (Option C is incorrect).

Policy behavior:Traffic rejected by a security policy is dropped according to the policy action. It is not forwarded to the null zone for logging (Option B is incorrect).

Correct Statements:A and D

From the exhibit output:

Policy Information:

Policy: https-access, action-type: permit

From zone: Trust, To zone: Untrust

Application: junos-https

IP protocol: tcp, Destination port: 443

Inactivity timeout: 1800

Sequence number: 1

Analysis:

Option A:Correct. The default inactivity timeout for flow sessions is60 seconds for TCP without activity. This policy shows aninactivity timeout of 1800 seconds, which is non-default.

Option B:Incorrect. The policy shows Sequence number: 1, which means it is thefirst policy, not the second.

Option C:Correct. The policy explicitly matches application junos-https (TCP port 443) and has an action of permit. Therefore, it allows HTTPS traffic.

Option D:Incorrect. This is clearly azone-based policy, but the question asks for two correct statements. Between the four options, the explicitly correct ones are A and C.

Correct Statements:This security policy uses a non-default inactivity timeout, and this security policy permits HTTPS traffic.