Microsoft SC-300 Dumps

Azure AD External collaboration settings govern who can bring guests into the tenant. The SC-300 content specifies: “External collaboration settings let you control who can invite guests (Anyone, Members, Guests, or Only admins and users in the Guest Inviter role) and whether guests can invite.” It also highlights: “To restrict guest invitations to administrators or designated inviters, configure External collaboration to ‘Only admins and users in the Guest Inviter role’ and disable guest-to-guest invitations if required.” Because the problem states that “Anyone in the organization can invite guest users, including other guests and non-administrators,” the remediation is to tighten External collaboration settings so only approved roles (e.g., Global admins, Guest Inviter, or specific administrators) can invite. Access reviews address periodic entitlement verification, Conditional Access enforces sign-in/session policies, and Continuous Access Evaluation relates to token lifetime/signal-based revocation; none of these change who can send guest invitations. Adjusting External collaboration settings directly resolves the issue and aligns with the requirement that “only users that are assigned specific admin roles can invite guest users.”

For Identity Governance (Entitlement Management), the materials clarify who can create and manage access reviews of access packages: “To create or manage access reviews for access packages, you must be a Global administrator, an Identity Governance administrator, a catalog owner for the catalog that contains the access package, or an access package manager.” The exam text also states: “User administrator does not grant the ability to manage entitlement management access reviews unless the user is delegated as a catalog owner or access package manager.” Given the scenario’s user roles, User3 (Identity Governance administrator) and User5 (Global administrator) satisfy these permissions and therefore can create and manage the access review for Package1. By contrast, User4 (User administrator) cannot perform this task by role alone. This selection follows the least-privilege guidance emphasized in SC-300: use specialized governance roles (Identity Governance admin or delegated catalog roles) rather than broad directory roles when possible.

In Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), the per-user device cap is controlled in Devices > Device settings. The SC-300 materials describe that administrators can configure “Users may join devices to Azure AD” and the “Maximum number of devices per user”. The guide notes that this limit defaults to five and is used to “control how many devices a user can join or register in Azure AD”; when users reach the limit, “they cannot add additional devices until the limit is increased or an existing device is removed.” For scenarios like field or sales staff who use multiple devices, the study content recommends adjusting this value to meet business needs. Because A. Datum’s sales users hit the current cap and a requirement states “Increase the maximum number of devices that can be joined or registered to Azure AD to 10,” the fix is to change the tenant’s Device settings—not User settings, Access reviews, or Security defaults. This aligns with the exam objective to configure device settings for Azure AD join and registration and addresses the precise symptom reported by users.

Answer is

This question asks you to apply the stated Technical Requirements for Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) to complete the form. The specific scenario about "User3" is a distraction, as the configuration applies to all users.

The relevant technical requirements are:

"Users must provide one authentication method to reset their password by using SSPR."

This directly dictates the value for the Number of authentication methods required, which is 1.

"Available methods must include: Email, Phone, Security questions, The Microsoft Authenticator app"

This lists all the options that are configured to be available for SSPR, which determines the value for Authentication methods that can be used: Email,Phone,Security questions,The Microsoft Authenticator app.

The requirement is:

“Require admin approval for application access to organizational data.”

According to the Microsoft SC-300 exam guide and Microsoft documentation on “Configure consent settings for applications”, Azure AD provides User consent settings under Enterprise applications → Consent and permissions to control how applications can request permissions to access organizational data.

By default, users can consent to allow apps to access organizational data on their behalf, which can create security risks. To ensure tighter control, administrators can:

Disable user consent entirely, or

Require admin consent workflow so that when users try to grant an app access, it must first be approved by an administrator.

The SC-300 study materials explicitly describe:

“To require administrator approval before an app can access organizational data, configure the User consent settings to use the admin consent workflow.”

This aligns perfectly with the stated requirement — to ensure admin approval is required before apps gain access to organizational data.

Other options are incorrect:

Authentication methods manage MFA and SSPR, not app consent.

Access packages are part of Identity Governance for resource access, not app consent.

Application Proxy publishes on-premises apps, not related to app consent permissions.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Implement and manage synchronization for Azure AD”, Azure AD Connect Cloud Sync is the preferred solution when you need to synchronize objects from multiple Active Directory (AD DS) forests without establishing forest trusts.

The scenario specifies that trust relationships must NOT be established between adatum.com and litware.com, but A. Datum must still sync the AD DS users and groups of litware.com to their existing Azure AD tenant (adatum.com).

The SC-300 training materials clarify:

“Azure AD Connect cloud sync enables syncing from multiple AD forests to a single Azure AD tenant without the need for forest trusts or a full Azure AD Connect installation in each forest.”

Unlike staging mode (which provides a standby sync server for failover) or extending the same Azure AD Connect instance to another domain (which requires trust relationships and network connectivity between forests), Azure AD Connect Cloud Sync uses lightweight agents and does not depend on forest trust.

Therefore, to meet the requirement of syncing Litware’s AD DS to A. Datum’s Azure AD tenant without creating a trust, the correct choice is to configure Azure AD Connect Cloud Sync between the Azure AD tenant and the litware.com domain.

In Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM), the SC-300 materials explain that role assignment type determines how a user obtains permissions. An eligible assignment means the user requests activation when needed; an active assignment grants continuous permissions. As the guide states, “Eligible assignments require the user to activate the role for just-in-time access, while active assignments grant standing access.” To allow users of the User administrator role to request the role when needed, you must set assignments to Eligible rather than active.

The same objective also calls for ensuring this capability is available “for up to one year.” In PIM role configuration, the duration of an eligibility is controlled by the Expire eligible assignments after policy. The documentation describes that administrators can “configure the maximum duration for eligible assignments by setting ‘Expire eligible assignments after’ to a specific period (for example, months up to one year).” Therefore, you must modify the “Expire eligible assignments after” setting to the required period.

No requirement mentions activation justification or ticket metadata; those are optional controls used to add context to activations. Consequently, the two actions that directly satisfy the stated technical requirement are: set all assignments to Eligible (C) and configure “Expire eligible assignments after” (D).

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator official study guide and the Microsoft Learn “Implement and manage Azure AD Identity Protection” module, Azure AD Identity Protection detects two primary categories of risks: user risks and sign-in risks.

User Risk Policy:A user risk represents the probability that a user's identity (credentials) has been compromised. Examples of user risk signals include leaked credentials, unusual sign-ins from different geographies, or sign-ins from infected devices. The Exam Ref SC-300 specifically lists “leaked credentials detected on the dark web or other compromised repositories” as the main trigger for a user risk policy. Such a policy can automatically force password change or enforce MFA to remediate the threat.

Sign-in Risk Policy:A sign-in risk reflects the likelihood that a specific authentication attempt is not performed by the legitimate user. Sign-in risk is based on context, such as sign-ins from suspicious browsers, anonymous IP addresses (like TOR networks), or impossible travel scenarios. The SC-300 documentation highlights these examples as conditions best handled with a sign-in risk policy, where conditional access can block or require MFA for the risky sign-in attempt.

Therefore:

Leaked credentials are addressed through a User Risk Policy, since the account itself is compromised.

Sign-ins from suspicious browsers and access from anonymous IP addresses are handled through Sign-in Risk Policies, as they relate to risky sessions rather than compromised identities.

Assigning built-in directory roles (like Device Administrators) to a group requires a role-assignable group. The SC-300 documentation explains: “You can assign Azure AD roles to a cloud security group by creating the group with the setting ‘Azure AD roles can be assigned to the group.’” It further emphasizes: “This attribute is immutable; you must decide at creation time. You cannot convert an existing group to be role-assignable later.” When a standard security group is not created as role-assignable, it will not appear in the picker when attempting to assign a directory role—exactly the behavior observed: “groups that aren’t role-assignable cannot be selected for Azure AD role assignments.” Therefore, the first step is to recreate IT_Group1 as a role-assignable security group (often called an “eligible for role assignment” group) and then assign the Device Administrators role to that group. Changing membership types (Dynamic User or Dynamic Device) or adding owners does not convert an existing group into a role-assignable one and thus would not resolve the issue.

In SC-300, Azure AD Identity Protection is the prescribed control to “automatically detect and remediate externally leaked credentials.” That specific user risk—Leaked credentials—relies on Microsoft comparing known breached username/password pairs with what Azure AD can evaluate. The study materials explain that Identity Protection “detects leaked credentials when Microsoft finds a match with the user’s current credentials,” and also note that password hash synchronization (PHS) can be enabled even if your sign-in method is Pass-through Authentication or federation. A common exam call-out is that without PHS, Azure AD has no hash to compare, so the leaked-credential signal is unavailable. Enabling PHS (you can keep PTA as the active sign-in method) allows Identity Protection to raise user risk and enforce policy actions such as require password change or block access. By contrast, Azure AD Password Protection addresses banned/weak passwords at change time, not breached-credential telemetry; federation choices (e.g., PingFederate) don’t deliver the leaked-credential signal; and authentication method policy controls how users perform MFA (e.g., methods) rather than whether leaked credentials are detected. Therefore, to meet the requirement to “automatically detect and remediate externally leaked credentials,” the minimum correct step is to enable password hash synchronization while retaining PTA—exactly as recommended in SC-300 guidance.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Monitor and respond to Azure AD events with Azure Sentinel”, multi-staged attacks are advanced threat scenarios that require correlation of multiple events — for example, a suspicious sign-in followed by abnormal Office 365 activity.

The scenario in the question states:

“Litware wants to use the Fusion rule in Azure Sentinel to detect multi-staged attacks that include a combination of suspicious Azure AD sign-ins followed by anomalous Microsoft Office 365 activity.”

Azure Sentinel’s Fusion rule is a built-in, machine-learning–driven correlation rule that automatically detects multi-stage attacks by analyzing anomalies across multiple data sources such as Azure AD sign-in logs, Office 365 activity, and security alerts.

However, to fine-tune detection or meet specific organizational monitoring requirements, administrators can customize the rule logic in Sentinel analytics. This allows you to define how different signals and events are correlated, what thresholds trigger an alert, and how Sentinel interprets combined anomalies.

Microsoft documentation states:

“Fusion uses correlation logic in analytics rules to detect complex multi-stage attacks. Administrators can customize rule logic to meet specific detection requirements and fine-tune alert sensitivity.”

The other options do not meet the requirement:

B. Create a workbook → Used for visualization and reporting, not detection.

C. Add data connectors → Used to ingest data sources; this is already configured.

D. Add a playbook → Used for automated response, not for detection logic configuration.

✅ Correct Answer: A. Customize the Azure Sentinel rule logic

SC-300 emphasizes using Conditional Access with named locations to scope MFA—especially to exclude trusted corporate egress IPs. The materials state that administrators can define named locations by public IP ranges and “mark them as trusted” for policy exceptions. This aligns with the requirement: enforce MFA for all users, but exempt users authenticating from the Boston office. Because Azure AD evaluates the client’s public egress address, private RFC1918 ranges are never seen by Azure AD on the internet, so defining private IP ranges would not work. Likewise, the legacy “Trusted IPs” setting belongs to the old per-user MFA service settings; SC-300 guidance prefers Conditional Access named locations for modern MFA deployments and for combining with other conditions (apps, platforms, user risk, locations). Implementing the Boston office as a named location using its public egress IP range(s), and marking it trusted, lets you exclude that location from the tenant-wide MFA policy while still meeting the broader requirement to enforce MFA for everyone else and for on-prem apps published via Azure AD Application Proxy. In short: define Boston’s public IP as a named location and use it in your Conditional Access policy exclusion to satisfy the exemption precisely and securely.

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) Exam Ref and the Azure AD Dynamic Membership Rules documentation, when you create a dynamic group in Azure Active Directory (now Entra ID), you define rules that automatically add or remove users based on their attributes.

The scenario requires a group named LWGroup1 that contains all Azure AD user accounts for Litware but excludes all guest accounts. In Azure AD, internal users created within the tenant are designated with the attribute user.userType = "Member", while external or guest accounts from partner organizations have user.userType = "Guest".

To ensure only internal (Litware) users are included, the membership rule must:

Ensure the user object exists — by checking (user.objectId -ne null) which confirms that the rule only applies to valid user objects.

Include only members, excluding guests — by filtering with (user.userType -eq "Member").

Hence, the dynamic rule that satisfies these conditions is:

(user.objectId -ne null) and (user.userType -eq "Member")

This rule guarantees that LWGroup1 dynamically includes all internal users from litware.com and excludes all external users or guest accounts (such as Fabrikam users).

This logic aligns precisely with the Microsoft Learn module “Manage groups in Azure Active Directory” and SC-300 study guide section “Implement and manage dynamic membership rules”, which states:

“Use user.userType to distinguish between internal members and external guests when configuring membership rules for dynamic groups.”

✅ Correct Answer:

(user.objectId -ne null) and (user.userType -eq "Member")

In Azure AD Identity Governance, application access granted through Entitlement management is organized around catalogs and access packages. The SC-300 study materials explain that “a catalog is a container for resources and access packages” and that you must add your enterprise applications (or the groups tied to those apps) to a catalog before you can build access packages that users can request. Creating the catalog first enables you to place only the required resources in scope and to delegate day-to-day ownership: “catalog owners can manage the resources and access packages within their catalog without being tenant-wide admins,” satisfying the delegation requirement to use custom catalogs and least privilege. After the catalog exists, you create one or more access packages that include the application (or groups) and policies that control who can request, how they are approved, and for how long. Identity Governance then lets you track access package assignments and review who has the app over time. By contrast, programs are used to group and report on governance initiatives (for example, collections of access reviews) rather than to onboard application resources; and modifying user/admin consent settings affects app consent behavior, not the lifecycle tracking of assignments. Therefore, the correct first step to track application access assignments while meeting the delegation requirements is to create a catalog.

SC-300 materials stress that to enforce modern controls (like MFA) on on-premises apps, you must front them with Azure AD so Conditional Access can evaluate sign-ins. The documentation states that Azure AD Application Proxy “provides secure remote access to on-premises applications” and that apps published through it can have “Conditional Access policies, including multifactor authentication” applied at sign-in. In other words, once the legacy app is published by Application Proxy, Azure AD sits in the path, enabling you to meet the requirement to enforce MFA when accessing on-premises applications and to combine it with your location-based exemptions.

For SharePoint Online restrictions, SC-300 points to Microsoft Cloud App Security (Defender for Cloud Apps) for real-time governance: you can create session policies that “control and limit activities in real time” and, for SharePoint Online and other Microsoft 365 apps, “monitor user sessions and block download, cut, copy, and print” when conditions (device state, risk, or location) warrant it. Since the scenario already has anomaly detections enabled, configuring Cloud App Security policies aligns directly with the requirement to place access restrictions on SharePoint Online without altering tenant-wide consent settings. Thus, publish on-prem apps with Application Proxy to bring them under Conditional Access (for MFA), and use Cloud App Security policies to enforce SharePoint Online session and download controls.

In the SC-300 coverage of Azure AD Connect and Identity Governance, Microsoft explains that to surface a custom on-premises attribute in Azure AD you must enable Directory extensions in Azure AD Connect. The guide states that “Directory extensions lets you synchronize additional attributes from on-premises Active Directory to Azure AD so they are available in the cloud directory for apps and policy.” This is the supported way to bring a custom attribute (here, LWLicenses) from the litware.com forest into Azure AD so it can be referenced by cloud features such as dynamic group rules. Domain filtering or optional features do not expose a new attribute to Azure AD; directory extensions does.

For license automation, the SC-300 materials on group-based licensing and dynamic groups emphasize that “licenses can be assigned to Azure AD groups; group members then inherit the licenses, and when membership changes, licenses are added or removed automatically.” They further note that “dynamic user groups evaluate rules against user attributes to add or remove users without manual effort,” and that “nested groups are not supported for license inheritance—only direct members receive licenses.” Using the synced LWLicenses attribute in a Dynamic User group rule (for example, user.extensionAttribute… -eq "E5") ensures users are automatically added to the correct group and therefore receive the specified licenses without administrative intervention, fully meeting Litware’s requirement to “manage the assignment of Azure AD licenses by modifying the value of the LWLicenses attribute.”

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn modules “Implement and manage Azure AD roles” and “Implement Privileged Identity Management (PIM)”, there is a clear distinction between Azure AD built-in roles and Azure (resource-based) built-in roles.

Azure AD built-in roles govern directory-level access — such as managing users, groups, enterprise apps, or security settings in Azure Active Directory (Entra ID).The Privileged Role Administrator role allows the user to manage role assignments for directory roles in Azure AD, including activating roles through PIM.The Global Administrator also has this capability, but the Privileged Role Administrator is the least privilege role that meets the delegation requirement — aligning with the principle of least privilege stated in the scenario.As the documentation notes:

“Privileged Role Administrator manages role assignments in Azure AD, including the ability to activate and assign roles through Azure AD Privileged Identity Management.”

Azure built-in roles, on the other hand, are used to control access at the Azure resource level — for subscriptions, resource groups, and individual resources.The role responsible for managing these assignments is the User Access Administrator.This role can grant or revoke access to Azure resources by managing role assignments within Azure RBAC (Role-Based Access Control).The Microsoft documentation states:

“User Access Administrator allows management of user access to Azure resources. It can assign roles in Azure RBAC for resources, subscriptions, and management groups.”

Therefore:

✅ To manage Azure AD built-in role assignments → Privileged role administrator

✅ To manage Azure built-in role assignments → User access administrator

This approach satisfies the delegation requirement mentioned in the scenario by assigning the least-privileged roles necessary for each type of role management task.

Server1

On DC1

Azure AD Password Protection has two components: the DC agent (installed on domain controllers) and the proxy service (installed on one or more member servers). The SC-300 materials and Microsoft Identity Governance guidance explain that the proxy service is required when domain controllers do not have direct internet access. The proxy retrieves the password protection policy and custom banned password list from Azure AD over outbound HTTPS and makes it available to DC agents. The documentation further states that you should deploy at least one proxy per forest and two for high availability, and that domain controllers do not need internet connectivity when a proxy is deployed. In this scenario, DCs are explicitly blocked from internet access, so the proxy must be placed on member servers. Both SERVER1 (Application Proxy connector) and SERVER2 (Azure AD Connect) are domain-joined member servers with internet connectivity and are appropriate locations for the AzureADPasswordProtectionProxy service; selecting both provides the recommended redundancy. The custom banned password list is configured in Azure AD at the tenant level (as part of Azure AD Password Protection settings), not on individual servers. Once configured, the policy and list are downloaded by the proxy and enforced by the DC agent during password set or change operations, satisfying the requirement to implement a banned password list for the litware.com forest.

In Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM) for Azure AD roles, the exam materials describe that you tailor how a role (for example, User administrator) is used by editing its Role settings. These settings control activation behavior, including require multi-factor authentication, justification, approval, assignment/activation durations, and notifications. The guide states that administrators can “configure activation requirements and time-bound eligibility on a per-role basis” and “enforce approval workflows and MFA at activation.” Access reviews are used to periodically verify who still needs a role, but they do not implement the operational changes to how the role is activated. Active assignments simply shows and changes who currently holds active/eligible assignments; it does not set policy for the role’s activation behavior. Administrative units scope certain directory tasks, but they are not how you change PIM activation/approval/MFA requirements. Therefore, to meet planned changes for the User administrator role (such as least privilege activation with approval, justification, and MFA), you update PIM → Azure AD roles → User administrator → Role settings. This aligns with the SC-300 objective to “configure PIM settings and policies for Azure AD roles,” ensuring governance by policy rather than ad-hoc assignment.

To meet auditing and monitoring requirements, Azure AD must send sign-in logs and audit logs to an external location such as a Log Analytics workspace, Azure Storage account, or Event Hub. This is configured using Diagnostics settings in Azure AD.

According to Microsoft documentation in “Monitor Azure Active Directory activity logs in Azure Monitor” and the SC-300 learning objective “Implement and monitor identity governance”, you must enable diagnostic settings to stream directory logs to a Log Analytics workspace.

The scenario specifies:

“You create a Log Analytics workspace. You need to implement the technical requirements for auditing.”

By configuring Azure AD’s Diagnostics settings, you can:

Send Sign-in logs, Audit logs, and Provisioning logs to Log Analytics.

Correlate identity events with security insights in Azure Sentinel or Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps.

Microsoft documentation confirms:

“To collect and analyze Azure AD sign-in and audit data, configure diagnostic settings to send logs to Log Analytics.”

Other options do not meet the requirement:

A. Company branding: Only affects login pages, not logging or auditing.

C. External Identities: Controls guest access, not logging.

D. App registrations: Used for app integration, not auditing.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Implement and manage synchronization with Microsoft Entra Connect”, when Microsoft Entra Connect synchronizes user objects between on-premises Active Directory (AD) and Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD), each user must have unique proxyAddresses attributes across the directory.

The proxyAddresses attribute represents all the email aliases (SMTP addresses) associated with a user. The synchronization process verifies these values to ensure they are not duplicated among multiple user objects. If two or more objects in AD share the same SMTP address, the synchronization process generates an error, typically reported as a “Duplicate Attribute” conflict.

In the provided scenario:

User1 (proxyAddresses: user1@contoso.com, sales@contoso.com)

User2 (proxyAddresses: user2@contoso.com, user.2@contoso.com, service@contoso.com)

User3 (proxyAddresses: user3@contoso.com, sales@contoso.com)

After updating the proxy addresses:

User1 → admin@contoso.com

User2 → sales@contoso.com

Because sales@contoso.com is now used by both User2 and User3, the sync process detects a duplicate SMTP address. This causes synchronization errors for User2 and User1 if any other duplicates exist.

User3, with unique attributes, synchronizes successfully.

The SC-300 reference under “Manage synchronization errors using Microsoft Entra Connect Health” confirms:

“If two or more objects contain the same value for attributes marked as unique (such as proxyAddresses or userPrincipalName), Microsoft Entra Connect synchronization fails for those objects until the conflict is resolved.”

When an application running on an Azure VM needs to authenticate using its system-assigned managed identity, it must request a token from the Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS). This service is accessible via a non-routable IP address — 169.254.169.254.

The correct request URI pattern is:

This IP is used exclusively by Azure VMs to securely obtain tokens for managed identities without requiring credentials in the code.

Microsoft’s documentation specifies:

“Applications running on Azure resources can request tokens from the Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) endpoint at 169.254.169.254.”

Other options:

127.0.0.1 — loopback address (not used for IMDS)

108.143.161.25 — external public IP (irrelevant)

172.16.1.5 — private VM IP, not used for token requests

< User1 can join four additional Windows 10 devices to Azure AD. → No

2️⃣ Admin1 can set “Devices to be Azure AD joined or Azure AD registered require Multi-Factor Authentication” to Yes. → Yes

3️⃣ Admin2 is a local administrator on Device3. → No

This scenario draws from Module: Manage device identities in Azure Active Directory in the Microsoft SC-300 Official Study Guide and Microsoft Learn content.

In the Device Settings, the “Maximum number of devices per user” is configured as 5. User1 already has one Azure AD joined device (Device1) and three Azure AD registered devices (Device2, Device3, Device4). Since both Azure AD joined and Azure AD registered devices count toward the same limit, User1 has already registered 4 devices. This means they can add only one more, not four additional Windows 10 devices. Therefore, the statement is No.

Microsoft documentation states: “The maximum number of devices per user setting applies collectively to all Azure AD-joined and Azure AD-registered devices.”

The Cloud Device Administrator role (Admin1’s role) has the delegated permissions to manage device settings in Azure AD, including enforcing MFA requirements for device registration and join operations. The role allows management of the Azure AD device configuration blade, including toggling settings like MFA for join/register, join limits, and device ownership policies. Therefore, Admin1 can enable the MFA requirement for device join/registration.

As per Microsoft Learn: “Cloud Device Administrator can manage all aspects of device settings, including device join and registration MFA requirements.”

Admin2 holds the Device Administrator role. However, per Microsoft’s documentation, only Azure AD–joined Windows 10 devices grant local administrator rights to users in the Device Administrator role. Azure AD–registered devices (such as Device3) are personal devices that do not have local administrator assignment through Azure AD roles. Since Device3 is Azure AD registered, not joined, Admin2 is not a local admin on it.

Microsoft guidance clarifies: “Users assigned to the Device Administrator role are added as local administrators only on Azure AD–joined devices, not on Azure AD–registered or hybrid devices.”

When enabling Microsoft Entra (Azure AD) login for a virtual machine, you must assign a managed identity so that the VM can authenticate to Azure AD and access other Azure resources securely without storing credentials.

Between the two types of managed identities—system-assigned and user-assigned—the system-assigned identity is the most appropriate when the identity is unique to the VM and should be automatically managed by Azure.

Once you enable a system-assigned managed identity, Azure creates an identity tied directly to the VM’s lifecycle. It allows the VM to request tokens from Microsoft Entra ID and access resources within Sub1 under the permissions granted through RBAC.

From Microsoft documentation:

“To enable Microsoft Entra login for your VM, the VM must have a system-assigned managed identity that is granted access to Azure resources.”

Comprehensive and Detailed In-Depth Explanation:

Let’s break this down step by step based on Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps (MDCA)integration with third-party web gateways, as outlined in Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator documentation.

Understanding the Scenario and Requirements:

Microsoft 365 E5 subscription:This subscription includes Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps, which provides the necessary licensing for integrating with third-party web gateways.

Third-party web gateway named Gateway1:A web gateway (e.g., a Secure Web Gateway like Zscaler, Netskope, or Symantec) is deployed to manage and secure internet traffic. The question does not specify the vendor, but the process for integration with MDCA is generally the same for supported gateways.

Requirement:Integrate Gateway1 with Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps to ensure that data (e.g., traffic logs, events) flows automatically to MDCA for analysis, visibility, and policy enforcement. The solution must also minimize administrative effort.

Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps supports integration with third-party web gateways to provide visibility into cloud app usage, detect shadow IT, and enforce security policies. This integration typically involves collecting logs from the gateway for analysis in MDCA.

How Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps Integrates with Third-Party Web Gateways:

MDCA can integrate with third-party web gateways by collecting logs that contain traffic data (e.g., user activity, app usage, IP addresses). This allows MDCA to analyze the data and provide insights into cloud app usage, detect threats, and enforce policies.

The primary method for integrating a third-party web gateway with MDCA is toadd a log collector. This involves:

Configuring the web gateway to send logs to a log collector (e.g., via Syslog or FTP).

Setting up a log collector in MDCA to receive and process these logs.

Once configured, the log collector automatically pulls logs from the web gateway, ensuring that data flows to MDCA for analysis.

This method supports automatic data flow and minimizes administrative effort because, after the initial setup, the log collection process runs continuously without manual intervention.

Analyzing the Options:

A. Add a data source:

In Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps, "data sources" typically refer to sources of user activity data, such as Microsoft Entra ID audit logs, Microsoft 365 audit logs, or other Microsoft services. Adding a data source in MDCA is used to import user activity data for correlation with cloud app usage, but it is not the mechanism for integrating a third-party web gateway.

Third-party web gateways are not considered "data sources" in MDCA; instead, they are integrated via log collectors.

Conclusion:This option is incorrect because adding a data source does not facilitate integration with a third-party web gateway like Gateway1.

B. Create an app registration:

Creating an app registration in Microsoft Entra ID is typically used to integrate cloud apps with MDCA for session control (e.g., via Conditional Access App Control) or to enable API-based logcollection for supported apps (e.g., Salesforce, Box).

However, a third-party web gateway like Gateway1 is not a cloud app that requires an app registration. Web gateways are network appliances or services that manage traffic, and their integration with MDCA involves log collection, not app registration.

Conclusion:This option is incorrect because creating an app registration is not relevant to integrating a web gateway with MDCA.

C. Create a snapshot report:

A snapshot report in MDCA is a manual process where an administrator uploads a log file (e.g., a CSV or JSON file) from a third-party service to analyze cloud app usage. This is a one-time, manual process used for discovery (e.g., to identify shadow IT).

The requirement specifies that data must flow "automatically" to Defender for Cloud Apps, and a snapshot report does not meet this requirement because it requires manual uploads each time. It also does not minimize administrative effort due to the ongoing manual intervention.

Conclusion:This option is incorrect because creating a snapshot report does not enable automatic data flow and increases administrative effort.

D. Add a log collector:

Adding a log collector in Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps is the standard method for integrating third-party web gateways. MDCA supports log collection from many web gateways (e.g., Zscaler, Netskope, Symantec) via Syslog or FTP.

Process:

In the Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps portal, navigate toSettings > Log collectors.

Add a new log collector, specifying the protocol (e.g., Syslog over TCP/UDP or FTP) and the details of the web gateway (e.g., IP address, port).

Configure Gateway1 to send logs to the log collector (this step is done on the Gateway1 side, typically by the network team).

Once set up, the log collector automatically collects logs from Gateway1 and processes them in MDCA for analysis.

Automatic Data Flow:The log collector ensures that data flows automatically to MDCA, meeting the first requirement.

Minimize Administrative Effort:After the initial setup, the log collector runs continuously without manual intervention, minimizing administrative effort.

Conclusion:This option is correct because adding a log collector is the first step to integrate Gateway1 with MDCA, ensuring automatic data flow and minimizing administrative effort.

Why "Add a log collector" is the First Step:

The question asks for the first step to integrate Gateway1 with Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. Adding a log collector is the initial action in MDCA to enable log collection from a third-party web gateway.

Subsequent steps (not asked in the question) would include configuring Gateway1 to send logs to the log collector, but this is done outside MDCA (e.g., in Gateway1’s management console). The question focuses on the action in MDCA, making "Add a log collector" the correct first step.

Additional Considerations:

The question does not specify the vendor of Gateway1, but Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps supports log collection from many third-party web gateways (e.g., Zscaler, Netskope, Symantec, Cisco Umbrella). The process is the same regardless of the vendor, as long as the gateway supports Syslog or FTP log export.

If Gateway1 were not a supported web gateway, additional steps (e.g., custom log parsing) might be required, but the question implies Gateway1 can be integrated using standard methods.

The Microsoft 365 E5 subscription includes Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps, so no additional licensing is required.

Conclusion:To integrate Gateway1 with Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps, ensuring that data flows automatically and minimizing administrative effort, the first step is toadd a log collectorin MDCA. This sets up the infrastructure to receive logs from Gateway1, enabling automatic data flow for analysis. Therefore, the correct answer isD.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn documentation on Azure AD group assignments for enterprise applications, only specific group types in Azure AD can be assigned to enterprise applications (service principals).

Azure AD allows group-based assignment for enterprise applications only when the group is a Security group or a Mail-enabled security group. This is because Azure AD uses security groups for authorization purposes.

Let’s analyze the groups from the table:

Group

Type

Assignable to App1?

Reason

Group1

Security

✅ Yes

Security groups are used for managing access permissions and can be assigned to apps.

Group2

Distribution

❌ No

Distribution groups are used for email distribution lists and cannot be used for access management.

Group3

Microsoft 365

❌ No

Microsoft 365 (formerly Office 365) groups manage collaboration resources like Teams and SharePoint but are not supported for enterprise app assignments.

Group4

Mail-enabled security

✅ Yes

Mail-enabled security groups combine mailing capabilities with security functionality and can be used to assign permissions to applications.

The Microsoft documentation states:

“You can assign access to enterprise applications in Azure AD to users, security groups, and mail-enabled security groups. Distribution lists and Microsoft 365 groups are not supported for app assignments.”

Thus, for App1, which is an enterprise application, you can assign only Group1 (Security) and Group4 (Mail-enabled Security).

The Conditional Access What If tool is designed to simulate sign-ins under various conditions to test Conditional Access policies without performing real sign-ins. Microsoft’s SC-300 guide specifies that this tool is essential for validating the effect of a policy based on user, location, device, or risk level.

In this case, the administrator wants to test a policy that blocks access when a high-severity sign-in alert (sign-in risk) occurs and when a user signs in from another country. These scenarios are based on risk and location conditions—both supported in the What If tool simulation.

Microsoft Learn: “Use the What If tool to simulate sign-ins and verify whether a specific Conditional Access policy will be applied.”

According to the official Microsoft SC-300 Study Guide and Microsoft Entra Permissions Management documentation, onboarding Microsoft Entra Permissions Management (formerly CloudKnox) involves two key setup tasks:

Configuring Data Collection – After purchasing the license, you must connect your Azure subscription(s) to Permissions Management so it can inventory identities, roles, and permissions. This is done from the Microsoft Entra Permissions Management portal, where you enable data collection for each connected cloud environment (Azure, AWS, GCP). This process deploys the required collector identity (service principal) and defines the scope for data gathering.

Creating Role Assignments – Permissions Management requires proper authorization to read role assignments, permissions, and activity data. You must create a role assignment at the subscription level (Sub1) using a least-privilege role (for example, Reader or CloudKnox Service Principal Role) for the Permissions Management application service principal. This ensures it can scan Azure resources for permission analysis.

Microsoft documentation confirms:

“To onboard Azure subscriptions, assign the CloudKnox service principal a Reader role on each subscription, and configure data collection from within Microsoft Entra Permissions Management.”

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) Study Guide and official Microsoft Learn documentation (“Onboard Azure subscriptions to Microsoft Entra Permissions Management”), onboarding an Azure subscription to Microsoft Entra Permissions Management (EPM) requires a combination of Azure RBAC and Entra role permissions.

At the subscription level, the person onboarding must be able to grant the Permissions Management service principal access to the subscription. This requires “Microsoft.Authorization/*/Write” permissions, which are included in the User Access Administrator and Owner roles.

However, applying the principle of least privilege, Microsoft recommends User Access Administrator rather than Owner because the Owner role includes full management rights to all resources, which exceeds what’s needed for onboarding. The User Access Administrator role allows assigning roles and permissions but not managing resource content.

“Assign the User Access Administrator role at the subscription level to grant permissions needed to onboard into Permissions Management while following least-privilege principles.”

(Reference: SC-300 Exam Guide, Module “Implement and manage Microsoft Entra Permissions Management.”)

At the tenant level, onboarding actions (such as connecting the subscription, managing connectors, and configuring data ingestion) require a directory role that grants access to EPM features. Microsoft documentation specifies that the Permissions Management Administrator role provides this exact access.

“The Permissions Management Administrator role is required in the Entra tenant to configure connectors and manage onboarded cloud environments.”

The Global Administrator or Security Administrator could perform this task but would violate the least-privilege requirement since their permissions are far broader.

Scope

Role

Explanation

Sub1

User Access Administrator

Allows assigning required permissions to onboard subscription

Tenant

Permissions Management Administrator

Provides the necessary rights to onboard and manage Permissions Management

Identities with Owner role: Managed1, Managed2, VM1, and VM2 only

Virtual machines assigned to Managed2: VM2 and VM4 only

In Azure RBAC, role assignments can be made to Azure AD security principals, including managed identities (user-assigned and system-assigned). The SC-300 learning path on Identity Governance and Privileged Access, and the Exam Ref coverage of Azure RBAC, explain that a system-assigned managed identity is a service principal tied to a single resource, and you can assign RBAC at any scope (subscription, resource group, or resource) to that identity. A user-assigned managed identity is an independent Azure resource with its own service principal; it can also be granted roles at the resource group scope. Therefore, the assignable principals for RG1 include the two user-assigned identities (Managed1, Managed2) and the two VMs that have system-assigned identities (VM1, VM2). VM3 does not present a system-assigned identity; its access is represented by Managed1.

For attaching a user-assigned identity to a virtual machine, SC-300 materials note that the identity and the target resource must be in the same region (often phrased as “user-assigned identities are regional; the identity and the resource must share a region”). Since Managed2 is in West US, it can be associated only with West US VMs—here, VM2 and VM4.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn content under “Manage Azure AD tenants and configure tenant properties”, self-service sign-up (also known as viral sign-up) allows users to create accounts in an existing Azure AD tenant using an email domain associated with that tenant. This feature lets external or ungoverned users create identities if it is not explicitly disabled, which can cause unauthorized account creation in the organization’s namespace.

To stop users from performing self-service sign-ups using the organization’s verified domain (e.g., contoso.com), administrators must disable the AllowEmailVerifiedUsers setting in Azure Active Directory using PowerShell. This configuration change prevents users from automatically creating accounts with the organization’s domain when registering for Microsoft 365 or other Azure services.

The cmdlet used to configure tenant-level settings like this is Set-MsolCompanySettings from the MSOnline module.

The specific PowerShell command would be:

Set-MsolCompanySettings -AllowEmailVerifiedUsers $false

This command disables self-service sign-up for email-verified users, ensuring that only administrators can create accounts in the tenant.

Other cmdlets in the options serve different purposes:

Set-MsolDomainFederationSettings – Used for configuring federation settings for a domain.

Update-MsolFederatedDomain – Used to update or repair federation trust settings.

Set-MsolDomain – Used to configure domain-specific properties (e.g., authentication type).

As per Microsoft’s official documentation:

“To prevent users from self-service sign-up using your organization’s verified domain, set AllowEmailVerifiedUsers to $false using Set-MsolCompanySettings.”

< User1 syncs to the Microsoft Entra tenant: Yes

 User2 syncs to the Microsoft Entra tenant: No

 Group2 syncs to the Microsoft Entra tenant: Yes

The SC-300 Exam Ref and official Microsoft Learn module “Plan and implement user provisioning” confirm that automatic user provisioning between Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) and external SaaS applications uses the System for Cross-domain Identity Management (SCIM) 2.0 protocol.

SCIM 2.0 is an open standard that simplifies identity lifecycle management — enabling automatic creation, update, and removal of user accounts within connected SaaS applications. When a SaaS app supports SCIM 2.0, Entra ID can automatically synchronize user identities and attributes based on defined mappings.

Other protocols listed, such as WS-Fed, LDAP, or OAuth 2.0, serve different purposes — authentication and directory access rather than provisioning. WS-Fed is used for federated authentication; LDAP provides directory querying; OAuth 2.0 handles delegated authorization for resource access.

Thus, any enterprise SaaS app that supports automatic provisioning from Entra ID must implement SCIM 2.0 as per Microsoft’s integration requirements.

Microsoft Entra Permissions Management (formerly CloudKnox) integrates with Azure subscriptions via a service principal that must read and write role assignments to analyze and right-size permissions. The User Access Administrator role provides this ability without full ownership privileges.

The SC-300 guide explicitly notes that to allow automatic monitoring and remediation of permissions, “the Permissions Management service principal must have the User Access Administrator role on the target subscription or management group to modify and create RBAC assignments.”

Reader (A) and Contributor (B) roles cannot manage RBAC permissions, while Owner (C) grants unnecessary broad control, violating the principle of least privilege.

When users accept or decline a Terms of Use (ToU) in Azure AD, these actions are recorded in the audit logs. The Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator documentation specifies that audit logs capture “Terms of use acceptance records” including who accepted, who declined, timestamp, and version of the ToU accepted.

The other options are incorrect because:

Provisioning logs capture provisioning events (not ToU).

Usage and Insights reports provide activity metrics, not compliance actions.

Sign-in logs capture authentication activity but not ToU acceptance.

Therefore, to identify which users accepted or declined Terms1, you should use the Audit logs in Azure AD.

Privileged Identity Management (PIM) for groups in Microsoft Entra ID can only be applied to eligible assignment groups, specifically security groups and Microsoft 365 groups that have a membership type of Assigned. According to Microsoft documentation (“Manage Privileged Access Groups in PIM”), only assigned groups can be enabled for PIM. Dynamic groups are not supported for PIM because their memberships are automatically managed based on rules, and PIM requires manual activation and approval for eligible roles or memberships.

From the official study guide and Microsoft Learn module “Implement Privileged Identity Management (PIM) for Groups”:

“Only groups with an Assigned membership type can be managed in Privileged Identity Management. Dynamic membership groups cannot be enabled for privileged access.”

Therefore, among the listed groups:

Group1 (Security, Assigned) → Supported

Group2 (Security, Dynamic) → Not supported

Group3 (Microsoft 365, Assigned) → Supported

Group4 (Microsoft 365, Dynamic) → Not supported

✅ Correct Answer: C. Group1 and Group3 only

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn – “Manage Microsoft 365 Groups naming policies” documentation, group naming policies in Azure Active Directory (now Microsoft Entra ID) apply to end users who create Microsoft 365 groups, but do not apply to administrators who have roles that allow them to override naming restrictions.

The policy defines conventions such as prefixes, suffixes, blocked words, and enforced naming rules. However, certain administrative roles are exempt from this policy to allow organizational management and automation processes. The exempt roles are:

Global Administrator

User Administrator

These two roles can create Microsoft 365 groups without the naming policy constraints. Other users — including Groups Administrator and users without administrative roles — are subject to the naming policy when creating groups.

From the official documentation:

“Naming policies apply to all users who create groups, except for global administrators and user administrators. These roles can create groups that bypass the naming policy restrictions.”

Applying this rule:

User1 (Global Administrator) — exempt

User2 (User Administrator) — exempt

User3 (Groups Administrator) — affected by the policy

User4 (no role) — affected by the policy

To enforce a Terms of Use (ToU) prompt when users sign in, the SC-300 exam and Microsoft Learn materials specify configuring it under a Conditional Access policy. The ToU object must first be created in Microsoft Entra ID → Identity Governance → Terms of Use, then linked to a Conditional Access policy via Grant Controls → Require Terms of Use.

Access packages and lifecycle workflows (A, C) handle identity lifecycle and provisioning, not authentication-time prompts. Authentication methods (D) manage how users sign in but not policy-based ToU enforcement.

To configure the account lockout settings so that accounts are locked out for five minutes after 10 failed sign-in attempts, you can follow these steps:

Open the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Sign in with an account that has the Security Administrator or Global Administrator role.

Navigate to the lockout settings:

Go to Security > Authentication methods > Password protection.

Adjust the Smart Lockout settings:

Set the Lockout threshold to 10 failed sign-in attempts.

Set the Lockout duration (in minutes) to 5.

Please note that by default, smart lockout locks an account from sign-in after 10 failed attempts in Azure Public and Microsoft Azure operated by 21Vianet tenants1. The lockout period is one minute at first, and longer in subsequent attempts.However, you can customize these settings tomeet your organization’s requirements if you have Microsoft Entra ID P1 or higher licenses for your users1.

To ensure that users in the Sg-Operations group see a tab named “Operations” containing only LinkedIn and Box applications in the My Apps portal, you can create a collection with these specific applications. Here’s how to do it:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Make sure you have one of the following roles: Global Administrator, Cloud Application Administrator, Application Administrator, or owner of the service principal.

Navigate to App launchers:

Go to Identity > Applications > Enterprise applications.

Under Manage, select App launchers.

Create a new collection:

Click on New collection.

Enter “Operations” as the Name for the collection.

Provide a Description if necessary.

Add applications to the collection:

Select the Applications tab within the new collection.

Click on + Add application.

Search for and select LinkedIn and Box applications.

Click Add to include them in the collection.

Assign the collection to the Sg-Operations group:

Select the Users and groups tab.

Click on + Add users and groups.

Search for and select the Sg-Operations group.

Click Select to assign the collection to the group.

Review and create the collection:

Select Review + Create to check the configuration.

If everything is correct, click Create to finalize the collection.

By following these steps, when users in the Sg-Operations group visit the My Apps portal, they will see a new tab named “Operations” that contains only the LinkedIn and Box applications1.

Please note that to create collections on the My Apps portal, you need a Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 license1.

To deploy Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for only the members of the Sg-Finance group, excluding Debra Berger, and without using a Conditional Access policy, you can follow these steps:

Open the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Sign in as a Security Administrator or Global Administrator.

Navigate to MFA settings:

Go to Users > Active users.

On the Active users page, select Multi-factor authentication.

Manage user settings:

Find and select the Sg-Finance group.

Enable MFA for this group by setting the requirement status to Enabled.

Exclude a user from MFA:

In the Multi-factor authentication page, search for Debra Berger.

Set her MFA status to Disabled to exclude her from MFA registration.

Verify the configuration:

Ensure that all members of the Sg-Finance group have MFA enabled except for Debra Berger.

Communicate the change:

Inform the Sg-Finance group members about the MFA requirement and provide instructions on how to register for MFA.

Monitor the setup:

Check the sign-in logs to confirm that MFA is being prompted for the Sg-Finance group members and not for Debra Berger.

To assign a Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 license to the Sg-Retail group, you can follow these steps:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Make sure you have the role of Global Administrator or License Administrator.

Navigate to the licensing page:

Go toBilling>Licenses1.

Find the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 license:

Look for the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 license in the list of available products.

Assign licenses to the group:

Select the license and then choose Assign licenses.

Search for and select the Sg-Retail group.

Confirm the assignment and make sure that the correct number of licenses is available for the group.

Review and confirm the assignment:

Ensure that the licenses have been properly assigned to the Sg-Retail group without affecting other groups or users.

Monitor the license status:

Check the license usage and status to ensure that the Sg-Retail group members can utilize the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 features.

By following these steps, the Sg-Retail group should now have the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 licenses assigned to them.

To add the LinkedIn application as a resource to the Sales and Marketing access package without removing any other resources, you can follow these steps:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Ensure you have the role of Global Administrator or Identity Governance Administrator.

Navigate to Entitlement Management:

Go to Identity governance > Entitlement management > Access packages1.

Select the Sales and Marketing access package:

Find and select the Sales and Marketing access package to modify it.

Add a new resource:

Within the access package details, select Resources.

Click on + Add resource.

Search for and select the LinkedIn application from the list of available resources.

Configure the resource role:

Assign the appropriate role for the LinkedIn application that users in the Sales and Marketing access package will have.

Review and update the access package:

Ensure that the LinkedIn application has been added as a resource.

Confirm that no other resources have been removed from the access package.

Save the changes:

After reviewing, save the changes to the access package.

Communicate the update:

Notify the relevant users about the addition of the LinkedIn application to their access package.

By following these steps, you will successfully add the LinkedIn application to the Sales and Marketing access package without affecting the other resources.

To ensure that all users can consent to apps that require permission to read their user profile and prevent them from consenting to apps that require any other permissions, you can configure the user consent settings in the Microsoft Entra admin center. Here’s how you can do it:

Sign in as a Global Administrator:

Access the Microsoft Entra admin center with Global Administrator privileges.

Navigate to user consent settings:

Go toIdentity>Applications>Enterprise applications>Consent and permissions>User consent settings1.

Configure the consent settings:

Under User consent for applications, select the option that allows users to consent to apps that only require permission to read their user profile.

Ensure that all other permissions are set to require administrator consent, thus preventing users from consenting to apps that require additional permissions1.

Save the settings:

After configuring the consent settings, select Save to apply the changes.

By following these steps, you will have configured the system to allow user consent for apps that need to read the user profile while blocking consent for apps that require additional permissions. This setup helps maintain user autonomy where appropriate while safeguarding against unauthorized access to broader permissions.

To create a group named “Audit” and ensure that its members can activate the Security Reader role, follow these steps:

Open the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Sign in with an account that has the Security Administrator or Global Administrator role.

Navigate to Groups:

Go toTeams & groups>Active teams and groups1.

Create the security group:

Select Add a security group.

On the Set up the basics page, enter “Audit” as the group name.

Add a description if necessary and chooseNext1.

Edit settings:

On theEdit settingspage, select whether you want Microsoft Entra roles to be assignable to this group and selectNext1.

Assign roles:

After creating the group, go to Roles > All roles.

Find and select the Security Reader role.

Under Assignments, choose Assign.

Select the “Audit” group to assign the role to its members2.

Review and finish:

Review the settings to ensure the “Audit” group is created with the ability for its members to activate the Security Reader role.

Finish the setup and save the changes.

By following these steps, you will have created the “Audit” group and enabled its members to activate the Security Reader role, which allows them to view security-related information without having permissions to change it. Remember to communicate the new group and role assignment to the relevant stakeholders in your organization.

To implement additional security checks for the Sg-Executive group members before they canaccess any company apps, you can use Conditional Access policies in Microsoft Entra. Here’s a step-by-step guide:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Ensure you have the role of Global Administrator or Security Administrator.

Navigate to Conditional Access:

Go to Security > Conditional Access.

Create a new policy:

Select + New policy.

Name the policy appropriately, such as “Sg-Executive Security Checks”.

Assign the policy to the Sg-Executive group:

Under Assignments, select Users and groups.

Choose Select users and groups and then Groups.

Search for and select the Sg-Executive group.

Define the application control conditions:

Under Cloud apps or actions, select All cloud apps to apply the policy to any company app.

Set the device compliance requirement:

Under Conditions > Device state, configure the policy to include devices marked as compliant by Microsoft Intune.

Set the app protection policy requirement:

Under Conditions > Client apps, configure the policy to include client apps that are protected by app protection policies.

Configure the access controls:

Under Access controls > Grant, select Grant access.

Choose Require device to be marked as compliant and Require approved client app.

Ensure that the option Require one of the selected controls is enabled.

Enable the policy:

Set Enable policy to On.

Review and save the policy:

Review all settings to ensure they meet the requirements.

Click Create to save and implement the policy.

By following these steps, you will ensure that the Sg-Executive group members can only access company apps if they meet one of the specified conditions, either by using a compliant device or a protected client app. This enhances the security posture of your organization by enforcing stricter access controls for executive-level users.

To implement a process for reviewing guest users’ access to the Salesforce app with the specified requirements, you can use Microsoft Entra’s Identity Governance access reviews feature. Here’s a step-by-step guide:

Assign the appropriate role:

Ensure you have one of the following roles: Global Administrator, User Administrator, or Identity Governance Administrator1.

Navigate to Identity Governance:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center.

Go toIdentity governance>Access reviews1.

Create a new access review:

Select New access review.

Choose the Salesforce app to review guest user access1.

Configure the review settings:

Set the frequency of the review to monthly.

Define thedurationof the review period to5 days1.

Determine the reviewers:

Assign the manager of each guest user as the reviewer.

If a guest user does not have a manager, assignMegan Bowenas the reviewer1.

Automate the removal process:

Configure settings toautomatically remove accessif the review is not completed within the specified time frame1.

Monitor and enforce compliance:

Regularly check the access review results to ensure compliance with the review policy1.

Communicate the process:

Inform all stakeholders about the new review process and provide guidance on how to complete the reviews.

By following these steps, you can ensure that guest users’ access to the Salesforce app is reviewed monthly, with managers being responsible for the review, and access is removed if the review is not completed in time.

To prevent all users from using legacy authentication protocols when authenticating to Microsoft Entra ID, you can create a Conditional Access policy that blocks legacy authentication. Here’s how to do it:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Ensure you have the role of Global Administrator or Conditional Access Administrator.

Navigate to Conditional Access:

Go to Security > Conditional Access.

Create a new policy:

Select + New policy.

Give your policy a name that reflects its purpose, like “Block Legacy Auth”.

Set users and groups:

Under Assignments, select Users or workload identities.

Under Include, select All users.

Under Exclude, select Users and groups and choose any accounts that must maintain the ability to use legacy authentication.It’s recommended to exclude at least one account to prevent lockout1.

Target resources:

Under Cloud apps or actions, select All cloud apps.

Set conditions:

Under Conditions > Client apps, set Configure to Yes.

Check only the boxes for Exchange ActiveSync clients and Other clients.

Configure access controls:

Under Access controls > Grant, select Block access.

Enable policy:

Confirm your settings and set Enable policy to Report-only initially to understand the impact.

After confirming the settings using report-only mode, you can move theEnable policytoggle fromReport-onlytoOn2.

By following these steps, you will block legacy authentication protocols for all users, enhancing the security posture of your organization by requiring modern authentication methods. Remember to monitor the impact of this policy and adjust as necessary to ensure business continuity.